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Abstract 
This thesis asked two research questions: 1) how are the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) 
and ClimateWise designed to achieve their objectives and 2) what explains the emergence of these 
unique initiatives? In answer to the first question, the thesis argues that the CDSB and ClimateWise 
adopt an “unconventional” approach to environmental co-regulation that embraces what I call 
“cognitive governance” within accounting (CDSB) and insurance (ClimateWise) markets. Many 
scholars describe environmental co-regulation as a voluntary agreement between transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) to enforce best 
practice standards that improve corporate environmental performance without the use of state 
authority. Cognitive governance employs a more unconventional approach to co-regulation by trying 
to embed financial knowledge that links a firm’s environmental performance to financial risks 
throughout the global economy vis-à-vis an expansion of state authority. More specifically, the CDSB 
and ClimateWise use best practice standards to leverage accounting and insurance knowledge in 
generating a technical and political consensus that supports expanding public regulation to govern 
financial risks related to climate change.  
In answer the second question, the thesis argues that this unconventional co-regulatory 
strategy adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise emerged in response to three factors. First, financial 
firms (in addition to corporate emitters in the case of the CDSB) had material interests in using public 
regulation to govern climate change risks. Second, these actors realized that collaboration was needed 
to generate a technical and political consensus among constituencies willing to support public 
regulation governing climate change risks. Third, ENGOs existed that had interests in using their 
technical expertise and political capacity to help generate this needed consensus through co-
regulation.  
 The thesis makes three contributions to the advancement of scholarly knowledge in the fields 
of international political economy (IPE) and global environmental politics (GEP). First, IPE and GEP 
scholars have have largely overlooked the emergence of environmental co-regulation in financial 
markets, and in particular, have yet to analyze the CDSB and ClimateWise. This study addresses this 
gap by revealing an effort to mobilize the accounting and insurance industry in strengthening global 
climate governance. Second, scholars have also tended to view co-regulation through a “post-
Westphalian” lens that sees co-regulation as designed to pre-empt or generate an alternative to public 
regulation. The CDSB and ClimateWise’s strategy, and the factors that explain the creation of these 
initiatives, challenge this perspective. Third, analysis of this strategy also contributes to emerging 
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Most debates on international financial governance ignore the powerful influence that financial 
markets have on the environment. Indeed, in the official debates concerning global financial 
regulatory reform in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the relationship between global 
financial regulation and the environment was completely ignored. Most international political 
economy (IPE) literature specializing in the politics of international financial regulation has tended to 
follow policymakers and has overlooked environmental issues as well.  
Scholars of global environmental politics (GEP) have also largely ignored the significance of 
international finance for the environment. But a small, emerging literature within GEP scholarship 
has begun to try to fill this gap by studying what Phillip Pattberg has identified as environmental “co-
regulation” between financial firms and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). 
Co-regulation refers to an agreement between profit and non-profit actors to design and implement 
regulation of a transnational or international problem. In most circumstances, environmental co-
regulation involves an agreement among TNCs to adopt voluntary best practice standards designed 
and monitored by ENGOs to improve corporate environmental performance. Scholars researching 
examples of environmental co-regulation in financial markets have focused on efforts between 
ENGOs and institutional investors to co-regulate through such initiatives as the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) and the Investor Network on Climate Risks (INCR)1 Each of these initiatives attempts 
to leverage the market power of institutional investors over the firms they invest in to adopt best 
practices in the disclosure of financial risks related to climate change.   
Although this emerging scholarship represents an important effort in studying the growing 
interface between financial markets and environmental issues, it has yet to analyze two new examples 
of co-regulation in this field which were both created in 2007: the Climate Disclosure Standards 
Board (CDSB) and ClimateWise. The CDSB and ClimateWise have targeted the internalization of the 
                                                     
1 This literature will be explored in more detail in section 1.3. Relevant literature that will be discussed includes 
See Pattberg, Private Institutions and Global Governance: The New Politics of Environmental Stability 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007); Michael MacLeod, “Private Governance and Climate Change: 
Institutional Investors and Emerging Investor-Driven Governance Mechanisms,” St Antony’s International 
Review 5, no. 2 (2010): 46-65; Michael Macleod and Jacob Park, “Financial Activism and Global Climate 
Change: The Rise of Investor-Driven Governance Networks,” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 2 (2011): 
54-74; Adam Harmes, “The Limits of Carbon Disclosure: Theorizing the Business Case for Investor 
Environmentalism,” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 2 (2011): 96-119. 
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financial risks associated with climate change as a significant “gap” in the way financial markets are 
governed. Both initiatives have designed voluntary best-practice standards that attempt to measure 
and price (or govern) climate change risks within international financial markets.2 But these 
initiatives depart from their predecessors by involving partnerships with the insurance and accounting 
sectors rather than with institutional investors. 
How are these new initiatives designed to achieve their objectives? And what explains 
their emergence? This thesis addresses these questions in order to build upon the new GEP literature 
examining environmental co-regulation in financial markets (and the finance-environment interface 
more broadly). The CDSB and ClimateWise are important initiatives to study not just because they 
represent a fascinating expansion of co-regulatory practices to accounting and insurance. These 
initiatives are also unique because of what they are designed to achieve.  
Many examples of environmental co-regulation are designed to provide an alternative to 
public regulation. Scholars debate the effectiveness of this approach with supporters arguing that co-
regulation is an effective alternative, while critics maintain that these efforts are really just examples 
of corporate “greenwashing” designed to generate reputational credibility to defend against ENGO 
protests and even regulatory intervention. These debates reveal a “post-Westphalian” assumption that 
co-regulation is designed to either replace or subvert public regulation. The CDSB and ClimateWise, 
however, stand outside this debate.3 These co-regulatory initiatives create private standards whose 
long-term goal includes the expansion of public authority in governing climate change risks.  
They pursue this goal through a strategy of what I call “cognitive governance”.4 This 
approach to co-regulation uses “best practice” standards to embed financial knowledge that links a 
firm’s environmental performance to financial risks throughout the global economy.5 To facilitate this 
objective, these standards target the generation of a technical and political consensus within and 
                                                     
2 The notation of “measuring and pricing climate change risks” will be used synonymously with “governing” or 
“internalizing” climate change risks throughout this thesis. Currently, financial risks associated with climate 
change are considered “externalities” that have yet to be priced into financial markets. As explained later in the 
thesis, the accountants and insurers involved in the CDSB and ClimateWise would like to see these risks 
internalized into these markets by measuring them in a firm’s corporate accounts, pricing them into premiums 
and deductibles, and more generally regulating that firms pay for their exposure or contribution to these risks. 
3 As noted later in the thesis, the INCR is another example, although somewhat less robust, of environmental 
co-regulation within the financial industry that targets the expansion of public regulation.  
4 It is important to note that cognitive governance is distinct from what IPE and GEP scholars identify as an 
“epistemic community”. See Chapter 2 (section 2.3.3). 
5 The term “best practice” is not intended to suggest that the CDSB or ClimateWise have developed the “best” 
approach to governing climate change risk. Rather, “best practice” is intended as a neutral term that simply 
refers to the voluntary standards each initiative believes at some point will facilitate best practice.  
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outside of accounting and insurance markets that supports the public regulation of financial risks 
related to climate change. To generate a technical consensus, these standards leverage financial 
knowledge to identify strategies and regulations that can improve market decision-making by 
governing climate change uncertainty as a financial risk. These standards then try to expand political 
support for embedding this technical consensus within public regulation. Like the CDP and INCR, the 
CDSB and ClimateWise target the governance of a specific type of corporate environmental 
performance, specifically exposure to financial risks created by uncertainty over the impacts of 
climate change. As noted in Table 1.1, financial risks relating to climate change can include a wide 
range of physical, regulatory, legal and reputational risks. 





Physical Risk Changing weather patterns resulting in stronger hurricanes, windstorms, drought, winter storms, coastal 
erosion, and, melting permafrost, are likely to create risks for various industries, specifically 
infrastructure intensive industry (transportation, energy, commercial, residential).  
Regulatory 
Risk 
As climate change impacts increase, regulators are more likely to regulate the emission of green house 
gases (GHG), increasing the cost of operations for GHG intensive areas of the economy. Risks 
associated with these regulations can emerge throughout a firm’s production process, supply-chain, and 
among various subsidiaries or equity holdings. 
Legal Risk Litigation against firms is likely to increase risk as shareholders and stakeholders sue over corporate 
mismanagement of climate change risks. 
Reputational 
Risk 
Higher expectations among shareholders, stakeholders and consumers vis-à-vis a firm’s policies 
towards climate change can create risks for corporate brand value. For some firms, this risk is related to 
the short-term impacts of changing perceptions within civil society about the private sector’s 
responsibility for climate change on corporate or brand reputation. For firms participating in financial 
markets, either as service providers or end-users, these risks are more “material” and related to the long-
term physical, regulatory and legal impacts of climate change on a firm or industry’s financial 
reputation within these markets.  
  
Supporters of the CDSB and ClimateWise hope that, once accounting and insurance markets 
incorporate knowledge that can measure and price these risks within their business practices, other 
firms will be forced to demonstrate that they have measured and priced these risks as conditions for 
accessing accounting and insurance services. Financial knowledge of the market value of climate 
change risks will then spread, they argue, throughout the economy and become embedded within 
existing cognitive expectations for rational economic behavior. In theory, the use of accounting and 
                                                     
6 This list was compiled based on research in the following documents:  Trucost, “Carbon Risks and 
Opportunities in the S&P 500” (Investor Responsibility Research Centre Institute for Corporate 
Responsibilities, June 2, 2009), http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/irrc_trucost_0906.pdf; Beth Young, Celine 
Suarez, and Kimberly Gladman, “Climate Risk Disclosure in SEC Filings: An Analysis of 10-K Reporting by 
Oil and Gas, Insurance, Coal, Transportation and Electric Power Companies” (Ceres and Environmental 
Defense Fund, June 2009). 
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insurance markets to shift these market expectations will create incentives for financial markets to 
begin rewarding economic behavior that supports mitigation and adaptation via greater access to 
capital and investment, while imposing costs on behavior exposed to these risks.  Firms using 
accounting services, for example, will be forced to measure their exposure to climate change risks 
within their accounts. Disclosure of these risks has the potential to create incentives for financial 
markets to reward firms that reduce their exposure to these risks by providing access to capital, and 
punish firms who contribute or are exposed to these risks through divestment. Insurance markets 
could create similar incentives if firms were forced to pay a “climate premium” that provides 
coverage for their contribution or exposure to insurance losses linked with climate change.  
To achieve these objectives, the strategy of “cognitive governance” involves a two-stage 
process governed by a “reflexive mechanism” designed to identify weaknesses and “ratchet-up” a 
firm’s capacity to improve its environmental performance, specifically the governance of climate 
change risks. The first stage involves the establishment of a technical consensus within accounting 
and insurance markets concerning the issue of how uncertainty around the impacts of climate change 
can be governed as a financial risk in ways that improve market efficiency. This “technical consensus 
building” stage attempts to generate consensual knowledge within the accounting and insurance 
industry on the regulations necessary to effectively govern climate change risks.  
The second stage attempts to spread this consensus among key constituencies to build support 
for the implementation of public regulations necessary for accountants and insurers to measure and 
price these risks throughout the global economy. For the accounting and insurance industry, climate 
change risks are generated by other firms that use their financial services. Without the implementation 
of public regulation, accountants and insurers could expose their markets to reputational and 
regulatory risk by imposing additional, and in some instances, costly conditions on firms and 
individuals that require the internalization of climate change risks. Before any public regulation can 
be implemented, it is important to build support for the initiative among the constituencies that will 
be affected.  These constituencies include various stakeholders involved in accounting and insurance 
markets such as: other accounting and insurance firms who have not joined the CDSB or 
ClimateWise, regulators, government policymakers, as well as corporate and individual users of each 
industry’s services. This “political consensus building” stage attempts to cultivate legitimacy among 
these politically important constituencies for expanding the use of public regulation in ways that 
allow accounting and insurance markets to measure and price climate change risks.   
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Both technical and political consensus building are governed by a “reflexive mechanism” that 
attempts to consistently audit and improve the efforts of participants as a means of cultivating support 
for internalizing climate change risks within accounting and insurance services. This process is a 
standard component of most co-regulative agreements where an ENGO (or another external auditor) 
acts as a third-party monitor to improve compliance among a group of industry actors with a set of 
voluntary best-practice standards. When used to support cognitive governance in financial markets, 
however, this reflexive mechanism is designed to improve compliance with a set of standards 
designed to cultivate a technical and political consensus that supports measuring and pricing climate 
change risks within accounting and insurance markets.  
While the co-regulation initiatives with institutional investors through the CDP and INCR 
incorporate aspects of cognitive governance into their approach to co-regulation, the CDSB and 
ClimateWise are more robust in trying to facilitate this strategy. The CDP, for example, engages in 
technical and political consensus building and employs a reflexive mechanism to improve the 
measurement and disclosure of climate change risks, but it does not explicitly seek an expansion of 
public regulation as a part of its mandate. The INCR is largely focused on political consensus 
building with corporate emitters and public actors by coordinating shareholder resolutions and 
lobbying for securities reform at the US domestic level, but it does not govern this process with a 
formal reflexive mechanism and it does not devote as much effort to technical consensus building. By 
comparison, the CDSB and ClimateWise are distinctive in their approach because they explicitly 
target the expansion of public regulation and they both use a robust form of cognitive governance that 
combines technical and political consensus building governed by a reflexive mechanism to achieve 
their objectives.  
It is important to quickly qualify the how the CDSB and ClimateWise are distinctive by 
supporting an expansion of public regulation. The CDP and INCR, in addition to other non-state 
initiatives in the global climate governance transnational space, do routinely support the “public 
governance” of the environment. For example, the CDP certainly speaks out in favor of emissions 
reductions regulations in the same way as ClimateWise. But the CDSB and ClimateWise (in addition 
to the INCR) formally ask participants to support an expansion of public regulation governing climate 
change risks as a part of each initiative’s mandate, whereas other voluntary initiatives like the CDP 
are more informal and indirect in their support for the use of public resources. From this perspective, 
the CDSB and ClimateWise build on an emerging trend among co-regulatory initiatives within 
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financial markets by formally recognizing that expanding state regulation should be a part of their 
mandate.  
What explains the emergence of this “unconventional” form of co-regulation? Many 
explanations for environmental co-regulation see it through the lens of a “post-Westphalian” 
perspective on world politics by identifying factors that shape TNCs and ENGOs preferences to 
support “governance beyond the state.” The growth of this “private” form of governance is often seen 
in structural terms as an emerging alternative to public authority in the context of economic 
globalization and neoliberal ideology.7 Others focus on incentives for transnational ENGOs to use co-
regulation as a “second best” alternative to public regulation.8 More radical scholars identify short-
term incentives for transnational corporate actors to initiate co-regulation as a strategy for generating 
reputational credibility in the face of ENGO protests and potential regulatory intervention.9  
These various post-Westphalian explanations of co-regulation are challenged by the cases of 
the CDSB and ClimateWise. To be sure, transnational non-state actors, specifically ENGOs, initiated 
the negotiations between the actors that formed each initiative. But these initiatives have each adopted 
an “unconventional” approach to co-regulation that attempts to empower rather than subvert or 
replace public regulation.10 
This thesis shows how three important factors supported the adoption of this unconventional 
form of co-regulation. First, financial firms (in addition to the corporate actors involved in the CDSB) 
realized that public regulation was required to advance their material interests in governing climate 
change uncertainty as a financial risk. Without public regulation, financial firms that try and impose 
additional conditions on accessing their services, such as measuring or pricing exposure to climate 
change risks, can be exposed to reputational and regulatory risks. Reputational risks are linked with 
the potential that the consumers or “end-users” of financial services, such as other firms and 
                                                     
7 Steven F. Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (Columbia University Press, 2001), 94; 
Robert Falkner, “Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links,” Global 
Environmental Politics 3, no. 2 (2003): 72-87, 74. 
8 John Ruggie, “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors and Practices,” European Journal of 
International Relations 10, no. 4 (2004): 499-531, 510; Pattberg, Private Institutions and Global Governance: 
The New Politics of Environmental Stability, 89; Peter Utting, “The Struggle for Corporate Accountability,” 
Development and Change 39, no. 6 (2008): 959 - 975, 965. 
9 David L. Levy and Peter J. Newell, “Business Strategy and International Environmental Governance,” Global 
Environmental Politics 2, no. 4 (2002): 84-100, 90; Harmes, “The Limits of Carbon Disclosure: Theorizing the 
Business Case for Investor Environmentalism”, 105. 
10 It is important to note that not all scholars see co-regulation through a “post-Westphalian” lens where it is 
designed to act as an alternative to public regulation. Some scholars, such as Peter Utting, suggest that non-state 
actors can engage in co-regulation as a strategy for strengthening public regulation  See Utting, “The Struggle 
for Corporate Accountability.” 
 
  7 
individuals, could turn to industry rivals as accountants and insurers try and force the internalization 
of climate change risks. Regulators could also intervene on behalf of consumers and sanction these 
firms for raising costs or “price-gouging.” Material interests in using public regulation to govern 
climate change risks explains the objective of the CDSB and ClimateWise, but it does not explain 
why firms with these interests pursued a collaborative approach rather than unilaterally lobbying 
policymakers and regulators.  
The second factor that explains the emergence of this “unconventional” co-regulation is the 
need to collaborate in generating a technical and political consensus within and outside of the industry 
that public regulation is necessary to govern climate change risks. Because public regulation has yet 
to be implemented firms are unsure of both the design of regulations that will be effective in 
governing climate change risks, and whether they have enough political support to avoid opposition 
in implementing these regulations. For these reasons, firms have turned to the formation of a “private 
regime” as a platform to incrementally build a technical and political consensus behind the design and 
implementation of such regulation.11 In the case of the CDSB and ClimateWise, the specific type of 
“private regime” created was one involving co-regulation with ENGOs. Why did these firms decide 
to pursue co-regulation rather than simply an inter-firm regime? 
The third factor was the existence of ENGOs that had interests in using their technical 
expertise and political capacity to help these firms generate the consensus necessary to implement 
public regulation. This technical expertise and political capacity represented welcome assets that 
financial firms could access through co-regulation to generate the consensus necessary for regulation. 
As previously mentioned, these ENGOs often initiated the negotiations to create the CDSB and 
ClimateWise as a means to leverage the firms’ material interests in measuring and pricing climate 
change risks to serve broader environmental goals. Some ENGOs have developed specialized 
technical expertise and political capacity in helping financial firms use best practice standards to 
govern climate change risks. In terms of technical expertise, ENGOs are able to supervise and 
monitor the use of best practice standards that harness an industry’s own knowledge in generating a 
technical consensus. More specifically, ENGOs can help design and govern standards that are able to 
“ratchet-up” a financial firm’s capacity in measuring and pricing climate change risks, and thus 
support a technical consensus justifying regulation.  In terms of political capacity, ENGOs offer 
                                                     
11 See A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, “Introduction,” in Private Authority and 
International Affairs, ed. Claire Cutler A., Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999), 
333-370, 9. 
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logistical support in organizing public policy advocacy, and they also can use best practice standards 
to coordinate an industry’s political resources in support of public regulation.  
1.1 Contributions to IPE and GEP Research 
 
What is the contribution of these arguments to the advancement of knowledge? The contributions can 
be grouped into three categories. The first set of contributions is to existing IPE and GEP research on 
the link between financial markets and environmental issues.12 This analysis of the CDSB and 
ClimateWise provides the first scholarly examination within IPE and GEP of these initiatives.13 Even 
emerging analyses of environmental co-regulation in financial markets have ignored these initiatives 
in favour of a focus on “investor environmentalism.” Analyzing the strategy and emergence of the 
CDSB and ClimateWise provides an important contribution to this new literature by demonstrating 
the emerging role of the accounting and insurance industry in promoting environmental governance.    
IPE scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the influence of the accounting 
profession in international financial regulatory debates, but have not linked the industry to 
environmental issues. The CDSB reveals that the accounting industry has a strong interest in using its 
markets to communicate financial information in ways that shifts decision-making in the global 
economy to promote sustainable economic behavior. Some GEP scholars have focused on the 
potential role of the insurance industry as form of private authority in promoting global climate 
governance, but have discounted the industry’s potential based on its history of avoiding a political 
stance on climate change issues.14 ClimateWise demonstrates an important shift in this position within 
                                                     
12 It is important to note that GEP scholars have examined the link between the structural influence of financial 
markets and the emergence of emissions trading or “marketized climate governance” as a frontline regulatory 
mechanism in climate change politics. But this literature has largely overlooked the specific relationship 
between financial service providers and environmental issues. For an overview on the debate about the 
influence of financial markets on the rise of “climate capitalism” see Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, 
Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) . 
13 Heather Lovell and Donald MacKenzie identify the CDSB’s “Technical Working Group” in a recent article 
as an example of the emerging interests of the professional accounting community in climate change, but do not 
expand on the politics behind its establishment, or its design as an example of private governance, specifically, 
co-regulation.  See Heather Lovell and Donald MacKenzie, “Accounting for Carbon: The Role of Accounting 
Professional Organisations in Governing Climate Change,” Antipode 43, no. 3 (2011): 704-731. 
14 See Matthew Paterson, “Risky Business: Insurance Companies in Global Warming Politics,” Global 
Environmental Politics 1, no. 4 (2001): 18-41; Sverker Jagers, Matthew Paterson, and Johannes Stripple, 
“Privatising Governance, Practising Triage: Securitization of Insurance Risks and the Politics of Global 
Warming,” in Business in International Environmental Politics: A Political Economy Approach, ed. David 
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the sector that needs to be explored to understand what is driving this robust engagement with climate 
change politics.  
The second set of contributions is to the literature within IPE and GEP about the purpose and 
sources of environmental co-regulation. The dissertation’s analysis of the unconventional approach 
adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise expands on critiques of scholarship which embrace “post-
Westphalian” assumptions when describing the purpose of environmental co-regulation.15 The latter 
scholarship often assumes that this form of “private governance” has emerged as a novel form of 
global governance challenging the state system, and it focuses on whether or not environmental co-
regulation is effective as an alternative to the state.16 The CDSB and ClimateWise’s use of cognitive 
governance as a strategy to expand public regulation constitutes a particular challenge for these 
assumptions.17 In particular, it challenges scholars who tend to see environmental co-regulation as 
“greenwash” or a strategy to generate reputational credibility and pre-empt public regulation. The 
strategy adopted by these initiatives demonstrates that co-regulation can be used as a tool to cultivate 
support for the expansion of public regulation, rather than its subversion.  
The dissertation’s explanation of the emergence of the CDSB and ClimateWise also 
challenges the common “post-Westphalian” interpretations of the rise of environmental co-regulation 
noted above. Rather than reflecting a structural shift towards markets driven by economic 
globalization and neoliberalism, the CDSB and ClimateWise emerged in response to conditions 
contingent on the actors involved. In fact, the CDSB and ClimateWise demonstrate a “loophole” or 
“contradiction” within the structural influence of neoliberalism.18 The CDSB and ClimateWise 
support an expansion of public regulation, which is opposed by neoliberal ideology, but with the 
intention of improving the efficiency of their markets, which is coherent with neoliberal ideology. 
Similarly, rather than simply pushing for a “second best” alternative to public regulation, the ENGOs 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Levy L, Peter Newell, and Matthew Paterson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); Sverker Jagers and Johannes 
Stripple, “Climate Governance Beyond the State,” Global Governance 9, no. 3 (2003): 385–400. 
15 It is important to note that not all scholars agree that co-regulation is designed to act as an alternative to 
public regulation. Chapter 2 (section 2.2.1) will highlight some scholars who see co-regulation as supporting a 
broad effort to engage private actors in supporting regulatory changes.  
16 A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs (SUNY 
Press, 1999); Thomas Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall, “The Emergence of Private Authority in the 
International System,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Thomas Biersteker 
and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
17 As previously mentioned, other co-regulatory initiatives such as the CDP also tend to challenge this “post-
Westphalian” consensus even if they do not explicitly target an expansion of public regulation within their 
mandate. The CDSB and ClimateWise (in addition to the INCR), however, do explicitly target an expansion of 
public regulation in their mandates.  
18 See Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism, 237. 
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involved were able to take advantage of preferences among accountants and insurers to push for a 
more robust regulatory approach. The financial firms involved also supported co-regulation for other 
reasons than short-term market concerns about reputational credibility; they saw public regulation as 
a means to advance their long-term material interests.  
The third set of contributions of this dissertation is to literature within social constructivism 
concerning the power of financial knowledge. To begin with, this analysis of the CDSB and 
ClimateWise contributes to an emerging strand of constructivist research examining the influence of 
“cognition” in shaping a market actors’ behavior.19 Although IPE scholars have analyzed the 
influence of financial knowledge on market behavior, they have yet to isolate how certain cognitive 
qualities of this knowledge can influence a market actors’ behavior. This gap is unfortunate because 
certain types of financial knowledge can influence the way market actors respond to conditions of 
economic uncertainty. This thesis begins to fill this gap by focusing on the influence of accounting 
and insurance “cognitive expectations” of the conditions necessary if financial markets are to 
efficiently govern exposure to climate change uncertainty.  
In particular, this analysis provides evidence for constructivist arguments that ideas matter in 
explaining the behavior of market actors in conditions of market uncertainty.20 The thesis argues that 
many in the accounting and insurance industry (in addition to institutional investors and corporate 
emitters in the case of the CDSB) support co-regulation because of their material interests in treating 
climate change risk as a financial risk that must be governed through public regulation. These 
interests reflect a departure from the “short-term” reputational concerns, or the perspective that 
climate change risks are a long-term issue that do not need to be measured or priced in the global 
economy. The thesis demonstrates that these interests are influenced by cognitive expectations within 
the accounting and insurance industry that “rational” market behavior should treat climate change 
uncertainty as a risk. This research supports constructivists who argue that ideas and knowledge 
influence the perception of market actors towards uncertainty in ways that support a longer-term 
perspective towards such uncertainty.    
The analysis of the unconventional approach to co-regulation adopted by the CDSB and 
ClimateWise provides another contribution to constructivist literature.  IPE literature on financial 
knowledge has described its influence over market behavior, but has yet to link the political use of 
                                                     
19 See Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, “Introduction: Constructing the International Economy,” 
in Constructing the International Political Economy, ed. Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010), 1-19. 
20 Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism, 237. 
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this knowledge to environmental governance, as this dissertation does. Moreover, this literature points 
to the political use of financial knowledge as a strategy to subvert public regulation, whereas the 
CDSB and ClimateWise take the opposite approach of trying to empower public authorities to expand 
regulation. From this perspective, this analysis of the CDSB’s and ClimateWise’s strategy provides a 
novel contribution to debates about the political use of financial knowledge.  
In sum, this thesis makes three sets of contributions to existing scholarly knowledge. First, 
this thesis contributes to recent efforts aimed at filling a gap in IPE and GEP research on the link 
between financial markets and environmental issues by analyzing the extension of environmental co-
regulatory practices to accounting and insurance markets. Second, the thesis contributes to IPE and 
GEP literature on environmental co-regulation by challenging “post-Westphalian” perspectives on the 
purposes and sources of this form of governance. Third, this dissertation contributes to constructivist 
arguments about the power of financial knowledge by examining the influence of cognitive 
expectations as a novel approach to the political use of financial knowledge.   
1.2  Methodology and the Objects of Analysis 
 
This study engages in process tracing based on qualitative analysis. Primary documents, web sites, 
and secondary sources, including academic and technical analysis, were consulted to inform analysis 
of the organization, design, purpose, and origins of each example of co-regulation. These primary 
documents included various publications from each initiative that explain their internal operation, and 
most importantly, external audits and feedback on compliance to their standards. An exhaustive key 
word search was also conducted on any reference to each of the initiatives mentioned in newspapers 
and trade journals since their establishment. Various primary documents written by accounting and 
insurance industry professionals on climate change were also consulted.  
To buttress this analysis, I conducted a set of interviews (approved by the University of 
Waterloo’s Office of Reseach Ethics: ORE #15928). I sent out 65 interview requests, and was 
successful in conducting thirty-seven interviews across seven countries. These interviews targeted 
actors involved in the negotiations to form each initiative, current members and employees of each 
initiative, financial industry professionals working on CSR or climate change issues, and ENGOs 
with experience in lobbying the financial industry.  To facilitate a level of comparability between 
each case study but maintain flexibility for the respondent to contribute expert knowledge, the 
interviews were “semi-structured”. Each respondent was asked a series of standard questions that 
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focused on identifying: the motivation behind initiating co-regulation, potential obstacles experienced 
in forming the co-regulative agreement, the strategy pursued by actors involved within the 
negotiations, and the overall objective of the initiative for both the profit and non-profit actors 
involved. The goal for the semi-structured approach was to ensure that common processes and trends 
were identified while allowing for each respondent to elaborate and “teach” the interviewer about the 
core problems and challenges involved in environmental co-regulation.21 In order to preserve 
anonymity, the names and the positions of various respondents are not disclosed in the text.  
This dissertation engages in an inductively driven analysis to understand two fascinating 
examples of co-regulation within financial markets. To provide some key background, the  following 
two sections outline how international accounting and insurance markets are governed and introduce 
the CDSB and ClimateWise as two unique examples of co-regulation that attempt to cultivate 
constituencies within these markets that are willing to support the implementation of public 
regulations governing climate change risks.  
1.2.1 Governing International Accounting Markets and the CDSB 
 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) currently governs the design and 
implementation of international accounting standards. The mandate of this institution is to harmonize 
national accounting standards into a set of international accounting standards so that investors are 
able to make capital allocation decisions based on a comparable benchmark for the measurement of 
financial value across borders.  
The IASB is located in London and designs the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), which have now either replaced national accounting standards or are in the process of being 
implemented by national securities regulators in over 120 countries. The EU Commission, which 
governs the second largest capital market in the world, adopted IFRS in 2005, while the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), which regulates the world’s largest capital market, will announce 
its timetable for adoption in 2011.22 IFRS has also been incorporated into the Financial Stability 
Board’s (FSB) “12 Standards for Sound Financial Systems,” and received endorsements from the 
                                                     
21 Pattberg, Private Institutions and Global Governance: The New Politics of Environmental Stability, 23. 
22 IASB, “Use Around the World” (International Accounting Standards Board, 2011), 
http://www.ifrs.org/use+around+the+world/use+around+the+world.htm; Michael Wells, “International 
Financial Reporting Standards”, January 2011, http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/272B5170-BF00-4B46-95EF-
2BEE10024ECF/0/Typicalvisitingstudentspresentation.pdf. 
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International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the G7.23 In response to the 
2007-2008 global financial crisis, G-20 leaders have given the FSB a mandate to coordinate and 
implement an international financial standards regime. The IASB is charged with developing 
standards for the global accounting sector as part of its membership responsibilities in the FSB.24  
The IASB is organized according to the “indirect-rule” tradition for standard setting in which 
the authority to design standards is delegated to a professional body of accountants.25 The rationale 
behind this approach is to ensure standards are designed using due process in an apolitical and neutral 
setting, maximizing the use of accounting knowledge to measure financial information in ways that 
promote efficient investment decisions. In this respect, the IASB is able to maintain the accounting 
community’s historical role as an arbiter between investor and manager without political 
interference.26 
Because professional accountants are delegated decision-making authority over the design of 
international accounting standards, some IPE scholars have suggested that the IASB represents a form 
of private governance.27 But others have challenged this argument on the grounds that any decision 
made by the IASB must be implemented by “public” national/regional public financial securities 
regulators or accounting standard setters.28 Indeed, the EU Commission, which was an early adopter 
of the IFRS, has refused to adopt standards that it deems contrary to European interests.29 The even 
                                                     
23 Martinez-Diaz Leonardo, “Strategic Experts and Improvising Regulators: Explaining the IASC’s Rise to 
Global Influence, 1973-2001,” Business and Politics 7, no. 3 (2005), 
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol7/iss3/art3. 
24 Andreas Nolke, “The Politics of Accounting Regulation: Responses to the Subprime Crisis,” in Global 
Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change, ed. Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari, and 
Hubert Zimmermann (London: Routledge, 2009), 37-55, 49. 
25 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 138. 
26 To facilitate these goals, the IASB is composed of fifteen accounting experts appointed by a group of 
Trustees based on their professional accomplishments and experience in the accounting sector. This 
membership criterion largely limits the composition of the IASB to members from industrialized economies 
with large and sophisticated capital markets. The group of Trustees, which is also composed of accounting 
experts and professionals, is proportionally selected to represent different regions (six members from 
Asia/Oceania, six from Europe, six from North American and four from any region). Recently, a Monitoring 
Board with public officials from the world’s major financial regulators was given oversight in this selection 
process. IASB, “Use Around the World”; Wells, “International Financial Reporting Standards.”  
27 See James Perry and Andreas Nolke, “The Political Economy of International Accounting Standards,” Review 
of International Political Economy 13, no. 4 (2006): 559-586. 
28 See Daniel Drezner, All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007); Beth Simmons, “The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of 
Capital Market Regulation,” International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 589-620. 
29 Financial Times, “Thickening Fog Over Accounting Row,” Financial Times, October 14, 2004, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b8e4b78-1d7e-11d9-abbf-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1KfzAGf6K. 
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more important challenge to arguments about the “private” nature of the IASB, however, come from 
the fact these public regulators have now been given formal oversight in the decision-making of the 
IASB. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the IASB’s decision-making formula came under close 
scrutiny by G-20 leaders for a perceived lack of accountability to the IASB’s member-states. In 
response, the IASB created a Monitoring Board composed of “public” officials from IOSCO, the 
European Commission, the Financial Services Agency of Japan, and the SEC.30 This Monitoring 
Board now oversees appointments to the decision-making IASB.31 These reforms have now clearly 
brought the IASB within the “public realm.”  
The IASB and its members, specifically national/regional securities regulators and accounting 
standard setters, are tasked with maintaining efficient accounting markets by establishing 
international standards that identify what type of financial information should be measured and 
disclosed to reduce information asymmetries and encourage efficient decision-making by investors. 
The ability of the IASB to achieve this outcome, however, is contingent on the political interests of its 
main constituents and the expertise that the accounting profession uses to identify “decision-useful” 
financial information that must be measured and disclosed to maintain efficient capital markets. 
The harmonization of national accounting standards through the IASB has created a new 
governable space at the international level where global financial accounting practices and their 
influence on the environment are now exposed to the IASB’s decision-making. More directly, the 
value of a firm’s environmental performance and consequent impact on its bottom-line is exposed to 
the same decision-making process. For example, the IASB develops accounting standards that 
determine how firms value their environmental liabilities and risks in international financial 
markets.32  
Because publicly listed firms in over 120 countries use or are in the process of adopting these 
standards, the IASB represents an influential institution in attributing value and costs to specific 
forms of economic behavior throughout the global economy. The IASB in addition to its national 
accounting setter counterparts, however, have failed to develop any standard addressing the 
measurement and disclosure of climate change risks.33 This inaction has led to increasing demands 
                                                     
30 Nolke, “The Politics of Accounting Regulation: Responses to the Subprime Crisis”, 46. 
31 IASB, “Monitoring Board,” Governance and Accountability, December 30, 2010, 
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/Governance+and+accountability/Monitoring+Board.htm. 
32 See Jason Thistlethwaite, “Counting the Environment: The Environmental Implications of International 
Accounting Standards,” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 2 (2011): 75-97.  
33 The IASB has worked on developing a standard for GHG accounting for firms participating in emissions 
trading markets. While an important effort, the accounting industry, in addition to institutional investors and 
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among ENGOs, institutional investors and corporate emitters concerned about exposure to climate 
change uncertainty for the strengthening of the disclosure of climate change risks at the international 
level.  
Accountants have also taken an interest in using their knowledge to govern climate change 
risk disclosure as a way to expand their markets. Although Heather Lovell and Donald McKenzie do 
not explicitly discuss material gains as a motivation for accountants, they do describe how the 
accounting professional organizations, such as the Canadian Institute for Chartered Accountants 
(CICA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), have started to 
engage in debates about how their industry can help govern climate change. In particular, accounting 
professional organizations have started to recognize how climate change represents an emerging 
“policy space” where their practices and expertise can be useful.34  
Demands for increased disclosure have led to a proliferation of multiple voluntary accounting 
standards designed to capture a more accurate measurement on the material impacts of climate 
change. As a consequence, the accounting sector, ENGOs, institutional investors and corporate 
emitters are faced with a patchwork of different standards that fail to generate an adequate market 
signal capturing the material risks associated with climate change (See Section 4.2).  
At the 2007 World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting, many of the stakeholders using 
these standards came together to form the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) as a strategy 
for harmonizing existing standards with the long term goal of promoting the implementation of a 
mandatory international standard.   After consultations were held with the accounting sector on the 
harmonization process, the Big Four accounting firms, and several national chartered accountancy 
bodies, were invited to participate in a Technical Working Group (TWG).35 After almost three years 
of work, the CDSB released the Climate Change Reporting Framework (CCRF). The completed 
framework extends the definition of “decision-useful” financial information to include climate change 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ENGO have called on the IASB to take a much more robust approach. Specifically, these actors want standards 
developed to govern GHG accounting, material (or regulatory) risks associated with these emissions, in addition 
to exposure to physical, legal and reputational risks. IASB, “Emissions Trading Schemes: Background and 
History” (IASB, June 2010), http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/A6F56527-957F-4614-B3DE-
A7EE5F4D4A1C/0/Background_historyETS.pdf; See for the appeal made by these actors for a more robust 
effort on the part of the IASB Rachel Singh, “Calls for Global Standard on Carbon Reporting Grow,” 
Accountancy Age, December 7, 2009, http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1748283/calls-global-standard-
carbon-reporting-grow. 
34 Lovell and MacKenzie, “Accounting for Carbon: The Role of Accounting Professional Organisations in 
Governing Climate Change”, 724. 
35 CDSB, “Technical Working Group,” Climate Disclosure Standards Board, 2010, http://www.cdsb-
global.org/technical-working-group/. 
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risks and offers various metrics for determining how to measure and disclose these risks.   
The CDSB was designed as a standard setter that uses cognitive governance to generate a 
technical and political consensus on an accounting framework capable of capturing “decision-useful” 
information concerning the financial uncertainty surrounding climate change impacts. Technical 
consensus building involves the design and implementation of a voluntary disclosure framework that 
is “cycled” through a reflexive mechanism to capture and address weaknesses among preparers (firms 
or corporate emitters exposed to risks), end-users (investors, and financial markets more broadly) and 
auditors (accounting firms) in capturing “decision-useful” financial information related to climate 
change risks. Political consensus building involves a strategic effort on the part of the CDSB’s 
constituents to cultivate a constituency among stakeholders whose support is necessary for the 
eventual implementation of a mandatory standard.  
The CDSB Secretariat is hosted by the CDP and coordinates the standard setting process 
through its three institutional bodies including the decision-making Board, a Technical Working 
Group (TWG) and an Advisory Committee (see Figure 1.1). The CDSB’s decision-making process 
for the design of an international standard begins with the TWG and ends with the CDSB Board 
Members, who represent the founding parties to the CDSB. The TWG is charged with harmonizing 
existing accounting approaches to climate change risks into a comparable international standard. 
Members of the TWG represent the expertise and interests of the accounting sector, including 
representatives from the Big Four accounting firms36, in addition to representatives from various 
professional accounting bodies.37 These bodies are funded by and represent the interests of the 
accountancy profession.  
                                                     
36 The Big Four accounting firms include PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche and Ernst & 
Young.  
37 CDSB, “Technical Working Group.” 
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Figure 1.1 The CDSB's organization 
 
 
Once the TWG has developed a set of standards they are “cycled” through the CDSB’s 
reflexive mechanism to capture potential weaknesses. The Advisory Committee provides the first 
feedback on whether the standards are effective in adequately capturing the risks associated with 
climate change.  The Advisory Committee is composed of twenty-five different organizations 
including large GHG emitters, investor groups and a few government departments and IOs (see Table 
1.2 for full list of participants).38 After feedback from the Advisory Committee, the Board provides 
approval for the public release of the standards in the form of an “Exposure Draft” (ED). External 
stakeholders, including investors, corporate emitters or any other interested party are encouraged to 
provide feedback on the standard during a predetermined “comment period”. The Board then collects 
these comments and asks the TWG to integrate this feedback into a revised standard. The TWG then 
re-submits a completed standard for feedback from the Advisory Committee. The final step involves 
formal approval of the completed standard by the CDSB Board. 
Once preparers, end-users, and auditors have been given an opportunity to formerly adopt the 
framework, the CDSB will collect feedback and start the standard setting process over again until a 
technical consensus that the standards accurately capture decision-useful information is reached.  
Over time, the CDSB is designed to leverage this technical consensus to build political support for 
embedding this consensus into international or national regulations that force mandatory disclosure. 
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Table 1.2 CDSB Participants 
CDSB Board Members Technical Working Group Advisory Committee 
• Paul	  Dickinson	  from	  the	  
CDP;	  Mindy	  Lubber	  from	  
Ceres;	  Mark	  Kenber	  
from	  the	  Climate	  Group	  
(a	  business	  focused	  
climate	  change	  NGO).	  
• Diane	  Wittenberg	  from	  





• Henry	  Derwent	  from	  the	  
International	  Emissions	  
Trading	  Association	  
(IETA)	  (a	  business	  
association	  that	  
represents	  the	  interests	  
of	  firms	  in	  climate	  
change	  legislation	  
negotiations).	  	  
• Richard	  Samans	  from	  
the	  World	  Economic	  
Forum	  (WEF)	  (a	  
business	  association	  that	  
hosts	  a	  popular	  annual	  
summit).	  
• Pankaj	  Bhatia	  from	  the	  
GHG	  Protocol	  (the	  




• The	  Big	  Four	  Accounting	  
firms	  
(PricewaterhouseCoope
rs,	   KPMG,	   Deloitte	   &	  
Touche,	   and	   Ernst	   &	  
Young),	   in	   addition	   to	  
Grant	  Thornton.	  
• The	   Association	   of	  
Chartered	   Certified	  
Accountants	  (ACCA)	  
• Canadian	   Institute	   of	  
Chartered	   Accountants	  
(CICA)	  	  
• International	   Federation	  
of	  Accountants	  (IFAC)	  	  
• Institute	   of	   Chartered	  
Accountants	   in	   England	  
and	  Wales	  (ICAEW)	  	  
• Japanese	   Institute	   of	  





• Climate	  Counts	  
• Confederation	  of	  British	  
Industry	  
• Duke	  Energy	  
• Haskell	  &	  White	  LLP	  
• Marsh	  McLennan	  
• Royal	  Dutch	  Shell	  
• JP	  Morgan	  Chase	  
• PG&E	  Corporation;	  
Praxair	  Inc	  
• Rio	  Tinto	  
• Swiss	  Re	  
• Tokyo	  Electric	  Power	  
Company	  
• Sun	  Group	  
• Skaden,	  Arps,	  Slate	  
Meagher	  &	  Flom	  LLP	  
• Institutional	  Investors	  
Group	  on	  Climate	  
Change	  
• Investor	  Group	  on	  
Climate	  Change	  
• UK	  Department	  of	  
Environment,	  Food	  and	  
Rural	  Affairs;	  California	  
State	  Assembly	  
• The	  Carbon	  Trust	  
• The	  Greenhouse	  Gas	  
Management	  Institute	  




• United	  Nations	  
Foundation.	  
 
The participation of “public” actors (the UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, the California State Assembly, the United Nations Environment Finance Initiative, and the 
United Nations Foundation) might lead some to wonder whether the CDSB is best seen as an example 
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of “hybrid” co-regulation between public and private actors.39 But the participation of these public 
actors is only in the Advisory Committee which has no formal authority in the decision-making 
process behind the CDSB’s standards.40 Each of these public organizations has expertise in 
developing climate change risk disclosure frameworks, and supports the mandate of the CDSB as an 
independent body charged with harmonizing different voluntary and existing mandatory standards. 
Public actors are often involved in providing feedback to the Board’s decisions, but do not have 
authority over how the standard is designed. The CDSB’s Advisory Committee provides a similar 
form of feedback after decisions by the “private” Board and TWG are finalized. For this reason, the 
CDSB still remains within the definitional boundaries of “non-state” environmental co-regulation, 
which is the phenomenon under inquiry in this study. The participation of these “public” actors does, 
however, signal the CDSB’s longer-term goal of embedding its standard in public regulation.  
1.2.2 Governing International Insurance Markets and ClimateWise 
 
ClimateWise is an initiative that tries to leverage global insurance markets to strengthen global 
climate governance. The global insurance market collected over $4.2 trillion in premiums in 2008. 
These premiums are split in half between health and life insurers and property and casualty insurers 
(P&C), which constitute two distinct markets with each sector pricing different sources of risk.41 
Although both health and life insurers and P&C insurers face climate change risks, the impacts are 
particularly relevant for P&C markets that provide insurance against weather-related losses, which are 
predicted to significantly increase under climate change conditions.  
Insurance coverage in developed countries, specifically Europe and North America, 
constitute almost 87% of the market share.42 This concentration creates a high level of competition 
between insurers for premium revenues in the industrialized world and significant incentives to 
establish markets in the developing world. Indeed, emerging markets in India, China and Brazil are 
                                                     
39 See Jennifer Clapp, “Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing 
World,” Global Governance 4 (1998): 295-316; Liliana B. Andonova, Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet 
Bulkeley, “Transnational Climate Governance,” Global Environmental Politics 9, no. 2 (2009): 52-73. 
40 CDSB, “Advisory Committee.” 
41 UNEP FI, “The Global State of Sustainable Insurance” (Insurance Working Group United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative, October 2009), 19. 
42 Ibid., 19. 
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potentially worth over $100 billion in premium revenue and represent the next source of growth for 
the insurance sector.43  
These international insurance markets are governed in part by the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), which is located in Basel, Switzerland, where its Secretariat is housed 
at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The IAIS was founded in 1994, and as of 2010, its 
members include insurance regulators from over 190 jurisdictions in 140 countries.44 The IAIS 
develops standards and guidance that national or sub-state regulators use to harmonize the way they 
supervise their own markets. The goal for these standards is to “establish and maintain fair and 
efficient insurance markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders.”45  
Compared to international accounting markets, which are governed by the IASB, regulatory 
authority is much more decentralized in insurance markets. This is particularly the case in P&C 
markets where regulators at the national or sub-state level play a much more prominent role in 
making sure that risk markets are efficient.46 Insurance regulators also embrace the indirect-rule 
tradition by delegating decision-making authority to officials with an insurance background.47 This 
design attempts to protect regulatory decisions from political interference and maintains the insurance 
sector’s historical role as a market mechanism for “spreading risk and pricing the engagement in risky 
activities.”48   
These regulators are tasked with maintaining “efficient” insurance markets through the 
preservation of the availability and affordability of insurance by making sure insurers accurately price 
                                                     
43 Evan Mills, “From Risk to Opportunity - Insurer Responses to Climate Change” (Ceres, November 2007), 18. 
44 IAIS, “International Association of Insurance Supervisors,” Improving Insurance Supervision, 2011, 
http://www.iaisweb.org/. 
45 IAIS, “Principles on Capital Adequacy and Solvency” (International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
January 2002), http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Principles_on_capital_adequacy_and_solvency.pdf. 
46 For example, In the UK and Germany, national regulators are tasked with governing insurance markets, 
whereas in the US and Canada, state and provincial regulators govern these markets. FSA, “FSA Regulation of 
Insurance Selling and Administration - do I need to be Authorised?,” Financial Services Authority, November 
1, 2010, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ins_reg.pdf; BaFin, “Act on the Supervision of Insurance 
Undertakings (Insurance Supervision Act),” Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, November 1, 
2010, 
http://www.bafin.de/cln_179/nn_721176/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetze/vag__ab__070326__en.html?
__nnn=true; NAIC, “About the NAIC,” National Association of Insurance Commissioners, November 1, 2010, 
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm; OSFI, “Property and Casualty Insurance Companies Section,” Office of 
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, November 1, 2010, http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/osfi/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=178; FSCO, “Insurance,” Financial Services Comission of Ontario, 
November 1, 2010, http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/english/insurance/. 
47 See section 4.4.1 for a discussion of insurance regulation. See also IAIS, “International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors.” 
48 Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Regulation Through Financial Organisations (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), 325. 
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the risks they are covering at affordable rates. This mandate is achieved partly by enforcing capital 
adequacy requirements, but more importantly by supervising the rate setting process, specifically the 
underwriting practices used to inform rate prices.49 This oversight ensures that consumers are 
protected from unaffordable rates through collaborative “price-fixing” and that insurance markets are 
protected from competitive pricing wars which can threaten their solvency if firms price risk too low.  
Climate change risks in the insurance sector largely materialize in markets associated with 
P&C coverage for “natural hazard” or weather risks.50 National insurance regulators are mandated to 
ensure that weather risk markets are efficient at governing risks by ensuring that insurers have enough 
capital reserves to cover large losses, and by supervising the rate setting and underwriting processes 
that insurers use to model and price risks.  
Governments also play a significant role in maintaining the efficiency of weather risk markets 
by implementing legislation that reduces behavior likely to contribute to these risks.51 Three loss-
prevention policies where public authorities can play a significant role in preserving the efficiency of 
weather risk markets are: infrastructure spending, enforcing building codes, and land-use planning.52 
In the context of climate change these policies represent important sources of adaptation within 
insurance markets. Mitigation of GHGs through emissions trading or a tax and adaptation policies 
constitute another policy area where governments have influence in preserving the efficiency of these 
markets. Without effective policy in these areas, weather risks can become “uninsurable” (ie. 
recurring flooding due to inadequate drainage and sewage systems), forcing insurers to raise rates to 
unaffordable levels or to pull out of markets. In an efficient market, such a crisis of insurance 
availability and affordability should send a signal to governments and consumers that additional 
spending and policy is required to reduce these risks.  
Climate change risks represent an important example of an “uninsurable” risk that justifies 
government intervention if insurance markets are to remain efficient. At the same time, insurers can 
also play an important role in governing these risks by pricing economic activity that contributes to 
these risks. According to a research paper commissioned by ClimateWise, insurers can use their skills 
                                                     
49 In the US, regulators either require insurers to submit rates before implementation, put their rates into use and 
then file them with regulators. See Howard Kunreuther and O. Michel-Kerjan, Erwann, At War with the 
Weather: Managing Large-Scale Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 33.  
50 As the climate changes, weather risks, such as flood and wind damage, are predicted to increase. See  Evan 
Mills and Eugene Lecomte, “Availability and Affordability of Insurance Under Climate Change: A Growing 
Threat for the U.S.” (Ceres, September 8, 2005). 
51 Richardson, Environmental Regulation Through Financial Organisations, 327. 
52 Evan Mills and Eugene Lecomte, “From Risk to Opportunity: How Insurers can Proactively and Profitably 
Manage Climate Change” (Ceres, August 2006), 35. 
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in risk modeling to “inform a debate about where a ‘climate premium’ could be levied to discourage 
high-carbon activity and fund action to mitigate and adapt to climate change.”53 But before insurers 
can take these steps, governments, insurers and stakeholders within these markets must believe 
climate change risks exist in the first place and be willing to impose costs on the behavior (ie. 
mitigation and adaptation regulations) that create these risks.  
Given the uncertainty around the impacts of climate change and the liabilities associated with 
these impacts, there is a “lag” between insurers, who argue that these risks are material and need to be 
priced, and wider constituencies.54 To overcome this “lag” and preserve the efficiency of risk-transfer 
markets, insurers need to engage in collective rule making to identify the impacts of climate change 
on their industry, and inform regulations and market practices than can be used to internalize these 
risks. 
The Prince of Wales recognized this emerging uncertainty within the insurance sector 
towards climate change, and through his ENGO, the Cambridge Programme for Sustainability 
Leadership (CPSL), initiated several meetings with insurers throughout 2006 and 2007. These 
meetings led to the establishment of the ClimateWise Principles (ClimateWise) in September 2007.55 
ClimateWise is designed to use cognitive governance to harness expertise and resources of the 
insurance industry in generating a technical and political consensus that climate change risks must be 
priced into global economic activity through international regulations and insurance markets. Similar 
to the CDSB, technical consensus building involves the use of best practice standards that target the 
generation of a market signal within insurance markets that climate change risks can be internalized 
as costs in an effort to increase investments in economic behavior that supports mitigation and 
adaptation. ClimateWise also supports political consensus building among strategic constituencies to 
generate support for international and national loss-prevention policies (ie. mitigation and adaptation 
policy) that assist insurers in maintaining the efficiency of their markets.  
The CPSL was delegated with the responsibility to host the ClimateWise Secretariat and 
monitor the implementation of forty standards among the insurers who signed up to the initiative (see 
Figure 1.2). These standards are categorized into six principles that encourage the adoption of best 
practices in governing climate change risks. These principles include 1) leading in risk analysis; 2) 
                                                     
53 Alice Chapple, “Responding to the Challenge of Climate Change” (Forum for the Future, January 12, 2010), 
http://www.forumforthefuture.org/files/2010-10-04-Climatewise-web%20%282%29.pdf, 1. 
54 UNEP FI, “The Global State of Sustainable Insurance”, 13. 
55 ClimateWise, “Member Signatories,” ClimateWise, November 5, 2010, 
http://www.climatewise.org.uk/member-signatories/. 
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informing public policy making; 3) supporting climate awareness among their customers; 4) 
incorporating climate change into investment strategies; 5) reducing the GHG footprint of their 
operations; and, 6) accountable reporting on their progress towards these goals  (see the appendix for 
a detailed breakdown of the principles).56 
Figure 1.2 ClimateWise's organization 
 
 
Currently, thirty-nine insurers have signed up to ClimateWise (see Table 1.3). Each year the 
ClimateWise Secretariat asks a third-party to perform an audit of each member’s progress towards 
best practices. The Secretariat collects information from the audit to identify weaknesses or 
challenges that insurers face in mobilizing their resources towards the governance of climate change 
risks. By identifying how certain firms have overcome these weaknesses and successfully 
implemented best practices, the Secretariat governs a reflexive mechanism that identifies strategies 
that other insurers can use to do the same. In the long-term, this process is designed to spread best 
practices that are conducive to a technical and political consensus that supports the implementation of 
regulations necessary to assist insurers in governing climate change risks.  
Table 1.3 ClimateWise participants 
Insurer Type of insurance firm Country 
Association of British Insurers Business association UK 
                                                     
56 ClimateWise, “The ClimateWise Principles”, December 2009, 
http://www.climatewise.org.uk/storage/climatewise-docs/ClimateWise%20Factsheet.pdf. See Appendix for 





  24 
ACE European Group P&C UK 
Allianz P&C/health and life Germany 
Aon-Benfield P&C/reinsurance UK 
Argo International P&C UK 
Aviva Health and life UK 
Axa P&C/health and life/reinsurance France 
Beazley Reinsurance UK 
Catlin P&C/reinsurance UK 
Chartis P&C US 
Chaucer P&C US 
Chartered Insurance Institute Business association UK 
Co-operative Insurance P&C/health and life UK 
Ecclesiastical P&C UK 
Equity Redstar P&C UK 
F&C Investments Institutional investments UK 
Fireman’s Fund P&C US 
Friends Provident Health and life UK 
Hardy Reinsurance UK 
Hiscox P&C Bermuda 
Kiln P&C/ Health and life/reinsurance UK 
Legal & General Health and life UK 
Lloyd’s of London P&C/Health and life/reinsurance UK 
Lloyd’s Banking Group P&C/heath and life UK 
Navigators P&C US 
NFU Mutual P&C/health and life UK 
Prudential Health and life US 
QBE P&C Australia 
RBS P&C UK 
RMS Risk-modeling US 
RSA P&C UK 
Santam P&C South Africa 
Spectrum P&C US 
Standard Life Health and life Canada 
Swiss Re Reinsurance Switzerland 
Tokio Marine Nichido P&C Japan 
Trygvesta P&C Norway 
XL Insurance P&C Bermuda 
Zurich P&C/health and life Switzerland 
 
 
1.3 Brief Outline of the Dissertation 
 
The emergence of the CDSB and ClimateWise represents an important opportunity to build on 
previous analyses of environmental co-regulation in financial markets and private governance more 
broadly by exploring the extension of environmental co-regulation to accounting and insurance 
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markets. Now that this chapter has introduced the major research questions, core arguments, 
contributions to the advancement of knowledge, and methodology and cases, it is necessary to 
provide a brief outline of the following chapters. 
 Chapter 2 begins by reviewing existing literature on private governance and environmental 
co-regulation that might be relevant to answering the first thesis question: how are the CDSB and 
ClimateWise designed to achieve their objectives? This literature review is used to differentiate the 
approach to co-regulation adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise. Many scholars argue that 
environmental co-regulation  is designed as a strategy for establishing “governance beyond the state.” 
The chapter highlights how the CDSB and ClimateWise instead are designed to use co-regulation as a 
tool for expanding state authority through the use of cognitive governance. The chapter also notes that 
these two initiatives are not entirely unique in this respect. Recent work examining environmental co-
regulation with institutional investors reveals a similar goal. But the CDSB and ClimateWise are 
distinctive in their strategy of leveraging accounting and insurance knowledge to convince 
constituencies throughout these markets that climate change uncertainty can be governed as a 
financial risk and that public regulation is necessary to do so.  
Chapter 3 turns to survey existing explanations for the emergence of environmental co-
regulation that might be useful for addressing the second thesis question: what explains the 
emergence of the CDSB and ClimateWise? Many explanations for environmental co-regulation start 
from the “post-Westphalian” assumption that the emergence of co-regulation is contingent on factors 
conducive to a strategy designed to establish “governance beyond the state.” More specifically, 
scholars explain co-regulation with reference to factors such as economic globalization and neoliberal 
ideology, efforts by transnational ENGOs to create “second best” alternatives to state authority, 
and/or the desire of TNCs to generate reputational credibility in the face of various challenges. The 
chapter highlights how these explanations are not terribly helpful for explaining co-regulation in the 
financial industry that is designed to support the expansion of public regulation. Drawing instead on 
explanations of the emergence of co-regulation with institutional investors, the chapter uses inductive 
analysis to hypothesize an alternative framework that could be used to explain the emergence of the 
CDSB and ClimateWise.57 The framework points to three explanatory factors: the existence of 
financial firms with material interests in using public regulation to govern climate change risks, the 
                                                     
57 It is important to note that this hypothesis is not designed to generalize “conditions” conducive to 
“unconventional” co-regulation. Rather, this chapter has the more modest goal of exploring the sources of the 
CDSB and ClimateWise’s strategy as two unique and robust examples of environmental co-regulation within 
financial markets.   
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need to collaborate in generating a technical and political consensus to implement this regulation, and 
the presence ENGOs with an interest in using their expertise and political capacity to help overcome 
these obstacles.  
Chapter 4 explores in more detail the conditions that led to the emergence of the CDSB and 
its strategy for achieving influence. The CDSB is designed to use cognitive governance in leveraging 
accounting knowledge to cultivate constituencies willing to implement a mandatory international 
accounting standard governing climate change risks. Institutional investors and corporate emitters 
support this strategy based on material interests in resolving an existing inefficient patchwork of 
voluntary standards governed by ENGOs. The accounting industry has its own material interests in 
implementing a mandatory standard to expand its services in governing climate change risks. But to 
fulfill these material interests, these actors must generate a technical consensus on standards capable 
of measuring these risks, and a political consensus supporting the use of public regulation. Co-
regulation with ENGOs governing the existing patchwork provides an optimal strategy to overcome 
these obstacles. These ENGOs have developed important expertise and political capacity necessary to 
cultivate constituencies supporting the implementation of a mandatory standard. Co-regulation 
between these ENGOs and the accounting industry provides an important platform for implementing 
this strategy.  
Chapter 5 explores in more detail the emergence of ClimateWise and its strategy for 
governing climate change risks within insurance markets. ClimateWise uses cognitive governance by 
leveraging insurance knowledge to link certain economic behavior to climate change risks and 
cultivate a constituency that supports pricing these risks in insurance markets and throughout the 
global economy with the assistance of public regulation. Insurers have material interests in supporting 
this strategy based on increasing exposure to weather-related losses associated with climate change. 
But to advance these interests, insurers must generate a technical consensus within and outside the 
industry on how to price these risks in ways that defend the industry. In addition, insurers must 
cultivate political support among consumers, regulators and policymakers that mitigation and 
adaptation regulation is necessary to defend the industry from increasing weather-related losses and 
reputational risks associated with rate increases. ENGOs and policy entrepreneurs have developed 
strategies for using best practice standards to generate this technical and political consensus. The 
CPSL was able to propose co-regulation as an optimal strategy for insurers to access this expertise 
and capacity.  
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Chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the thesis. The chapter summarizes the main arguments of 
the dissertation and its answers to the two core research questions. The chapter also revisits the 
contributions of the dissertation to existing literature and highlights potential future research agendas 




Co-Regulating Climate Change Risks: Governing Climate Change 
Risks within Accounting and Insurance Markets 
2.1 Introduction 
 
How are CDSB and ClimateWise designed to achieve their objectives? This chapter begins to address 
this question by examining how existing research describes the strategy behind private governance, 
particularly that of environmental co-regulation. This analysis is used to differentiate the approach 
adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise. The chapter develops an argument that the CDSB and 
ClimateWise have adopted a form of environmental co-regulation that embraces what I call 
“cognitive governance” within accounting and insurance markets with the longer-term goal of 
expanding public regulation governing climate change risks. To make this argument, the chapter 
examines how IPE and GEP literature on private governance has overlooked the unique form of co-
regulation adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise.  
This scholarship often takes a “post-Westphalian” perspective that points to environmental 
co-regulation as a strategy for establishing “governance beyond the state” as a core objective. Recent 
research on co-regulation within financial markets, specifically between ENGOs and institutional 
investors, demonstrates that co-regulation can in fact be used to support the expansion of public 
regulation.1 This approach demonstrates an interesting departure from the way most IPE and GEP 
scholars have conceptualized the objective of private governance. The CDSB and ClimateWise 
provide further support for this argument since they try to expand public regulation in governing 
climate change risks through the strategy of cognitive governance.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section begins by outlining how IPE and 
GEP literature have analyzed the objective of transnational non-state actors in using private 
governance to influence the global economy. In addition, this section takes a closer look at recent 
literature on co-regulation within international financial markets and highlights a gap in research 
identifying “cognitive governance” targeting public regulation as a strategy for realizing influence. 
                                                     
1See Peter Utting, “Social and Environmental Liabilities of Transnational Corporations: New Directions, 
Opportunities and Constraints,” in Corporate Accountability and Sustainable Development (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 92-119; Utting, “The Struggle for Corporate Accountability.” 
 
  29 
The second section takes a closer look at what distinguishes the unique approach adopted by the 
CDSB and ClimateWise to achieve influence. After a closer look at literature on the power of 
financial knowledge in the global economy, the section examines how the accounting and insurance 
industries govern “knowledge structures” with important implications in shaping the relationship 
between the global economy and the environment. The section then describes in more detail the use 
of cognitive governance by the CDSB and ClimateWise as a strategy to achieve influence through the 
reform of these knowledge structures and the expansion of public regulation.   
 
2.2 The Influence of Transnational Non-State Actors in IPE and GEP Literature: 
The Emergence of Private Governance and Co-Regulation 
 
This section explains how IPE and GEP scholars have explored the role of transnational non-state 
actors and the use of private governance to achieve influence within the global economy. In 
particular, it demonstrates how IPE and GEP scholars researching transnational non-state actors have 
mostly seen the objective of private governance as an attempt to generate “governance beyond the 
state”, rather than as a strategy to expand state authority.  
According to Robert Gilpin’s The Political Economy of International Relations, IPE emerged 
as a field in which scholars debated whether states or markets were the central sites of authority in the 
international economy. While Gilpin maintained that states or public authority remained the ultimate 
arbiter of resources in the global economy, the onset of economic globalization provided evidence for 
scholars who argued a structural shift had occurred within the global economy towards “private” 
markets and global business as sites of authority.2  
Susan Strange was the biggest proponent of this argument writing in her 1996 book, The 
Retreat of the State that markets “are now more powerful than states to whom ultimate political 
authority over society and economy is supposed to belong.”3 Scholars such as Claire Cutler 
interpreted the rise of global business and markets as a shift back to private authority over the 
governance of transnational space, which predated efforts by sovereign states to establish 
                                                     
2 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987). 
3 Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 4. 
 
  30 
international rules and regulations.4 This argument was informed by Gramscian or historical 
materialist approaches which contend that private authority has emerged in response to the interests 
of a dominant “corporate hegemonic bloc”, pursuing greater power in determining their own 
regulations and rules.5  
Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter’s 1999 edited volume, Private Authority and 
International Affairs, developed the analysis of private authority further. When private actors 
formally collaborate to govern a specific issue-area, these authors suggested that an “international 
private regime” was formed. These regimes were not different from the “principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures” that generate authority behind intergovernmental regimes, but they were 
designed and enforced by private actors.6 Cutler, Haufler and Porter focused primarily on the 
emergence of “international inter-firm regimes” where business actors agree to “self-regulate” their 
behavior by “either going beyond current regulatory requirements or establishing new standards in 
areas in which government rules or standards are lacking.”7 Other scholars soon went further to study 
private international regimes involving other actors, including trade unions, and most importantly, 
civil-society organizations and their advocacy groups – non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
In 2000, Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider described the concept of a “private 
organization” where various actors, including private firms, trade unions, think tanks, religious 
groups and environmental groups, formed alternative governance arrangements in issue-areas where 
intergovernmental regimes did not exist.8 Jean-Christophe Graz and Andreas Nolke described what 
they called “transnational private governance” where non-state actors, including businesses and civil-
society actors  “obey norms that are not set by states.”9 Klaus Dingwerth described this movement by 
a whole range of non-state actors to generate their own rules - instead of lobbying their governments 
                                                     
4 Claire Cutler A., “Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in International Law,” 
Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 2 (1997): 261-285. 
5 Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); See Levy 
and Newell, “Business Strategy and International Environmental Governance.” 
6 Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, “Introduction”, 336-338. 
7 Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy 
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 8. 
8 Karsten Ronit and Schneider Volker, “Global Governance Through Private-Organizations.,” Governance: 
International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions 12, no. 3 (1999): 243-266, 8; Karsten Ronit and 
Volker Schneider, “Private Organizations and Their Contribution to Problem-Solving in the Global Arena,” in 
Private Organizations, ed. Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider (London: Routledge, 2000). 
9 Ronit and Volker, “Global Governance Through Private-Organizations.”, 8; Ronit and Schneider, “Private 
Organizations and Their Contribution to Problem-Solving in the Global Arena.” 
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or international organizations - as the “new transnationalism.”10 He even went so far as to say that the 
analysis of private governance now constituted a legitimate “third pillar” in global governance 
alongside intergovernmental regimes and transgovernmental networks.11 For the rest of this thesis, 
these initiatives involving non-state actors in an agreement to regulate transnational business behavior 
will be identified as transnational private governance, or more directly, private governance.   
Scholars researching international financial politics and those focused on global 
environmental politics have discussed the important role of private governance in determining 
outcomes in their respective fields, but they each tend to limit their discussion to debates about the 
influence of private governance as alternatives to public authority. In doing so, they have yet to 
discuss the emergence of the kind of environmental co-regulation represented by the CDSB and 
ClimateWise.  The following two sections will explore this gap in analyses of private governance 
more specifically within literature on international financial politics and global environmental 
governance.  
2.2.1 Private Governance in Global Financial and Environmental Politics 
 
Within IPE, the financial industry has received particular attention as an example of the growing 
authority of private actors. The rising influence of the industry in the global economy has been 
attributed to a number of factors such as liberalization and globalization of capital markets since the 
end of the Bretton Woods era, the growing complexities of regulating these markets, and the technical 
expertise or “knowledge” of private financial actors. In her 1988 book States and Markets, Susan 
Strange argued that the financial industry had accumulated “structural power” through its monopoly 
over private credit creation.12 According to Strange, the accounting and insurance industries 
constituted important examples of the private authority of financial actors.  
She highlighted how the globalization of financial markets has increased the accounting 
sector’s influence in communicating financial information.13 Financial markets require transparency 
to make efficient decisions in allocating private capital. As governments have relaxed regulations 
over their capital accounts and financial markets have grown, so too has the demand for the 
                                                     
10 Klaus Dingwerth, The New Transnationalism: Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimacy (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). 
11 Klaus Dingwerth, “Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A Comparative 
Perspective,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 607-634. 
12 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988). 
13 Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 135. 
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accounting profession’s services and expertise in providing transparency for these markets.   While its 
information is meant to be neutral, or reflect the “economic reality” of a firm’s corporate accounts, 
the accounting profession’s perspective on what should count towards this reality represents an 
important structural influence over the way market actors perceive value.14  
Strange also noted how the insurance industry has enjoyed a similar increase in influence as a 
consequence of economic globalization. As global markets have grown, the potential for risk has 
increased, giving the insurance industry a vital role in regulating economic behavior by defining and 
pricing these risks.15 Virginia Haufler’s analysis of the industry confirmed this influence. When 
insurers collectively decide that a risk is uninsurable, she showed how they could force states into 
implementing regulations that reduce these risks in order to maintain the efficiency of insurance 
markets.16 Indeed, as analysis in Chapter 5 will demonstrate, this strategy is one of the key planks in 
convincing governments to regulate climate change risks.   
In addition to the accounting and insurance industries, scholars have identified other 
increasingly influential private financial authorities within the world economy. Tim Sinclair, for 
example, has pointed to private credit rating agencies as a significant form of private governance 
within financial markets because their ratings are the “basis for the subsequent decision-making by 
participants.”17  Particularly important for the purposes of this thesis is the growing influence of 
institutional investors, such as pension, mutual and hedge funds. Adam Harmes has analyzed their 
rapid growth in size and their acquisition of increasingly significant shares in most of the global 
economy’s largest companies. These shares constitute an important lever of influence in enforcing 
financial market demands for increased efficiency of these companies.18  
Within this IPE literature analyzing the growing influence of private financial actors, the 
emergence of “private governance” arrangements has generally been linked to efforts to generate 
“governance beyond the state.” The use of private governance or co-regulation to generate an 
                                                     
14 Andreas Nolke and James Perry, “The Power of Transnational Private Governance: Financialization and the 
IASB,” Business & Politics 9, no. 3 (2007): 1-34. 
15 Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 124. 
16 Virginia Haufler, Dangerous Commerce: Insurance and the Management of International Risk (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997). 
17 Timothy Sinclair, “An Institutional Approach to the Politics of Global Finance,” in Towards a Cognitive 
Mode in Global Finance: The Governance of a Knowledge-Based Financial System, ed. Torsten Strulik and 
Helmut Willke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 103-130, 112. Timothy Sinclair, The New 
Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005). 
18 Adam Harmes, Unseen Power: How Mutual Funds Threaten the Political and Economic Wealth of Nations 
(Toronto: Stoddart, 2001), 14. 
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alternative to public regulation can be categorized as a “post-Westphalian” explanation for the 
strategy behind this approach to achieving influence. An examination of debates concerning private 
regimes, or “private environmental governance” in GEP literature reveals a similar “post-
Westphalian” perspective.     
The increasing role of private actors in environmental governance was first described in 
Jennifer Clapp’s 1998 journal article, The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 
14000 and the Developing World.19 She observed how the design and implementation of ISO 14000 
provided a window for an emerging trend within environmental politics where private actors were 
able to “privatize” the standard setting process.20 Clapp describes that the privatization of 
environmental governance was largely contingent on the recognition that private governance is more 
efficient and compatible with “liberal norms that call for a reduced role for the state.”21 The goals of 
“private environmental governance” (PEG) are to use a range of voluntary initiatives to encourage 
firms to regulate their environmental performance.22 
In response to the constraints facing states in their efforts to regulate environmental 
protection, many civil-society organizations and NGOs started campaigning to encourage TNCs to 
adopt a specific form of PEG that scholars and practitioners call Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). These efforts proved quite successful, and CSR has become a commonly accepted form of 
business practice. The most successful example of CSR (although a public-private or hybrid 
partnership) is the UN Global Compact, which has over 3,600 participating companies.23  
Private governance also offered a useful strategy for TNCs, which argued that they could 
identify the most efficient processes for improving their environmental performance.24 One of the key 
strategies in this approach is promote the adoption of private governance based on potential 
efficiency-gains associated with “eco-efficiency”.25 The latter is associated with the implementation 
of standards or programs that minimize the environmental impact of a firm’s production process, 
                                                     
19 Clapp, “Privatization of Global Environmental Governance.” 
20 Jennifer Clapp, “The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing 
World,” in The Business of Global Environmental Governance, ed. David L. Levy and Peter J. Newell 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 223-248, 223. 
21 Clapp, “Privatization of Global Environmental Governance”, 298. 
22 For the phrase “private environmental governance”, See Falkner, “Private Environmental Governance and 
International Relations.” 
23 Peter Utting, “The Struggle for Corporate Accountability,” Development and Change 39, no. 6 (2008): 959 - 
975, 963. 
24 Clapp, “Privatization of Global Environmental Governance”, 298. 
25 See Stephan Schmidheiny and Federico Zorraquin, Financing Change: The Financial Community, Eco-
efficiency, and Sustainable Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), xxii-xxiv. 
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while simultaneously identifying ways of improving efficiency and reducing overall costs. In addition 
to efficiency gains, PEG helps firms promote a “green” brand or image encouraging reputational 
gains, which can attract new customers, and even attract new investors. In this regard, “firms are self-
motivated to make environmental improvements without being forced into doing so by state-based 
regulation.”26 Private environmental governance can thus be used as a strategy to avoid the 
implementation of command-and-control regulations by convincing firms to regulate their own 
environmental performance.  The popularity of PEG has spread throughout the private sector with 
various programs being adopted by the utilities, chemical, nuclear power and hospitality and 
recreation sectors to self-regulate their environmental performance.27 
  By the end of the 1990s, however, many NGOs started to notice that PEG schemes, such as 
CSR, had failed to fill the “regulatory void” left by states unwilling to implement effective 
environmental regulation. The most significant flaw in these approaches was a gap between “rhetoric 
and policy” and a failure on the part of TNCs to enforce the commitments they had made.28 These 
observations led to a shift in NGO strategy towards what Peter Utting called the “corporate 
accountability movement.” Instead of relying on the firm to realize the “eco-efficient” gains from 
PEG as an incentive to improve environmental performance, NGOs argued that firms required their 
assistance in monitoring and providing expertise on effective enforcement measures. By adopting a 
more cooperative approach to TNCs, NGOs hoped they could “open new channels for exerting 
influence.”29 From this perspective, co-regulation was designed as a “second best” alternative in 
addressing the regulatory void compared to official regulation backed by states.  
 Phillip Pattberg identified this growing trend towards TNC and NGO partnerships as 
distinctive from “public-private partnerships” or “global public-policy networks” embodied by efforts 
                                                     
26 See Falkner, “Private Environmental Governance and International Relations.” 
27 Magali A. Delmas and Maria Montes-Sancho, “Voluntary Agreements to Improve Environmental Quality: 
Symbolic and Substantive Cooperation,” Strategic Management Journal 31 (2010): 575-601; Andrew King, 
Michael Lenox, and Michael Barnett, “Strategic Responses to the Reputation Commons Problem,” in 
Organizations, Policy and the Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives, ed. Andrew 
Hoffman and M Ventresca (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 393-406; Joseph Rees, Hostages of 
Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994); Joseph Rivera and Peter De Leon, “Is Greener Whiter? The Sustainable Slopes Program and 
Voluntary Environmental Performance of Western Ski Slopes,” Policy Studies Journal 34 (2004): 195-221. 
28 Utting, “The Struggle for Corporate Accountability”, 965. 
29 Ibid., 966; Among environmental groups, public backlash against Greenpeace’s efforts to stop Shell from 
dumping an oil storage into the North Sea encouraged many NGOs to take a more cooperate stance towards 
TNCs in addressing environmental performance. See Bas Arts, “Green Alliances of Business and and NGOs. 
New Styles of Self-Regulation or Dead-End Roads?,” Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management 9, no. 1 (2002): 26-36. 
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such as the UN Global Compact or ISO 14000. Pattberg expanded the notion of PEG to include 
specific arrangements between TNCs and NGOs, which he called “co-regulation.”30 In Pattberg’s 
words, “co-regulation arises when two or more actors or “stakeholders” are involved in the design 
and implementation of norms and instruments that attempt to improve the social and environmental 
performance of firms.”31  
As Utting correctly notes, the growing involvement of NGOs in working with TNCs to 
improve corporate environmental performance through co-regulation has been interpreted in both 
positive and negative ways as an alternative to public regulation. Benjamin Cashore’s assessment of 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) as a form of “non-state market driven governance” (NSMD) 
offers perhaps the most optimistic argument in favor of PEG as an alternative to public authority. The 
key provision within his conception of NSMD is an “external audience evaluation” by ENGOs and 
other market participants along the timber supply-chain which acts an “achievement strategy” for 
influencing effective enforcement.32 Third party monitoring represents an important opportunity to 
give voluntary initiatives some “teeth” because ENGOs can use their assessments to put pressure on 
firms to comply with their commitments by publicly “naming and shaming” poor compliance.33 In 
addition to providing a negative incentive for enforcement, this achievement strategy can also work to 
identify why some firms lag others, and find solutions that could encourage greater compliance.  
Neo-Gramscian scholars provide the strongest criticisms of the strategy for achieving 
influence through PEG. From their perspective, the use of voluntary standards demonstrates that the 
corporate actors involved are not accountable for improving environmental performance.  Instead, 
PEG constitutes a strategy designed simply to generate reputational credibility for corporate actors to 
defend them against civil-society protests and pre-empt potential regulation.34 A partnership with an 
ENGO as a third-party monitor, for example, represents a key source of legitimacy in signaling to 
                                                     
30 Phillip Pattberg, “The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and Nonprofit Organizations 
Agree on Transnational Rules,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and 
Institutions 18, no. 4 (2005): 589-610, 590. 
31 Pattberg, Private Institutions and Global Governance: The New Politics of Environmental Stability, 87; See 
also Peter Utting, “Regulating Business via Multistakeholder Initiatives: A Preliminary Assessment,” in 
Voluntary Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility: Readings and Resources Guide, ed. R Jenkins, P 
Utting, and R.A. Pino (Geneva: NGLS, 2002), 61-130, 65. 
32 Benjamin Cashore, “Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-
Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority,” Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration, and Institutions 15, no. 4 (October 2002): 503-539, 511. 
33 Utting, “The Struggle for Corporate Accountability”, 969. 
34 Levy and Newell, “Business Strategy and International Environmental Governance”, 92; See also Michael 
Barnett and Andrew King, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbours: A Longitudinal Analysis of an Industry Self-
Regulatory Institution,” Academy of Management Journal 51, no. 6 (2008): 1150-1170, 1155-1156. 
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public authorities and consumers that the regulation is being enforced.35 It is for these reasons that 
many critics argue that the impact of PEG in strengthening the governance of the environment is 
largely overstated, and public authority remains critical for enforcing effective environmental 
governance.36  
Utting has analyzed how some approaches to co-regulation do in fact recognize that voluntary 
approaches are insufficient over the long term and that ultimately public regulation is necessary if 
firms are to successfully improve their environmental performance.37 Utting argues that the corporate 
accountability movement, or co-regulation, “has expanded the terrain where so-called voluntary and 
legalistic approaches merge in ways that are complementary and synergistic.”38 For example, co-
regulation could encourage national governments to legalize “soft” voluntary initiatives into “hard” 
laws through formal legislation.  
From this perspective, the use of voluntary standards is a strategic component in facilitating 
regulatory change. Rather than generating reputational credibility or pre-empting regulation, 
voluntary standards are designed to provide a flexible platform for corporate actors to refine policy 
ideas, and build a constituency supporting the implementation of these ideas into official policy.39 A 
voluntary approach designed to influence public regulation makes a trade off in its initial efforts by 
promoting participation at the expense of compliance. Over time, the use of a reflexive mechanism 
can “ratchet-up” compliance by directing corporate actors to weaknesses or opposition in their efforts 
to reform government policy.  
As the analysis in the following section on environmental co-regulation in financial markets 
will demonstrate, the CDP, INCR, CDSB and ClimateWise provide evidence for the strategic use of 
                                                     
35 Pattberg, Private Institutions and Global Governance: The New Politics of Environmental Stability, 58. 
36 Falkner, “Private Environmental Governance and International Relations”, 79; See also Jennifer Clapp and 
Jason Thistlethwaite, “Private Voluntary Programs in Environmental Governance: Climate Change and the 
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39 In management studies literature, scholars refer to this constituency building approach as a “relational” 
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preferences. Collaboration between corporate actors to share costs associated with lobbying or influencing 
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voluntary standards, or co-regulation in facilitating official regulatory change. Whereas the INCR and 
CDSB are closely related to Utting’s conception of co-regulation, ClimateWise is slightly different 
because it attempts to act as a platform for expanding various forms of regulation, rather than 
embedding its own voluntary standards in public regulation. ClimateWise is thus similar to the CDP, 
which, as will be discussed below, does support climate change regulations. But, unlike the INCR, 
CDSB and ClimateWise, it does not explicitly ask its participants to promote the expansion of 
specific regulations.  
This “unconventional” form of co-regulation adopted by initiatives such as the INCR, CDSB 
and ClimateWise challenges scholars who invoke a post-Westphalian assumption that co-regulation is 
primarily designed as an alternative to state-based forms of governance. It is important to note that 
some scholars researching private governance do argue that co-regulation can be designed to “align 
[corporate] behavior in ways that support both private and public goals” (emphasis added).40. 
Environmental co-regulation within financial markets certainly reflects this trend in private 
governance. But as section 2.2.4 will demonstrate, they tend to be much more specific and up-front 
about their regulatory goals compared to more “conventional” or “post-Westphalian” approaches. 
Whereas NSMD, for example, is designed to operate autonomously from public authorities, and even 
“reduce or alter the scope of authority of traditional and international public policy-making 
processes”, the INCR, CDSB and ClimateWise target and depend on an eventual expansion of public 
regulation to effectively govern climate change risks.41 
To facilitate support for this regulation, each initiative uses cognitive governance by 
implementing voluntary best practice standards designed to spread financial knowledge that climate 
change economic uncertainty constitutes a financial risk that must be governed through public 
regulation. This strategy reveals a second distinction between NSMD and the approach to co-
regulation adopted by the INCR, CDSB and ClimateWise. NSMD involves the use of reputational 
arguments in shaming a firm to comply with the FSC based on its poor environmental image, whereas 
co-regulation in financial markets promotes an explicit business case that financial firms should 
comply with these initiatives to support regulations that will advance their material interests in 
governing climate change risks.42  
                                                     
40 Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley, “Transnational Climate Governance”, 63. 
41 Cashore, “Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven 
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42 Macleod and Park, “Financial Activism and Global Climate Change: The Rise of Investor-Driven 
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While most IPE and GEP literature on private governance assumes that it is designed as an 
alternative to the authority of the state, Utting’s work thus provides an important link to the approach 
adopted by initiatives such as the INCR, CDSB and ClimateWise. Utting does not, however, describe 
how cognitive governance could be used to facilitate this objective. He also does not discuss the 
emergence of these initiatives and other forms of co-regulation within financial markets. 
2.2.2 Environmental Co-Regulation in Financial Markets 
 
Environmental co-regulation in financial markets has begun to attract the attention of some other 
scholars. This section draws on their work to show how environmental co-regulation in financial 
markets has often adopted strategies that are designed to embed private co-regulatory preferences into 
public regulation. By taking a closer look at these initiatives, this section will also reveal that, despite 
some similarities between the form of co-regulation pursued by the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies’ (Ceres) Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) and the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), the CDSB and ClimateWise are distinctive in their approach in two 
respects. First, the CDSB and ClimateWise target the use of cognitive governance within accounting 
and insurance markets. Second, while the CDP and INCR incorporate several aspects of cognitive 
governance, more broadly their approach is not as robust as the CDSB and ClimateWise. Before 
taking a closer look at the CDP and INCR, however, it is necessary to briefly provide a history on 
previous efforts to engage financial firms through co-regulation.  
  The first discussions on the relationship between private finance and the environment 
occurred among NGOs and the policy world as a part of a broader concern about the increasing role 
of private capital in foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries during the early 1990s.43 
In response, NGOs began to target investors and fund managers investing in companies in the 
developing world with poor environmental track records.44  
In 1992, policymakers within the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
addressed emerging concerns about the environmental impact of private capital in developing 
                                                     
43 Andrea Durbin and Carol Welch do identify shareholder activism on environmental issues among groups 
such as Ceres and other institutional investors as an emerging “private” trend. But the majority of their effort 
focuses on efforts by NGOs to lobby public financial institutions to implement environmental reform. See 
Andrea Durbin and Carol Welch, “The Environmental Movement and Global Finance,” in Civil Society and 
Global Finance, ed. Jan Aart Scholte and Albrecht Schnabel (London: Routledge, 2002), 213-228. 
44 Schmidheiny and Zorraquin, Financing Change: The Financial Community, Eco-efficiency, and Sustainable 
Development, 16. 
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countries by partnering with Deutsche Bank, HSBC Holdings, Natwest, Royal Bank of Canada and 
Westpac. In 1995 a group of concerned insurers took a similar approach and partnered with UNEP to 
address the environmental implications of insurer decision-making.45  
In 1996 Stephan Schmidheiny and Federico Zorraquín identified this emerging engagement 
with environmental issues within the financial sector and attempted to explain the relationship 
between decision-making in these markets and the environment in their volume Financing Change: 
The Financial Community, Eco-efficiency, and Sustainable Development. The book began by asking 
whether the world’s private global financial markets, including stocks, bonds and debt, are a “force 
for sustainable human progress, or are they an impediment against it?”46 Works such as Financing 
Change raised the potential that private financial markets could be leveraged to impose costs on 
environmental pollution and dramatically improve the sustainability of the global economy.47  
Academic work on the role of co-regulation in governing the relationship between private 
financial markets and the environment first emerged through a debate on the potential influence of the 
insurance sector in climate change politics. In 2001, Matthew Paterson examined efforts by 
Greenpeace and UNEP-FI during the 1990s to convince the insurance sector to adopt a private regime 
leveraging their political and market resources in the fight against climate change.48 Paterson’s 
analysis focused on the efforts of Jeremy Leggett, head of Greenpeace’s international climate change 
campaign, to encourage insurers to adopt his idea of “solidarity within the risk community.”  
Although Leggett’s plan identified several of the key goals set out by ClimateWise half a 
decade later, his efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, and thus represent an incomplete attempt to 
establish environmental co-regulation in the insurance sector. In 2005, Paterson, Sverker Jagers and 
Johannes Stripple argued that insurers had few incentives to co-regulate because they could govern 
climate change risks through financial securitization as an “exit option” to engaging in climate change 
politics.49 By “pricing” weather-related risks linked to climate change through securitization, insurers 
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had alternative strategies available to offset potential losses rather than supporting the use of public 
regulation, specifically international mitigation regulation. For example, insurers could issue what 
they call catastrophe bonds or “CAT bonds”. These bonds are contracts between investors and 
insurers structured so that in the event of a significant climate change related event (ie. a higher than 
average hurricane season) occuring in a specific area and time period, the investor who bought the 
bond loses their money to pay for the insured losses. If there is no weather event, the investor is able 
to collect what is usually a favorable rate of interest.50 Their analysis was written before the 
implementation of ClimateWise. As Chapter 5 will discuss, insurers participating in ClimateWise 
claim that this securitization does not in fact provide enough benefits to allow them to avoid political 
engagement in climate change politics.  
Outside of the insurance sector, Christopher Wright and Alexis Rwabizambuga have 
examined the adoption of the Equator Principles. These are a set of principles established in 2003 to 
limit the environmental impact of banks involved in project financing. They encourage project 
developers to abide by certain environmental rules in order to access loans from these banks.51 The 
Principles ask banks to implement an extra layer of due diligence on project financing where banks 
evaluate the environmental impacts of their loan on a project-by-project basis.52 The Equator 
Principles were initiated in response to a campaign launched by ENGOs against the environmental 
impacts of lending practices of banks involved in providing loans to infrastructure projects in 
developing countries. But because only member banks are charged with implementing the Principles 
through the “EP Association Steering Committee”, the Equator Principles do not represent an 
example of co-regulation. Indeed, BankTrack, a network of civil society organizations that monitors 
the environmental impacts of international banking, has been highly critical about the initiative’s lack 
of a reflexive mechanism to improve accountability and oversight.53  
                                                                                                                                                                    
specifically Swiss Re, was involved in the initial debates about CO2 “benchmarking” within the investment 
community. These discussions involved some of the policy entrepreneurs who founded CDP, which formerlly 
engaged in an effort to benchmark CO2 emissions throughout financial markets. See Newell and Paterson, 
Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy, 63. 
50 Newell and Paterson, Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy, 
63. 
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There are other more robust examples of environmental co-regulation in financial markets 
that have similar objectives and strategies to the CDSB and ClimateWise. Although overlooked by 
academic scholarship, the Climate Principles, developed by the Climate Group, a business friendly 
ENGO, represents an important example of environmental co-regulation in financial markets at the 
international level. Financial institutions such as Credit Agricole, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Swiss 
Re, F&C Asset Management, and BNP Paribas have signed up to its Principles. The Climate 
Principles outline six best practice standards, including 1) the minimization of each member’s carbon 
footprint, 2) business decision-making that reduces climate change risks, 3) developing new products 
and services that enable customers to manage climate change risks, 4) engagement with customers on 
strategies for reducing climate change risks, 5) supporting “sound energy and climate policy”; and, 6) 
disclosure on each member’s progress towards the principles.54 Similar to other forms of 
environmental co-regulation to be discussed below, the Climate Principles attempt to use financial 
knowledge to govern climate change risks, and even leverage this knowledge to engage within 
external constituencies, including consumers and policymakers.55  
Other recent importance academic efforts to understand environmental co-regulation in 
financial markets has been the research of Phillip Pattberg on Ceres, as well as that of Michael 
MacLeod and Jacob Park on the INCR and the CDP.56 These examples of co-regulation attempt to 
leverage the interests of institutional investors in using their broad investments throughout the 
economy to encourage the governance of climate change risks. Rather than emphasizing brand 
reputation or gains achieved through eco-efficiency as an incentive to adopt a voluntary 
environmental program, these cases of co-regulation in financial markets leverage material interests 
among both institutional investors and the firms they invest in to reduce investors’ exposure to 
climate change risks.57  
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Ceres, the INCR and the CDP all target TNCs’ financial reputation among their key suppliers 
of capital. The goal of these initiatives is to shrink the capital available to firms contributing or 
exposed to high levels of climate change risk, while redirecting capital to corporations mitigating 
these risks. Efforts by Ceres, the INCR and the CDP to leverage the expertise and resources of 
institutional investors to implement standards governing the disclosure of climate change risks 
represent an important precursor to the strategy developed by the CDSB and ClimateWise. Indeed, 
both initiatives represent the first successful attempts at environmental co-regulation with private 
financial actors.  
2.2.3 The INCR and CDP 
 
The following analysis explains briefly the form of co-regulation adopted by the INCR and CDP 
since existing literature has covered these initiatives. Environmental co-regulation between financial 
firms, specifically institutional investors, and ENGOs first emerged with the formation of Ceres.58 In 
the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, institutional investors faced significant losses 
associated with the impact of fines, clean-up costs and lawsuits on the company’s financial 
performance. These losses revealed that institutional investors faced an information asymmetry in 
determining their exposure to financial risks associated with the environmental performance of the 
firms in which they invested. In response, a group of investors and pension funds met with ENGOs to 
discuss strategies for how investors could get more access to information on a firm’s environmental 
performance.59 These efforts resulted in the establishment of Ceres and the “Ceres Principles.”60 
The Ceres Principles asked TNCs to provide disclosure on various aspects of their 
environmental performance. Ceres realized that institutional investors could leverage their market 
power over the firms they invest in to encourage disclosure of their environmental performance 
through the principles. If adopted across the financial sector, these standards could create a 
comparable market signal on a firm’s exposure to environmental risks. Institutional investors and 
other financial actors could then use this information to allocate their assets in ways that avoided 
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these risks and by doing so create financial incentives for firms to adopt sustainable practices. 
Through these efforts to compare corporate environmental performance, Ceres attempted to 
“reframe” corporate environmental performance as a proxy for good overall corporate management, 
rather than a simple reputational signal for “ethical” corporate citizenship. According to Pattberg, the 
use of corporate environmental reporting by Ceres helped resolve the “myth of CSR,” by arguing that 
a firm’s environmental performance was indeed an important measure of market competitiveness.61 
For this reason, Ceres can be considered the first ENGO to promote a cognitive frame linking 
corporate environmental performance to more material concerns by spearheading the norm that this 
performance could generate risks within financial markets.62 
Although Ceres’ initial objective was to govern the disclosure of corporate environmental 
information through its Ceres Principles, it turned its focus in the early 2000s towards the governance 
of climate change risks. After conducting extensive research on climate change risks within financial 
markets, Ceres decided to take a more direct approach in facilitating risk disclosure than the 
implementation of a voluntary disclosure framework. In 2003, Ceres hosted the “Institutional 
Investors Summit on Climate Change” in cooperation with the United Nations Foundation and the 
State of Connecticut Treasurer’s Office. The Summit was able to attract fifteen institutional investors 
worth over a trillion dollars in invested capital.63 This meeting resulted in the formation of the INCR 
as a network of investors with a mandate to co-ordinate institutional investors in facilitating climate 
change risk disclosure.64 The key outcome from this meeting was the establishment of a Climate Risk 
Action Plan.  
The Action Plan uses voluntary best practice standards to coordinate efforts among 
institutional investors to improve climate change risk disclosure. The Action Plan requires the 
following: implementation of a due diligence mechanism for screening climate change risks; 
improvements in efforts to invest in companies developing clean technology; identification of ways of 
expanding investments in companies developing clean technology; introduction of measures to 
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improve the energy performance of real estate and investment portfolios; encouragement to firms that 
they invest in to develop comprehensive responses to climate change; and, support for public policy 
action encouraging the mandatory disclosure of climate change risks and the implementation of GHG 
emission regulations.65 
In a recent article, Michael MacLeod and Jacob Park provide evidence that the INCR does 
support aspects of what I am labeling the “cognitive governance” approach adopted by the CDSB and 
ClimateWise, which is discussed in more detail later (section 2.3.3).66 Specifically, it promotes 
technical and political consensus building among various constituencies within financial markets. The 
INCR is most focused on political consensus building. The preamble to the Action Plan clearly 
reflects this objective by arguing that political leaders must implement “legislation that would provide 
regulatory certainty, provide incentives for climate solutions, and minimize the risks that climate 
change poses to business, investors and the economy.”67 
The INCR targets two important constituencies in generating support for the disclosure of 
climate change risks. First, it targets corporations by using shareholder resolutions and awareness 
campaigns to ask corporate boards about their actions on governing climate change risks. The INCR 
is also designed to leverage investors to convince the firms that they invest in that US federal 
regulations on GHG emissions are necessary if climate change risks are to be effectively governed.68 
Second, the INCR also targets the use of public authority in strengthening official regulations over the 
disclosure of climate change risks. After six years of filing petitions with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to force the disclosure of climate change risks, these latter efforts were rewarded 
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66 Technical consensus building involves generating evidence that measuring and pricing climate change risks 
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constiuencies throughout financial markets that support disclosure. Political consensus building is designed to 
leverage supporters of disclosure to overcome potential opposition among firms or investors that fail to see the 
market benefits. Chapter 2 (section 2.3.3) elaborates more specifically on the details of cognitive governance.   
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in 2010 when the SEC announced it would include “guidance” that firms can use to measure and 
disclose their climate change risks.69 Although this guidance is not a mandatory requirement for 
disclosure, it is a significant accomplishment for the INCR, in addition to its success in encouraging 
shareholder resolutions on climate change risk information. The INCR thus shares a similar form of 
co-regulation to the CDSB and ClimateWise by attempting to use financial knowledge to convince 
external constituencies to support expanding public regulation in governing climate change risks. 
In terms of technical consensus building, the INCR encourages its members to pressure the 
firms they invest in to disclose exposure to climate change risks through Ceres’ Global Framework 
for Climate Change Risk Disclosure.70 The INCR also asks that members use information obtained 
through disclosure to encourage and improve risk scrutiny among investors, stock market analysts, 
and rating agencies.71 By encouraging these actors to expand climate risk analysis among other 
financial actors so that it becomes a part of “their routine financial analysis and company and 
portfolio valuation”, INCR supports technical consensus building.72 Although not as organized as the 
CDP’s survey (see below), these efforts are designed to promote a technical consensus that climate 
change risk analysis can improve investor decision-making. Unlike the CDP, CDSB or ClimateWise, 
however, the INCR does not govern technical and political consensus building with a reflexive 
mechanism that regularly evaluates the compliance of its members towards its Action Plan.  
The CDP also implements a similar form of co-regulation to the CDSB and ClimateWise, but 
it is more focused on technical consensus building than the INCR. To help institutional investors 
generate a consensus on strategies for governing climate change risks, Paul Dickinson and Tessa 
Tennant approached these investors in 2001 and formed the CDP Secretariat to coordinate a 
strategy.73 This Secretariat is the core organization behind the CDP as it facilitates the logistics and 
organization needed to implement the disclosure survey and the reflexive mechanism used to improve 
the survey. Throughout this thesis, the Secretariat will be referred to as the CDP, which acts as the 
central platform for coordinating institutional investors in governing climate change risk disclosure. 
Similar to Ceres and the INCR, the CDP is an example of co-regulation with institutional investors 
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designed to leverage their market power in facilitating climate change risk disclosure. The CDP, 
however, has a much larger membership compared to its counterparts. Currently, 534 institutional 
investors representing over $64 trillion in assets have signed up to support the CDP.74 
The CDP is designed to encourage the disclosure of climate change risks among the world’s 
largest publicly traded firms through an annual disclosure survey sent to each firm’s corporate 
board.75 Each survey asks these firms to disclose four categories of information, including their 
governance strategy for climate change risks, physical risks, regulatory risks, and a measure of the 
amount of their current emissions.76 To encourage its members to include more information on their 
disclosure, the CDP ranks each emitter based on their level of transparency on the CDP Leadership 
Index, which is made public along with the survey each year.77  
Ranking the disclosure of its members represents a limited form of political consensus 
building by trying to reduce opposition to disclosure.78 The CDP also encourages political consensus 
building by promoting its survey as a tool for institutional investors who have joined the initiative to 
target firms with a poor record of disclosure with shareholder resolutions. The CDP attempts to 
leverage its vast network of institutional investors to convince other investors and financial actors that 
climate change uncertainty represents a financial risk that must be governed. Based on MacLeod and 
Park’s judgment, the CDP has been quite effective in this strategy because it now represents over 75 
percent of the worldwide assets managed by the investment industry.79  
Unlike the INCR, the CDP attempts to improve its survey and accountability to its objectives 
through a reflexive mechanism governed by the Secretariat. The CDP’s goal is to generate a technical 
consensus that institutional investors can use to promote disclosure by standardizing a strategy on the 
way climate change risks can be measured and evaluated to improve market decision-making.80 To 
facilitate this consensus, the CDP Secretariat reviews each annual survey results, identifies 
weaknesses in the disclosure of climate change risk data, and attempts to address these weaknesses in 
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the next survey. The goal of this process is to facilitate the “commensuration” of different accounting 
methodologies for climate change risks so that institutional investors are able to assess their exposure 
based on a comparable approach used throughout the economy.81  
Some have criticized the CDP and INCR for their voluntary approach, seeing them as a form 
of “greenwash”. For example, Adam Harmes suggests that the form of co-regulation these initiatives 
support is “entirely consistent with the analysis that mainstream investors will promote climate 
change mitigation for primarily reputational reasons in a low-cost or “soft” manner.”82 In the case of 
the INCR, however, this criticism overlooks the fact that this co-regulatory initiative explicitly 
recognizes that a voluntary approach is not sufficient, and government regulation is necessary to 
effectively measure climate change risks. Its voluntary approach simply reflects a recognition of the 
strategic challenges in the short-to-medium term involved in cultivating constituencies within 
financial markets to measure climate change risks. The CDP does not explicitly embrace the long-
term goal of strengthening government regulation in the same way.83 But its use of a reflexive 
mechanism to improve the capacity of its survey demonstrates recognition on the part of its 
participants that effective climate change risk disclosure is a long-term project.  
This brief description of the CDP and INCR reveals that these initiatives support some 
aspects of the kind of “cognitive governance” strategy which is explained in the following section. 
The INCR is engaged in some forms of technical consensus building but it is primarily focused on 
political consensus building that includes organizing shareholder resolutions and lobbying for the 
expansion of public regulations in governing the disclosure of climate change risks. Its initiatives, 
however, are not governed by a reflexive mechanism. The CDP is more focused on technical 
consensus building by using its survey to support the “commensuration” of climate change risk 
measurement, but it also supports political consensus building by attempting to target corporate 
emitters with poor levels of disclosure. The CDP also includes a reflexive mechanism that is designed 
to improve its survey. Both initiatives in various capacities attempt to shift markets’ expectations 
                                                     
81 Ibid., 727. 
82 Harmes, “The Limits of Carbon Disclosure: Theorizing the Business Case for Investor Environmentalism”, 
116. 
83 The CDP does support climate change regulations, such as international regulations on emissions, in the same 
way as ClimateWise. But unlike ClimateWise, its voluntary standards do not ask participants to collectively 
engage in public policy advocacy. The CDSB’s standards are similar to the CDP, which also develops voluntary 
risk disclosure standards, but it has also implemented an engagement program that asks members to lobby 
regulators for support in implementing a mandatory standard. This is one reason that the CDSB and 
ClimateWise are more robust in their approach to cognitive governance. 
 
  48 
about the economic value of a firm’s environmental performance by supporting investor knowledge 
that exposure to climate change uncertainty represents a financial risk. 
2.2.4 The Distinctiveness of the CDSB and ClimateWise 
 
The CDSB and ClimateWise are distinctive from the INCR and CDP in two respects (see also Table 
2.1 for a comparison). First, each initiative adopts more robustly both of the two characteristics of co-
regulation using cognitive governance outlined below in section 2.3.3. These are: 1) the use of 
voluntary best-practice standards to generate technical and political consensus that a firm’s 
environmental performance has an economic value that, if measured and priced through public 
regulation, can improve the efficiency of market decision-making; and, 2) a reflexive mechanism to 
govern compliance among participants to these standards. Both initiatives adopt a similar approach to 
the INCR in trying to leverage technical and political consensus building to support an expansion of 
national and international public regulation, but the CDSB and ClimateWise engage in a more 
thorough effort at using cognitive governance to facilitate this change. For this reason, they represent 
compelling cases to build on existing analysis of voluntary co-regulatory standards within financial 
markets that use cognitive governance and target a long-term goal of expanding public regulation.  
To reinforce this latter point, it is useful to briefly examine how each initiative communicates 
this long-term objective. The objective is expressed clearly in the CDSB’s 2009 document outlining 
the Basis for Conclusions for supporting mandatory or “mainstream” climate change risk reporting: 
“Whilst acknowledging the important role these developments [standards supporting voluntary 
disclosure] have made in advancing disclosure practices”, the CDSB supports “progressing climate 
change related reporting from a solely voluntary activity into “mainstream financial reporting.”84 
ClimateWise targets different public authorities, specifically national governments, insurance market 
regulators, and policymakers involved in the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The initiative also shares with the CDSB the 
goal of supporting governments to take the lead in developing policy that incentivizes market actors – 
in this case, insurers - to use their resources in the governance of climate change risks. ClimateWise’s 
Principle Two, for example, asks insurers to help policy makers both nationally and internationally 
“develop and maintain an economy that is resilient to climate risk”, establish “national and global 
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emissions reduction targets,” and implement regulation that will “enhance the resilience and reduce 
the environmental impact of infrastructure and communities”.85  
The second, and perhaps the more important, distinctive feature of the co-regulation 
employed by the CDSB and ClimateWise is that they leverage accounting and insurance knowledge 
in their cognitive governance strategy, whereas the INCR and CDP rely solely on the knowledge and 
market power of investors. As the next section will demonstrate, accountants and insurers govern 
powerful “knowledge structures” with important implications for the relationship between the global 
economy and the environment. This form of financial knowledge plays an important role in defining 
market expectations for the economic value of corporate environmental performance and efforts to 
protect the environment. The leveraging of this knowledge represents an important difference from 
environmental co-regulation involving institutional investors.     
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2.3 Ideas and Global Governance: Cognitive Governance in the Accounting 
and Insurance Sectors  
 
Within global governance literature, debates about the influence of “ideas” at the global level first 
emerged as a critique of “rationalist” arguments that international actors only respond to material 
interests. For scholars who support the latter perspective, most explanations for the behavior of 
international actors can derive from “some function of rational responses to objective and largely 
knowable and transparent environments.”86 In IPE, this environment is shaped by market incentives 
where rational responses are largely determined based on short-term cost-benefit calculations. From 
this “rationalist” perspective co-regulation emerges in response to, for example, short-term concerns 
among TNCs about corporate reputation, rather than long-term concerns about market uncertainty 
related to climate change. Constructivists have challenged this conclusion by demonstrating that 
actors interpret and respond to economic structures in different ways. To explain this variation, 
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constructivists cite the influence of various ideational conditions such as identity, ethnicity, 
professional background and knowledge that inform an actor’s behavior.87  
Constructivist insights are particularly important in understanding the strategy employed by 
the CDSB and ClimateWise. For constructivists, “actions taken by human beings depend on the 
substantive quality of available ideas, since such ideas help to clarify principles and conceptions of 
causal relationships, and to coordinate individual behavior.”88 These ideational conditions often play a 
significant role in defining what is “rational” behavior for market actors when material interests are 
unclear or exposed to uncertainty. From this perspective, TNCs could support co-regulation based on 
their own interpretation of whether climate change economic uncertainty is a short-term priority for 
their market strategy. The following analysis will take a closer look at a specific “strand” of social 
constructivism that explains how the cognitive qualities of knowledge can influence the rational 
response of market actors to conditions of market uncertainty in ways that support linking a firm’s 
environmental performance to measures of economic value.  
2.3.1 The Power of Financial Knowledge in the Global Economy 
 
The political authority associated with different forms of knowledge represents a key plank within the 
constructivist school of IPE. Constructivism is varied in its approach to conceptualizing the authority 
of different forms of knowledge. Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth and Craig Parson divide constructivist 
literature in political economy into four different strands. The first describes how economic actors 
inform their behavioral decisions based on how they associate meaning to different ideational 
constructs, such as their profession or national identity.89 The second focuses on how economic 
actors’ decisions can be “pre-constituted” by the actors’ “subjective” identity within an environment 
where certain actions are made possible and impossible by their position and role within this 
environment.90  
More important for explaining the political influence of accounting and insurance knowledge 
are the two other strands that focus on “cognition” and “uncertainty”. “Cognitive constructivism” 
describes how economic actors respond to “cognitive schemas” or psychological expectations that are 
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“connected to social identities, as opposed to merely individual psychological biases and 
predispositions.”91 These “shared mental models” can generate a “script for behavior based on a logic 
about how the world works, socially constructed framings of decision points, and taken-for-granted 
understandings of economic phenomenon.”92  
Constructivist literature on “uncertainty” focuses on how, despite common definitions of 
meaning or similar cognitive expectations, actors still respond in ways that are not contingent on past 
experiences or existing knowledge. For example, cognitive constructivists tend to view uncertainty as 
a “complex” problem that can be resolved using existing knowledge that identifies a “rational” course 
of action to reduce this uncertainty. Uncertainty constructivists see the world as genuinely uncertain 
where previous expertise or identity cannot be used to predict how an actor is likely to respond.93  
Because accounting and insurance knowledge derives its authority as a “lens” that filters 
market uncertainty towards certain “rational” actions, the influence of this knowledge should most 
accurately be viewed as an example of the cognitive strand of constructivism. As mentioned above, 
the key distinction between “cognitive” and “uncertainty” constructivism is that the latter does not 
constrain its explanation of economic behavior to existing knowledge or expectations. In this respect, 
the influence of cognition in the accounting and insurance industry is closer to a “thin” type of 
constructivism where certain common ideas act as focal points in shaping an actor’s behavior, as 
opposed to “thicker” types of constructivism, such as uncertainty or subjectivity constructivism which 
are concerned more with intersubjective processes of identify formation.94   
In the context of accounting and insurance, a “common knowledge base” shaped by shared 
education and professional experiences defines expectations for how to respond to new economic 
information or uncertainty in ways conducive to common pathways that are considered implicitly 
more “rational” than others.95 For example, rather than waiting for issues creating economic 
uncertainty to emerge as a risk or a source of market value, accountants are likely to take a 
“precautionary” approach and test out metrics for measuring new forms of economic uncertainty to 
determine its impact on a business, whereas insurers are likely to develop models for testing whether 
this uncertainty represents a risk that can be priced. The key obstacle for each actor is using their 
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knowledge base to govern the complexity associated with developing practices that can measure and 
assign probabilities to certain events that any market actor can easily implement.96  
While institutional investors are loosely organized and come from a variety of different 
business backgrounds, accountants and insurers have their own professional schools and 
requirements. Before financial accountants can sell their services, they must be a registered as a 
Chartered Accountant, which requires a professional accounting degree, and a series of professional 
tests developed by the sector that must be passed to acquire certification. Insurers, specifically the 
actuaries who model and price risk which drives the industries’ business model, must be 
professionally certified, and similarly must pass several industry tests before taking on a job in risk 
modeling. Institutional investors are governed much more loosely and usually only require a 
government administered course providing a certificate that allows them to sell securities.97 
While a common background may be conducive to similar interpretations of economic 
uncertainty among accountants and insurers, they can also shape the interpretation of complex 
economic information among external economic actors who use this knowledge to inform their own 
expectations for “rational” market decision-making in conditions of uncertainty. Although scholars 
have yet to link “cognitive expectations” within the accounting and insurance professions to the way 
market actors perceive economic information, there is research that points to this potential 
connection. Tony Porter, for example, has built on Peter Haas’ notion of an “epistemic community” 
to describe how the financial industry produces knowledge that “involves a normative dimension in 
which compliance with rules is elicited as a result of a belief in the inherent superiority of a technical 
or scientific way of doing things.”98 Timothy Sinclair has been the most explicit in his arguments 
about the power of technical knowledge in financial markets, specifically efforts by credit rating 
agencies to create “embedded knowledge networks” whereby their expertise is “generally considered 
legitimate rather than imposed on entities by market participants.”99 Sinclair discusses how the 
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“knowledge output” from credit raters is usually some form of “recommendation, ranking or rating, 
which claims to condense these forms of knowledge” into a “benchmark around which market players 
subsequently organize their affairs.”100  
Accountants and insurers govern similar forms of knowledge by developing standards on 
how market players should communicate financial information (accountants) and respond to risk 
(insurance). Similar to credit rating, these rules are seamlessly embedded into cognitive expectations 
used by investors, businesses, shareholders and consumers in interpreting economic information 
because accounting and insurance services are necessary to access private capital. Because accounting 
and insurance services are often required by law before any commercial activity takes place, these 
sectors project informal governance that “can shape the environment of other private sector actors in 
ways that regulate their behavior, and amount to informal governance.”101  
The financial sector’s legitimacy in dispensing important technical expertise about the proper 
functioning of markets and desired behavior of market actors demonstrates how financial actors can 
act as an intermediary between the cognitive functions of economic knowledge and the governance of 
financial markets.  More specifically, accountants and insurers possess knowledge that reduces 
market uncertainty or complex economic information into a set of probabilities or risks that market 
actors can then use to better inform their decision-making. For this reason, the way the accounting 
and insurance profession define how a market should attribute value to economic activity has 
tremendous influence. Indeed, Susan Strange argues that such authority over the knowledge necessary 
to govern financial markets represents what she calls a “knowledge structure.” The knowledge 
structure represents a set of ideational resources that determines “what knowledge is discovered, how 
it is stored, and who communicates it by what means, and on what terms.”102  
 Both the accounting and insurance industries govern powerful knowledge structures that 
influence the way financial information is communicated to market actors, and how these actors 
perceive the risks associated with market decision-making. Debates in IPE on the influence of the 
accounting and insurance industry were initiated by Susan Strange who devoted a chapter to both 
accountants and insurers in her 1996 book, The Retreat of the State. She demonstrated how these 
industries enjoy “structural power” and have become powerful private authorities in dictating 
outcomes in the global economy. Her arguments inspired an impressive body of research on the 
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accounting industry’s growing influence in international financial politics.103 Virginia Haufler has 
devoted similar efforts to analyzing how the insurance industry governs a powerful “international risk 
regime.”104  
The capacity to govern a knowledge structure is often linked to important political influence 
at the international level. As Ian Rowlands argues, international actors “who are perceived to have a 
monopoly of knowledge” are often “given greater access to decision-makers.”105 Indeed, the 
accounting and insurance industry’s influence over powerful regulatory institutions has received 
considerable attention in these IPE debates. While institutional investors are primarily “rule-takers”, 
accountants and insurers are “rule-makers” who belong to financial professions that have been 
delegated authority at both the international and national level in developing rules for their own 
industry.106  
Chapter 1 (section 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 ) outlined the important influence of these industries in 
shaping the way their markets are regulated. In the accounting industry, the International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB) designs and implements international accounting standards as a part of its 
mandate to harmonize national accounting standards. The accounting profession has important 
influence in this institution based on its expertise on communicating financial information and its 
formal role in designing the standards.107 In the insurance industry, the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has a similar mandate to the IASB in facilitating the harmonization of 
national insurance regulations. Insurers, like accountants, play a significant role in the design of these 
regulations based on their expertise in pricing risks.108  
 By influencing these regulations based on their cognitive expectations for an efficient or 
rational market behavior, the accountancy and insurance professions enjoy asymmetrical influence 
over the private sector and global economy because they function as gatekeepers to accessing capital 
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and reputational intermediaries. Although governments have delegated authority to institutions that 
protect the transmission of accounting and insurance knowledge into regulations from political 
interference, IPE scholars increasingly recognize that this governance process masks important 
political trade-offs with significant consequences for the global economy.  As Sinclair puts it more 
generally, “any social behavior which has potentially enormous consequences for hundreds of 
millions of people can hardly be considered apolitical.”109  
IPE scholars have thus recognized important links between financial knowledge and market 
behavior in conditions of uncertainty. Financial industries embed knowledge into their services and 
even regulations, which influence market expectations for “rational” behavior in response to such 
uncertainty.  Despite this important recognition, IPE scholars have yet to analyze the potential role 
that cognitive qualities within the accounting and insurance “knowledge structure” can have in 
governing the relationship between financial markets and the environment. In addition, these scholars 
tend to describe the political use of financial knowledge as strategy to subvert, rather than expand, 
public regulation.110  
2.3.2 Accounting and Insurance Knowledge and Global Environmental Governance 
 
This section examines how the cognitive expectations that accountants and insurers use to interpret 
economic information can be drawn upon to reform the financial “knowledge structure” that currently 
disregards the economic value of corporate environmental performance from consideration in 
financial decision-making. More specifically, it describes how these cognitive expectations interpret 
economic uncertainty around the market value of a firm’s corporate environmental performance as an 
opportunity to develop new financial practices and knowledge. Accountants and insurers can use their 
expertise to reduce this uncertainty around the economic impacts of climate change into a “risk” that 
can be measured, priced, and ultimately internalized in financial decision-making throughout the 
economy.   
As is widely recognized in debates over the governance of climate change, the most 
significant obstacle to implementing effective regulation is the uncertainty that exists concerning the 
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future impacts of climate change, and who should be held liable for the cost of such impacts.  In this 
context, accounting and insurance cognitive expectations are potentially significant sources of 
technical authority in strengthening the governance of climate change. Before describing how these 
expectations can be used to support global climate governance, it is first necessary to describe at a 
more general level how accounting and insurance knowledge governs the relationship between the 
economy and the environment.  
Within the accounting profession, there is a growing recognition that “financial accounting, 
and in particular, the reported profit figures in financial statements, lie at the very heart of the 
environmental crisis.”111 Financial accounting is designed to identify and eliminate information 
asymmetries that exist between investors and their investments by developing calculative practices 
that organize, evaluate and communicate financial information to generate a cohesive signal on 
whether a certain economic activity is a source of value or a potential risk or cost. According to 
scholars of accounting, the elimination of information asymmetries relating to a firm’s environmental 
performance has the potential to improve decision-making among investors in ways that support a 
more environmentally sustainable allocation of their resources.112  
Before accountants are willing to measure a firm’s environmental performance, however, 
they must determine whether information about this performance fits within their cognitive 
expectations for information that is “decision-useful” for capital providers in improving their 
decision-making.113 The boundary between information that is and is not decision-useful is a source 
of technical debate for accountants. These debates create uncertainty for accountants in fulfilling their 
responsibilities as auditors and communicators of financial information. This uncertainty provides an 
incentive for “practitioners and researchers to develop new accounting approaches to cope with the 
reporting gap.”114  
These debates are particularly active over whether or not a firm’s environmental performance 
constitutes a risk that is decision-useful information and should be measured and disclosed. Because 
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environmental risks are usually defined as the “exposure to potential environmental losses” which 
depend on the confirmation of a future outflow of resources from a firm, accountants are generally 
hesitant to disclose such information given that there is no present measurable outflow of 
resources.115 Despite this hesitation, investors who prefer to err on the side of transparency 
continually push accountants “to put a price on the environmental risks faced by companies.”116 
To resolve these debates and determine whether a firm’s environmental performance (ie. 
exposure to environmental risk) is considered decision-useful, accountants will experiment in how to 
measure these risks in ways that progressively improve its decision-useful qualities. More 
specifically, accountants test measurement and valuation techniques to understand whether a firm’s 
environmental performance is decision-useful for investors. By working to identify weaknesses in 
these practices, accounting knowledge renders uncertainty about the impacts of a firm’s 
environmental performance “visible in financial terms” by demonstrating how financial flows “come 
to be transformed” by these impacts.117 Miller and O’Leary make a similar conclusion arguing that 
while accountancy is meant in practice to “reflect economic reality”, it can also end up shaping this 
reality.118 
The insurance industry also governs a powerful “knowledge structure” with significant 
implications for environmental governance. As a market mechanism for spreading and pricing 
economic risk, insurance “provides a framework for communicating to economic actors the nature 
and cost of environmental risks, and offers incentives for firms to behave more carefully.”119 These 
incentives manifest in premium and deductible adjustments, which can raise or lower the cost of 
economic activity depending on an insurer’s assessment of a firm’s exposure to risk. The 
environmental performance of a firm can thus be governed through the availability of insurance and 
the cost of the premiums to adequately cover such risks. As Benjamin Richardson argues, “the 
insurance market prima facie provides reflexive-style incentives for improved [environmental] 
corporate conduct.”120 
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Increasingly, insurers have been looking to strengthen their ability to predict risks associated 
with corporate environmental performance, specifically exposure to weather-related property and 
casualty losses, which many insurers believe are increasing in response to a warming climate.  But 
before insurers can begin to price a risk, they must use their cognitive expectations to evaluate 
whether this risk is in fact insurable. These expectations are informed by “actuarialism”, or the 
capacity to accurately predict and price future risks based on a statistical model that determines the 
frequency and magnitude of these risks using the historical record of these risks manifesting into 
losses.121  
Essentially, insurers are willing to price a future risk if: 1) they can predict the probability of 
the risk materializing into a loss, 2) it can be priced at a level that customers are willing to pay, and 3) 
it can compensate insurers for any claims made without suffering a net loss.122 Often environmental 
risks do not perfectly satisfy the actuarial process (e.g. some weather events happen more frequently 
with more severity in certain geographic locations).123 Insurers, like accountants, are compelled to 
take up the challenge created by risks that remain outside their calculative practices.  
For example, insurers were initially only able to price fire risks, but as technology and 
actuarial science has improved, insurers can now model and provide coverage for a plurality of 
weather related risks, including wind, thunderstorms, hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding. By working 
to expand their modeling capacity, insurers can reduce the uncertainty around potential losses in ways 
that bring these uninsurable risks “back in line” with their models. Guy Carpenter confirms this 
process in reference to catastrophe or CAT models that predict losses associated with significant 
natural hazards: “catastrophe models create information where none would exist otherwise to enable 
analysis and effective risk management decision-making.”124 
Examining the influence of accounting and insurance knowledge in governing the 
relationship between the global economy and the environment reveals that these industries have 
tremendous potential to use this knowledge to regulate the impacts of the global economy on the 
environment. This influence derives from two intrinsic qualities of the accounting and insurance 
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“knowledge structure”. First, both industries are influenced by cognitive expectations that invoke the 
“precautionary principle” when faced with conditions of economic uncertainty.125 Because the 
economy currently excludes a firm’s environmental performance as a source of economic 
information, there is a great deal of uncertainty and even controversy over whether and how to 
measure this information. Despite this uncertainty, accountants and insurers are encouraged by their 
professions’ cognitive expectations to identify strategies and practices that can reduce this uncertainty 
into a governable risk. These expectations are therefore conductive to market behavior that supports 
an expansion of accounting and insurance services that can mitigate market uncertainty through this 
conversion into a risk.  
Indeed, the second important quality of accounting and insurance knowledge is its capacity to 
govern market uncertainty in ways that convert this uncertainty into a financial risk that is 
internalized in accounting and insurance services. Because climate change represents a source of 
economic uncertainty, both in terms of its potential costs to the economy and in terms of how these 
costs are attributed to certain economic behavior as a liability, accountants and insurers govern 
“knowledge structures” with the potential to reduce this uncertainty into governable risks. By making 
this connection, accountants and insurers have the potential to use their technical authority, in 
addition to their access to powerful rule-making authorities over financial markets, to encourage 
economic behavior supporting mitigation and adaptation to climate change risks. More precisely, 
accountants and insurers are predisposed to knowledge that links a firm’s financial performance to 
climate change risks that must be governed through regulations that measure and price these risks.  
 Chapter 4 will discuss how accountants could implement international accounting standards 
that measure a firm’s exposure to climate change risks in its corporate accounts (e.g. by measuring 
the cost of GHG emissions, and exposure to physical or legal risks). Similarly, Chapter 5 will analyze 
how insurers could model the impacts of climate change on their markets to inform a “climate 
premium” on economic behavior that contributes to climate change (e.g. by raising premiums on 
GHG intensive areas of the economy), and economic behavior that exposes insurers to weather 
related losses (e.g. by raising premiums in areas with poor building infrastructure as an incentive to 
reduce physical climate change risks). These models could also inform various international 
mitigation and adaptation regulations necessary to ensure risk-transfer markets remain efficient as 
climate change impacts increase. In this respect, accountants and insurers govern knowledge that, if 
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spread among market actors throughout financial markets, could attribute market value to behavior 
supporting mitigation and adaptation.   
2.3.3 The CDSB and ClimateWise as forms of “Cognitive Governance” 
 
The main objective of cognitive governance in the cases discussed in this thesis is to use best practice 
standards to embed financial knowledge that links a firm’s environmental performance to financial 
risks throughout the economy vis-à-vis public regulation. The strategic use of financial knowledge is 
critical to the effectiveness of cognitive governance. In the case of the CDSB and ClimateWise, 
accounting and insurance knowledge that interprets climate change uncertainty as a financial risk is 
used to challenge existing market expectations that disregard the economic value of this uncertainty. 
Financial knowledge can reduce this uncertainty by “creating ways to make more expectations 
expectable and giving improbabilities a structuring function.”126 Co-regulation provides an 
organizational platform for cognitive governance by creating a system where financial knowledge can 
be tested and refined to improve decision-making in response to economic uncertainty, and determine 
strategies and regulations that embed this knowledge throughout the economy  (See Figure 2.1). 
Indeed, once a technical consensus is reached on how to improve market decision-making in response 
to this uncertainty, co-regulation also provides a platform for cultivating political support to embed 
this consensus within new kinds of public regulation.  
Environmental co-regulation using cognitive governance attempts to connect existing market 
expectations that disregard a firm’s corporate environmental performance as a form of market 
uncertainty to financial knowledge that can govern this uncertainty as a risk. By demonstrating that 
the treatment of this uncertainty as a risk can improve the efficiency of market decisions, cognitive 
governance reveals “hidden links” between economic behavior protecting the environment and the 
creation of market value. Conversely, cognitive governance can also reveal links between economic 
behavior damaging the environment and market costs. Once this knowledge is embedded within 
global financial markets with the assistance of public regulation, these “hidden links” should 
influence market decisions in ways that shift capital towards the former economic behavior, and away 
from the latter.  
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Figure 2.1 Cognitive governance 
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To facilitate the goal of shifting market expectations within the global economy to recognize the 
economic value of a firm’s environmental performance (i.e. exposure to climate change risks), 
cognitive governance involves two key characteristics. First, cognitive governance involves the use of 
voluntary best-practice standards to generate technical and political consensus that a firm’s 
environmental performance has an economic value that, if measured and priced with the assistance of 
regulation, can improve the efficiency of market decision-making. Second, the adoption of these best 
practice standards is governed by a “reflexive mechanism.” These mechanisms have received a lot of 
attention as a key component of the “corporate accountability” movement among ENGOs.127 
Reflexive mechanisms traditionally take the form of ENGO or third party oversight to monitor 
compliance among corporate actors to voluntary best practice standards that target environmental 
improvement. This oversight constitutes an important source of reflexivity in environmental co-
regulation. By identifying weaknesses in a corporate actors ability to comply with best practices, 
ENGOs can provide neutral expertise on how to improve compliance.  
 In the case of the CDSB and ClimateWise, the reflexive mechanism takes on a unique role 
because of the unconventional objectives targeted by each initiative’s best practice standards. 
Whereas most best practices standards target “eco-efficiency” improvements by asking individual 
firms or sectors to reduce their environmental footprint, the standards adopted by the CDSB and 
ClimateWise targets the creation of financial incentives to improve environmental performance 
among firms participating in accounting and insurance markets. These standards are somewhat 
similar to NSMD governance, which also target best practices for introducing market incentives.128  
But to introduce incentives to measure and price climate change risks within accounting and 
insurance markets, the CDSB and ClimateWise standards are designed to facilitate best practices in 
mobilizing the expertise and resources necessary to implement cognitive governance. For this reason, 
the reflexive mechanism employed by these initiatives is designed to identify and resolve obstacles 
faced by accountants and insurers in generating a technical and political consensus that supports an 
expansion of public regulation governing climate change risks. By identifying weaknesses in 
complying with efforts to generate a technical and political consensus, this mechanism generates 
information that ENGOs can use to focus expertise and resources among the initiative’s participants. 
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This process incorporates reflexivity or the capacity to “ratchet-up” compliance in supporting the 
two-stage process involved in cognitive governance.  
This analysis confirms that while co-regulation using cognitive governance does leverage the 
influence of financial “epistemic communities”, it is a more robust and formal approach to 
influencing international outcomes than through the spread of expert knowledge.129 More specifically, 
cognitive governance attempts to “instrumentalize” knowledge by targeting specific policy outcomes 
and political advocacy through best-practice standards that are governed by an ENGO. 
 The first stage of cognitive governance involves generating a technical consensus on financial 
practices that reduce economic uncertainty into usable economic information which improves 
decision-making in response to this uncertainty. This “technical consensus building” stage involves 
the use of voluntary best practice standards that encourage firms to test financial knowledge for 
reducing uncertainty which can then be used to inform regulations that embed this knowledge 
throughout the global economy. ENGOs often provide the logistical support for the use of a reflexive 
mechanism by acting as a third party monitor or auditor that identifies weaknesses or challenges in 
complying with commitments to use financial knowledge in ways that reduce uncertainty and 
improve market efficiency.  ENGOs can then coordinate financial actors to address these weaknesses 
through further experimentation, or encouragement to devote more resources towards a technical 
consensus. This reflexive mechanism represents what Cashore calls an “achievement strategy” that 
“actively seeks legitimation”.130 In the case of the CDSB and ClimateWise, this reflexive mechanism 
incorporates accounting and insurance cognitive expectations for how climate change uncertainty can 
be governed as a risk into usable financial knowledge.  
This process is designed to facilitate “cycles” of evaluation on emerging financial knowledge 
until a technical consensus is reached on the strategies necessary to reduce climate change uncertainty 
into usable financial information that improves efficiency. Despite the development of new practices 
that allow financial actors to take advantage of climate change uncertainty, the implementation of 
these new practices often requires the support of external constituencies participating in financial 
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markets. In the case of NSMD governance described by Cashore, these constituencies included 
various market players along the timber supply-chain.131 As coordination service firms, accountants 
and insurers require “legitimation” of new financial knowledge not just among end-users of their 
services, who could face additional costs, but also among government policymakers and regulators 
before that knowledge can be implemented to improve efficiency.  
The second stage of cognitive governance is designed to generate this legitimacy through 
engaging with strategic constituencies to generate support for the behavioral change required to 
reduce uncertainty around climate change impacts. This “political consensus building” stage attempts 
to generate legitimacy for new financial practices by leveraging the technical consensus that these 
practices can yield material gains (e.g. climate change risk disclosure improves corporate reputation, 
improves investor decision-making, and expands accounting markets). Similar to the first stage, 
efforts to generate this political consensus are incorporated into the reflexive mechanism to identify 
and resolve weaknesses in complying with efforts to cultivate a constituency of support.  
The CDSB and ClimateWise (in addition to the INCR) differ from previous examples of 
environmental co-regulation such as NSMD governance because this political consensus building 
must develop legitimacy among powerful public authorities in addition to market participants 
throughout the accounting and insurance supply-chain. As Chapter 3, 4 and 5 will discuss, the 
realization of accountants’ and insurers’ material interests in the efficient governance of risks, and 
any corresponding efficiency gains, are contingent on the implementation of new financial knowledge 
into public regulation and policy. For this reason, the CDSB and ClimateWise are designed to act as 
platforms that embed accounting and insurance knowledge that links climate change uncertainty to 
financial risk within public regulation. This component of cognitive governance is important because 
once these financial practices are incorporated into accounting and insurance markets vis-à-vis the 
support of public authorities, their influence will multiply throughout the global economy.   
With the support of various public authorities, financial markets can impose conditions 
requiring that market players measure and price the economic value of a firm’s environmental 
performance (ie. exposure to climate change risks). At this point, the “knowledge structure” relating 
to what defines “market value” as governed by accountants and insurers will foster new market 
expectations that corporate environmental performance represents a source of market value. As these 
practices are adopted by more firms, however, their visibility as a form of influence supported by the 
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CDSB and ClimateWise will be diffused and they will be transformed into a normal inter-subjective 
business practice.  
Once a firm is made aware of new accounting and insurance standards that require the 
measurement and pricing of climate change risks, this knowledge will spread throughout its 
international operations and become embedded in normal business practices. In this respect, the firm 
acts as a vehicle for spreading market expectations that have incorporated new financial knowledge 
capable of governing uncertainty. It is at this stage of cognitive governance where the notion that 
climate change uncertainty constitutes a measurable financial risk becomes “taken-for-granted” 
within existing market expectations for efficient business decision-making. Similar to any form of 
financial risk, market actors are incentivized to govern and reduce this risk to improve their economic 
efficiency, or “bottom-line.”  
Co-regulation involving the use of cognitive governance to target the expansion of public 
regulation is thus quite different from more conventional “post-Westpalian” co-regulation that is 
designed to act as a form of “governance beyond the state”. Rather than generating reputational 
credibility, the use of voluntary standards in these cases constitutes a key element in facilitating a 
broad constituency of support in governing climate change risks through public regulation. Both 
CDSB and ClimateWise recognize that voluntary standards are necessary for cultivating 
constituencies to support the governance of climate change risks, but that public regulation is 
ultimately required for this governance to be fully effective. The extent to which the financial firms 
involved in these “unconventional” kinds of co-regulation are held accountable to facilitating each 
voluntary initiative’s ultimate objective is an issue discussed later in the thesis.  
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The goal of this chapter was to examine how existing literature describes co-regulation as a strategy 
to achieve influence, and differentiate the approach adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise. IPE and 
GEP literature has mostly discussed co-regulation in “post-Westphalian” terms as strategy to generate 
“governance beyond the state”. Analysis of examples of environmental co-regulation within financial 
markets revealed that they have quite a different objective of using co-regulation to support the 
expansion of public regulation. The INCR, CDSB and ClimateWise, in particular, have targetted the 
expansion of public regulation explicitly within their mandate. They draw on a unique strategy that I 
have labeled “cognitive governance” which uses voluntary standards to embed financial knowledge 
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for the efficient governance of climate change risks within existing market expectations for efficient 
business decision-making. In so doing, they build upon the experience of the several other recent co-
regulatory initiatives within financial markets between ENGOs and institutional investors, notably 
Ceres, the CDP and INCR.   
In their strategic attempt to use cognitive governance in overcoming the challenges involved 
in transforming climate change uncertainty into a financial risk, the CDSB and ClimateWise embrace 
a two-stage process.  The first stage engages in technical consensus building to develop financial 
knowledge and regulations required to govern climate change uncertainty as a risk. The second stage 
attempts to cultivate a political consensus around this new financial knowledge among rival industry 
actors, market participants, policymakers and regulators to implement public regulation that can assist 
in using this knowledge to govern climate change risks. Both of these stages are governed by a 
reflexive mechanism designed to identify weaknesses and improve the initiative’s capacity to achieve 
these outcomes.  
The use of cognitive governance in leveraging accounting and insurance knowledge to reduce 
economic uncertainty on climate change through the CDSB and ClimateWise provides a compelling 
example of how environmental co-regulation has evolved from more conventional approaches that 
target “governance beyond the state”. What factors encouraged private actors to support this form of 
co-regulation? Chapter 3 turns to analyze existing literature on the emergence of private governance 









What explains the emergence of the distinctive form of co-regulation adopted by the CDSB and 
ClimateWise?  The chapter reviews IPE and GEP literature relevant to answering this question. This 
analysis is used to hypothesize a framework that identifies factors conducive to the emergence of 
“unconventional” co-regulation in financial markets that can be applied to the objects of analyses in 
Chapter 4 and 5.1  To generate this framework, the chapter is divided into two sections.  
The first section surveys explanations of the emergence of “conventional” forms of 
environmental co-regulation that are designed to act as an alternative to official regulation. Some of 
these explanations focus on the influence of economic globalization and the rise of neoliberal 
ideology. Others point to the rising influence of transnational civil society actors who view co-
regulation as “second-best” tool to regulate global capitalism in the absence of public regulation. Still 
others have interpreted co-regulation as a pro-active effort by TNCs to co-opt opposition and pre-
empt a resurgence of public regulation by signaling to regulators and civil society that they are 
willing to self-regulate.  
The second section notes that that these conventional explanations have limited use in 
identifying factors conducive to the form of co-regulation adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise, 
and it hypothesizes an alternative framework. The framework draws on explanations of the 
emergence of co-regulation within financial markets, specifically collaboration between ENGOs and 
institutional investors through such initiatives as the CDP and INCR. This framework identifies three 
important factors that explain the unique form of environmental co-regulation emerging within 
                                                     
1 While this “hypothesized” framework is designed to capture factors that may be relevant to explaining the 
emergence of the CDSB and ClimateWise, it is not intended to provide a generalized explanation for all 
unconventional co-regulation. Rather the purpose of this framework is to reveal the sources of the unique and 
fascinating examples of co-regulation within financial markets through inductive empirical analyses of several 
existing examples of this phenomenon. 
 
  69 
financial markets. First, financial firms (and corporate emitters in the case of the CDSB) have realized 
that public regulation is required to advance their material interests in governing climate change 
uncertainty as a financial risk. Second, those same firms have recognized that collaboration in 
technical and political consensus building is necessary before public regulation can be expanded to 
govern climate change risks. Third, there are ENGOs that have interests in using their expertise and 
political capacity to help these firms build the consensus necessary to implement public regulation. 
3.2 Explaining the Emergence of Conventional Environmental Co-regulation 
 
What explanations are offered in IPE and GEP literature for the emergence of environmental co-
regulation? Most of the literature focuses on explaining the rise of “conventional” co-regulation that 
is designed to act as an alternative to official regulation. Within this literature, various explanations 
are put forward to explain why TNCs and ENGOs to support co-regulation as a strategy to generate 
“governance beyond the state”. Despite their differences, these explanations are united by the view 
that the emergence of co-regulation is a “post-Westphalian” phenomenon linked to various 
transnational economic processes and actors that challenge state authority.  
3.2.1 Economic Globalization and Neoliberal Ideology   
 
A number of scholars have suggested that environmental co-regulation has emerged in response to a 
worldwide structural and ideological shift from the 1980s onwards towards the use of markets as 
“sites” of governance. This shift from “state authority to market authority” was driven partly by 
economic globalization which encouraged governments to relax regulations as a means of 
strengthening the competitiveness of domestic firms in the new global economy.2 Also important was 
the growing dominance of neoliberal ideology, whose supporters backed reforms which encouraged 
self-regulation within the private sector as a more efficient and effective approach to regulating global 
capitalism.3 The combination of economic globalization and neoliberalism legitimized the use of 
private governance as an effective alternative to burdensome and costly official “command-and-
control” regulations. As Robert Falkner puts it, the emergence of private governance is part of a 
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“long-term shift away from state-centric models of governance to new forms of authority located in 
the global economy, with private actors emerging as the new sovereigns.”4  
 Within global environmental politics, the influence of this broad shift towards markets as 
sources of governance manifested in growing support for strategies for linking market growth and 
environmental protection. The idea that market growth and environmental protection could be made 
compatible was first championed by the 1987 Bruntland Report, authored by the World Commission 
on Environment and Development (WCED). At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development, or “Rio Earth Summit”, the norm promoting the use of markets to protect the 
environment gained further support among participating governments through Agenda 21, which 
encouraged market instruments as tools for environmental regulation.5  
In response, groups such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) started promoting the view that global business could help address environmental 
degradation rather than being viewed as a part of the problem.6 Within the business community more 
broadly, neoliberal ideology legitimized thinking that state intervention could be subordinated to 
support a “broader project of [environmental] governance by and through the market.”7 Steven 
Bernstein linked the onset of neoliberal ideology to the emergence of a “norm-complex” he calls 
“liberal environmentalism” within environmental politics. This norm-complex, he argued, legitimizes 
the emergence of private environmental governance. In Bernstein’s words:   
Liberal environmentalism accepts the liberalization of trade and finance as consistent with, 
and even necessary for, international environmental protection. It also promotes market and 
other economic mechanisms (such as tradeable permit schemes or the privatization of the 
commons) over “command-and-control” methods (standards, bans, quotas, and so on) as the 
preferred method of environmental management.8 
From Bernstein’s perspective, the “privatization of environmental governance” through such 
initiatives as ISO 14000 and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) demonstrates the 
institutionalization of liberal environmentalism within environmental politics.9 Newell and Paterson 
argue that neoliberalism has been conducive to the emergence of various “collaborative partnerships, 
involving networks of all sorts of actors” that promote market-based approaches to climate 
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governance.10 At a more specific level, these structural and ideological changes in the global economy 
have also been linked by other scholars to the emergence of environmental co-regulation in the 
forestry industry through the FSC. According to Pattberg, the emergence of the FSC can in part be 
attributed to failed efforts at implementing international regulation through the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). These efforts were constrained by 
governments worried that such regulation would violate the free trade regime governed by the World 
Trade Organization.11 Cashore makes a broader argument that the FSC emerged in response to 
“economic and political trends in the last ten years that have given market-oriented policy instruments 
increasing salience.”12  
3.2.2 The Rising Influence of Non-State Actors 
 
While explanations pointing to economic globalization and neoliberal ideology explain environmental 
co-regulation in a structural manner, others embrace a more agency-centred account that points to the 
growing influence of non-state actors in global governance as an important factor in co-regulation. 
Indeed, Strange concluded her 1996 analysis of the growing regulatory void at the international level 
arguing that non-state actors have an opportunity to take advantage of their agency in shaping the 
governance of the global economy.13 
John Ruggie developed this argument further to suggest that the retreat of the state represents 
a fundamental shift at the global level towards what he called a “global public domain.” In his view, 
this shift is facilitating the emergence of a new global space where transnational civil society and 
global business could cooperate on the appropriate norms and practices for regulating global 
capitalism.14 Co-regulation represented one outcome of the politics within this global public domain.  
More specifically, co-regulation represents an operational platform for non-state actors to 
advance norms or approaches to resolving tension between civil society and global business at the 
transnational level. Both ENGOs and TNCs have had reasons to support co-regulation to promote 
new norms in this “global public domain” given the regulatory void created by economic 
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globalization. For ENGOs and other civil-society actors, the structural shift towards markets led to a 
recognition that the strengthening of environmental governance depended on leveraging the resources 
of TNCs, who represent an increasingly powerful influence over the environment.  
As the previous chapter noted, co-regulation initially emerged as an ENGO strategy to 
address “greenwash” by offering to monitor and govern the implementation of voluntary best practice 
standards that target the improvement of corporate environmental performance. ENGOs believed that 
this approach had potential to help enforce the implementation of these standards and addressing the 
“regulatory void” as states refrained from implementing command-and-control environmental 
policy.15 
This collaborative approach was welcomed by TNCs who realized that co-regulation could 
help them respond to these ENGO concerns in addition to promoting several interests of their own.16 
In addition to the recognition that allying with ENGOs could resolve reputational risks associated 
with increases in environmental advocacy, TNCs realized co-regulation could improve their brand’s 
competitiveness through its association with environmental norms. TNCs could also start developing 
their own regulations as a strategy for avoiding or “pre-empting” the costs associated with formal 
interstate regulation. In addition, co-regulation provided an opportunity for TNCs to develop 
strategies for increasing  “eco-efficiency”.17  
Both Pattberg and Cashore have analyzed the factors behind the emergence of the FSC to 
demonstrate how the agency of non-state actors represented an important explanation for this form of 
co-regulation.18 During the late 1980s, ENGOs targeted the forestry industry and retail suppliers of 
lumber by linking their reputation to the destruction of rare tropical timber forests. These protests 
imposed reputational costs on the forestry industry by forcing firms to identify sources of sustainable 
timber. A number of certification schemes emerged in response to these protests in which forestry 
firms agree to let ENGOs label timber as sustainable. ENGOs soon realized that the proliferation of 
these schemes lead to confusion about which firms were indeed supporting sustainable forestry 
practices.19  
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In 1990, representatives from the forestry industry and environmental and human-rights 
groups met in California to “discuss how to combine their interests in improving forest conservation 
and reducing deforestation.”20 The FSC agreement emerged out of these negotiations as a 
compromise between ENGOs and the forestry industry on how regulate sustainable forestry practices 
given the lack of formal international regulation.21 For ENGOs, the development of a universal 
sustainable forestry certification program fulfilled their normative goals by increasing accountability 
over the industry’s practices. For TNCs, this strategy represented an effective approach for dealing 
with reputational attacks as well as for improving brand reputation and potentially increasing 
marketshare.22 The FSC demonstrates the important role of non-state actors in promoting co-
regulation as an operational platform for advancing new sustainability norms that can resolve 
contestation between ENGOs and TNCs at the transnational level without depending on the authority 
of the state.23  
3.2.3 Radical Explanations 
 
The emergence of co-regulation has also been interpreted from a more radical perspective that is more 
skeptical of the influence of a “bottom-up” mobilization of civil society interests. Rather than seeing 
co-regulation as an effective strategy to reign in the forces of global capitalism, neo-Gramscian 
scholars argue that co-regulation has been driven primarily by corporate interests attempting to thwart 
effective international environmental regulation. From this perspective, corporate interests have used 
co-regulation as a strategy for securing “hegemonic stability” necessary to preserve a capitalist 
“neoliberal historic bloc” against environmentalists who see markets as intrinsic sources of 
environmental damage.24 As a consequence, initiatives described as co-regulation in this thesis are 
seen by some as a “strategy of accommodation, combining material and discursive efforts to preserve 
corporate legitimacy and autonomy in the face of growing public environmental concern; it is thus 
more about political and economic than environmental sustainability.”25  These arguments are 
particularly pervasive among environmental groups who criticize private climate governance 
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strategies as a “weak response to climate change” influenced by the “domination of the world by 
neoliberal capitalism.”26   
Although neo-Gramscians are skeptical of the purpose of co-regulation, some acknowledge 
that the efforts of civil society actors, ENGOs or policy entrepreneurs to link a firm’s brand reputation 
to broader societal expectations for appropriate corporate behavior can “pose challenges to the 
legitimacy and reputation of individual firms.”27 According to Peter Newell and David Levy, these 
efforts can take advantage of “crises” that expose corporate behavior to greater scrutiny among 
broader societal constituencies. By appealing to moral principles, or exploiting divisions between 
industry and states or between different sectors, civil-society actors can “compensate for their lack of 
resources” to generate improved corporate behavior.28 Despite this optimism, the threshold they set 
for legitimately challenging the “neoliberal hegemonic bloc” is quite high and involves both an 
alliance between states, business, NGOs, and “an alignment of ideological forces that coordinate the 
members of the bloc.”29 
According to the radical explanation, co-regulation emerges in response to short-term market 
concerns about a firm’s reputation and potential regulatory risks associated with its environmental 
performance. In the context of environmental co-regulation in financial markets, this argument 
questions the “business case” for advancing material interests in governing long-term climate change 
risks through public regulation. Instead of using voluntary co-regulation to generate evidence of a 
business case, or cultivate constituencies willing to support public regulation, corporate actors are 
seen to join co-regulatory initiatives simply to generate reputational credibility.  
Adam Harmes has interpreted investor interest in voluntary climate change risk disclosure 
initiatives such as CDP and INCR from this perspective. Rather than embracing the long term 
“business case” for “investor environmentalism”,30 Harmes argues that investors are constrained by 
much more short-term constraints and that their material interests in supporting climate change risk 
disclosure are more superficial and related primarily to reputational concerns among their 
shareholders.31 Although voluntary approaches may generate reputational credibility, Harmes argues 
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that investors will only change their behavior in significant ways that reduce climate change risks if 
they are forced to do so through robust public regulation.32  
3.3 Conceptualizing the Emergence of Environmental Co-regulation in 
Financial Markets 
 
These various explanations of environmental co-regulation are of limited use in accounting for the 
factors that explain the form of co-regulation adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise. The structural 
approaches that invoke globalization and neoliberalism are focused on explaining why regulation is 
shifting away from the state towards private forms of regulation. The CSDB and ClimateWise, 
however, are forms of co-regulation that support an expansion of public regulation. In contrast to 
neoliberalism, these preferences reflect what Paterson and Newell call “climate Keynesianism” where 
“markets are not abandoned; merely better governed to direct them more closely towards the goal of 
decarbonisation”.33 From this perspective, the CDSB and ClimateWise challenge those scholars who 
view neoliberalism as an “anti-regulatory” ideology legitimizing the use of private governance. 
Moreover, as we shall see, the creation of this distinct form of co-regulation in financial markets is 
heavily contingent on the actors involved and their preferences, rather than being determined so much 
by these kinds of macro-level structural conditions.  
The emergence of CDSB and ClimateWise also demonstrates that ENGOs and other non-
state actors have found success in pushing for more robust objectives than simply a “second best” 
alternative to state regulation. Rather than settling for a voluntary approach, the ENGOs involved in 
these initiatives have found ways of using their expertise and capacity to ally with corporate interests 
favouring an expansion of public regulation.  
The support of these corporate interests is also difficult to reconcile with explanations that 
point to TNCs’ desire to preempt official regulation or to simply address reputational risks and 
branding concerns through voluntary initiatives. We need a better explanation for why the corporate 
interests involved in CDSB and ClimateWise support a strengthened role for the state, one that 
requires firms throughout the economy to measure or price climate change risks. As we shall see, 
these corporate interests believe that voluntary approaches are insufficient to facilitate improved 
environmental performance.  
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What, then, explains the emergence of the form of co-regulation embraced by CDSB and 
ClimateWise? Instead of drawing on factors from explanations of “conventional” co-regulation, it 
may be more useful to look at scholarship that has examined the rise of other examples of co-
regulation in the financial industry that bear some similarities to CDSB and ClimateWise, notably 
Ceres, the CDP and especially the INCR. This next section builds upon that scholarship to 
hypothesize an explanatory framework that identifies factors conducive to the emergence of 
“unconventional” co-regulation, which is then applied to the CDSB and ClimateWise cases in 
Chapters 4 and 5.   
3.3.1 Governing Climate Change Risks through Public Regulation 
 
Existing accounts of the emergence of the Ceres, the CDP and INCR all point to the influence of 
financial firms with material interests in governing climate change uncertainty. In trying to 
distinguish these forms of co-regulation involving institutional investors from conventional examples 
of co-regulation, Michael MacLeod argues that despite potential environmental benefits, the actors 
involved in Ceres, the CDP and INCR “are engaged together primarily for material reasons.”34 Rather 
than promoting improved environmental performance based on normative gains for the firm, Ceres, 
the CDP and INCR “operate according to a logic of consequences – that responsible investing is 
actually rational, responsible investing because it takes into account factors that will ultimately 
improve the corporate bottom line, and hence, represents a fiduciary duty.”35 According to MacLeod, 
institutional investors support these initiatives as a strategy to advance their material interests in 
reducing exposure to financial risks linked to a firm’s environmental performance.  
 Material interests in adopting conventional forms of co-regulation are usually related to 
improvements in eco-efficiency where firms improve their environmental performance to save costs 
on energy use and waste management. Firms that are energy intensive or that emit a lot of pollution 
are often targeted by ENGOs for co-regulation by appealing to their material interests in governing 
the costs associated with these environmental externalities. Co-regulation offers a useful strategy for 
these firms because they can determine the most efficient way to reduce the costs associated with 
these externalities.  
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In the financial industry, these material interests are not directly related to eco-efficiency of 
financial firms. Indeed, the financial industry has a relatively small direct environmental footprint 
compared to other industries. For this reason, the use of co-regulation to govern exposure to these 
risks is not related with a financial firm’s environmental performance and is more related to risks 
generated by other firms that use their financial services. Risks associated with a firm’s financial 
performance and its potential impact on financial markets is therefore not a traditional CSR or 
reputational issue, but rather a risk-management issue.36 This “business case” for supporting co-
regulation as a strategy to improve risk-management in the financial industry is somewhat more 
robust than the case for using co-regulation to improve eco-efficiency. 
For example, the Ceres Principles represented an optimal approach to addressing information 
asymmetries associated with a firm’s environmental performance.37 By collectively supporting the 
principles, institutional investors could ally with each other in coordinating efforts to improve the 
disclosure of the firms in which they invested. More specifically, investors could use disclosure as a 
condition for accessing further investment, or threaten to file shareholder resolutions if firms failed to 
provide disclosure.  
In the last decade, ENGOs and institutional investors have turned their attention to the use of 
co-regulation through disclosure frameworks to identify the impact of climate change risks on an 
investor’s portfolio. Institutional investors, specifically mutual and pension funds, are particularly 
exposed to climate change risks because their investments are largely made up of retirement funds 
that have a long-term time horizon. In addition, these funds are passively managed by buying shares 
from firms that are widely used in major stock market indexes.38 As a consequence, these investors 
are often described as “universal owners” because they are “substantial owners of assets” across the 
economy.39  
This long-term, low-risk strategy is exposed to climate change economic uncertainty because 
the impacts of climate change are predicted to increase in the long-term and manifest throughout the 
economy. Because of this unique investment strategy, supporters of Ceres, CDP and INCR argue that 
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institutional investors must take into account longer-term risks associated with climate change 
uncertainty to maintain their fiduciary duty to their shareholders.40 Whether they will do so, however, 
is questioned by some scholars. Harmes, for example, suggests that investors do not employ a long-
term strategy because of concerns related to demands among their shareholders for improvements in 
short-term performance.41 While these short-term incentives could marginalize concerns about the 
long-term implications of climate change among some investors, others may be predisposed to taking 
a precautionary approach based on their risk-management expertise. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
demonstrate the accounting and insurance industry are in fact more dependent on this precautionary 
approach.   
Climate change risks are most likely to materialize in areas of the economy that are GHG 
intensive and exposed to physical risks. Oil and gas, utilities, industrial goods and transportation are 
all examples of this kind of economic activity.42 Institutional investors are often highly exposed to 
these industries because they are capital intensive and dependent on raising capital through private 
financial markets. Because they also have stable long-term growth prospects, these industries often 
take up a disproportionate share of major stock market indexes.43 Some investors have developed 
cognitive expectations that rational risk-management requires disclosure of these risks because of 
their long-term growth strategy but also their disproportionate exposure to industries likely to be 
impacted by climate change risks.  
These expectations are mostly directed towards four categories of risk. The first is regulatory 
risk associated with the impact of government regulations that force firm’s to pay for their GHG 
emissions through emissions trading or a tax. For investors with significant exposure to GHG 
intensive industry, such as oil and gas, utilities, and transportation, the impact of additional costs 
associated with these regulations could alter the returns on their investment. 
Other industries, such as agriculture, insurance, tourism and real estate are exposed to 
physical risks from the changing environment. Climate change is predicted to increase the volatility 
of weather leading to physical damage, intensified drought and flooding, which could lead to business 
closure or interruptions if supply-chains are impacted.  
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The third and fourth categories are legal and reputational risks. Concerning the former, as 
society grows more aware of the link between climate change and industry, lawsuits against GHG 
intensive industry are predicted to increase leading to potential liability losses. Reputational risks 
relate to the risk that climate change could hurt the brand image of firms with a significant GHG 
footprint.44   
MacLeod and Park’s analysis on the rise of “investor environmentalism” has described how 
the potential impact of climate change risks on investment performance has generated material 
interests among institutional investors in governing their exposure to these risks by supporting 
voluntary disclosure frameworks initiated by ENGOs. As the previous chapter discussed, UK policy 
entrepreneurs were able to take advantage of these material interests to establish the CDP 
Secretariat.45 The Secretariat offered to help institutional investors address their material interests in 
facilitating climate change risk disclosure by implementing and organizing its annual CDP survey.46  
In a separate effort, Ceres was able to take advantage of similar material interests to establish 
the INCR in 2003. The INCR follows the CDP’s strategy by promoting the link between climate 
change uncertainty and material risk through a disclosure framework called the “Global Framework 
for Climate Risk Disclosure.” But the INCR also supports a more robust form of co-regulation by 
engaging in public policy advocacy involving the lobbying of the SEC to enforce mandatory 
disclosure of these risks and supporting US GHG emissions regulation.47 These objectives are 
outlined in the INCR’s Climate Risk Action Plan, which is discussed in section 3.3.3.   
By explicitly identifying regulatory reform as a part of its mandate, the INCR is more robust 
in its efforts to target public regulators. More specifically, it demonstrates how environmental co-
regulation within financial markets has evolved from a general focus on supporting the “public 
governance” of the environment to more a specific and direct effort to strengthen individual public 
regulations. This more robust effort to target public regulators represents an important distinguishing 
characteristic of “unconventional” environmental co-regulation. More specifically, institutional 
investors support public regulation as a strategy for advancing material interests in governing climate 
change uncertainty as a financial risk. 
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What explains the emergence of this unique strategy of using co-regulation to promote the 
expansion of public regulation? Although MacLeod and Park’s analysis provides a robust explanation 
of the material interests of institutional investors in governing climate change risks, they do not 
identify this strategy of the INCR as a distinguishing characteristic of efforts to advance these 
material interests.48 The INCR’s goal of expanding public regulation to govern climate change risk 
disclosure stems from a recognition of the limitations of trying to convince firms to disclose their 
risks through voluntary disclosure. In its 2009 SEC petition, the INCR argued that “the investor 
community has made it increasingly clear that information on climate risk is a necessary part of 
investment decisions. And yet publicly traded companies have not responded with the meaningful 
disclosure investors seek.”49 They also point out that weaknesses in voluntary disclosure are 
associated with a lack of “rigor to address the full range of information required in reports files 
pursuant to mandatory SEC rules certified by senior management.”50 
Although investors can ask the firms they invest in to voluntarily disclose these risks, they do 
not have the political authority to force robust disclosure necessary to address material interests in 
governing climate change risks. As a consequence, institutional investors need to “lock-in” collective 
rules governing market uncertainty into public regulation.  According to Walter Mattli and Ngaire 
Woods, this strategy is common among “corporations at risk” which require the support of public 
regulation to adequately govern risks within their markets.51 Indeed, some scholars who embrace a 
broader understanding of neoliberalism, rather than an explicit “anti-regulatory” ideology, argue that 
it can sometimes have contradictory outcomes. Bernstein argues that corporations who invoke the 
“precautionary principle” as a justification for the use of public regulation to govern market 
uncertainty demonstrate a “contradiction” within the influence of neoliberalism, where regulation is 
viewed as a key tool in promoting market efficiency.52 But this recognition that voluntary approaches 
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are insufficient for advancing material interests among financial actors support climate governance 
strategies is perhaps most accurately captured by Newell and Paterson’s notion of “climate 
Keynesianism.” Although these authors describe “climate Keynesianism” in reference to a 
strengthening of public regulation in governing the environmental integrity of carbon markets, the 
same incentives are evident among the financial firms involved in the INCR, CDSB and ClimateWise 
which have realized “the limits of what they can achieve autonomously” without the support of public 
regulation.53  
Chapters 4 and 5 will develop a similar explanation of the CDSB’s and ClimateWise’s 
support for the use of public regulation in governing climate change risks. Although INCR, CDSB, 
and ClimateWise each support the use of public regulation based on the recognition that the firms 
involved do not have the political authority to effectively govern climate change risks, the actors 
involved in each of these three initiatives have different material interests in facilitating this 
regulation. In the case of the accounting and insurance industry, material interests in the use of public 
regulation as a strategy to govern climate change risks are arguably more robust than those among 
institutional investors.  
Within the accounting industry, climate change risk must be governed through public 
regulation based on cognitive expectations that voluntary disclosure could create reputational and 
regulatory risks. But, more significantly, public regulation is required to stimulate demand for 
accounting services. For insurers, public regulation is necessary based on cognitive expectations that 
climate change risks are likely to threaten the insurability of many existing markets. Without the 
support of regulation, insurers will be exposed to reputational and regulatory risks as they raise rates 
or pull out of markets vulnerable to climate change impacts. In particular, international mitigation and 
adaptation policy is necessary to ensure the risk-profile of weather-related events does not increase 
beyond the point of insurability. If insurers are to expand their services in governing climate change 
risks, the magnitude and frequency of these risks must increase at an incremental rate to avoid a 
spread of costly “low-probability, high impact” events.  
This analysis suggests that while reputational concerns related to environmental legitimacy 
driven by the business case to improve investor decision-making were factors in explaining the 
emergence of the INCR and CDP, these concerns are much more robust in the case of the CDSB and 
ClimateWise. But rather than targeting legitimacy among environmental opponents, the CDSB and 
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ClimateWise must also generate support among end-users of their services who could oppose 
regulations that advance material interests among accountants and insurers at their expense.   
 The support of the INCR, CDSB and ClimateWise for the use of public regulation as a 
strategy for advancing firms’ material interests in governing climate change risks demonstrates that 
“post-Westphalian” arguments are limited in explaining their approach to co-regulation. Material 
interests among financial firms in governing climate change uncertainty is linked to financial 
knowledge that this uncertainty must be measured and priced as a risk through public regulation as a 
precautionary measure. This financial knowledge is also conducive to the realization that effective 
governance of these risks could yield market opportunities if governed through public 
regulation.These interests reveal the influence of cognitive expectations that market efficiency 
necessitates the use of public regulation.  
Given the incentives for the firms involved in these initiatives to support public regulation as 
a strategy for governing climate change economic uncertainty, however, it is somewhat puzzling that 
co-regulation represented the optimal strategy for achieving this objective rather than more direct 
efforts to lobby of securities regulators and legislators. This puzzle, however, can be explained if 
these actors face constraints in unilaterally pursuing public regulation, specifically the need to 
collaborate in generating a technical and political consensus that supports the implementation of this 
regulation.  
3.3.2 Generating a Technical and Political Consensus 
 
Because public regulation has yet to be implemented that is effective in governing climate change 
risks, financial firms are unsure of both the design of effective regulations, and whether there is 
enough political support to avoid potential opposition when implementing these regulations. 
According to Cutler, Haufler and Porter’s analysis, firms often engage in inter-firm collaboration 
through the formation of a “private regime” to identify strategies for dealing with such market 
uncertainty. In particular, collaboration allows firms to reduce transaction costs related to researching 
new strategies, and to share costs associated with public policy advocacy if new “rules for the road” 
are necessary to govern this uncertainty.54  
From this perspective, an inter-firm collaboration through a private regime provides a 
platform to incrementally build a technical and political consensus that public regulation is justified 
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as a strategy for governing these risks. Both forms of consensus are critical if an industry is to 
influence environmental regulation.  
On the technical side, it is crucial that a technical consensus be developed within the industry 
around a “business case” that market uncertainty justifies collective action in supporting an expansion 
of public regulation. A key aspect to this consensus is identifying regulations that can be effective in 
delivering material gains through the governance of climate change risks. If incumbent firms are 
uncertain whether there is a business case behind the use of regulation and its effectiveness in 
governing climate change risks, they are unlikely to devote resources to collective action in support of 
such regulation.  
Without a technical consensus around a business case, financial firms face a significant 
challenge in generating political support for the implementation of regulation. First, any collective 
effort to expand public regulation must enjoy a wide and robust “intra-industry” consensus. 
Institutional investors, for example, are likely to oppose public regulation if it threatens their own 
investments or limits their access to growing markets. This argument has been used to explain 
reluctance among Canadian mutual and pension funds to support climate change risk disclosure. 
Because these funds hold a disproportionate amount of their assets in the oil and gas industry, climate 
change risk disclosure is likely to increase scrutiny over investments in this industry.55 Shareholders 
could increase pressure on fund managers to pull out of investments that in the short-term remain 
profitable and leave market share for rival investment companies who disregard climate change 
uncertainty as a financial risk.  
Robert Falkner’s analysis of business power in global environmental politics has confirmed 
that without a broad consensus within the industry on its policy objectives, political opponents can 
exploit divisions and compromise an industry’s ability to achieve these objectives.56 In this case, one 
source of opposition may come from firms external to the industry that face an increased regulatory 
burden as consequence of new regulations. This opposition could be very significant: the 
advancement of material interests within the financial industry through public regulation is likely to 
come at the expense of other firms who must endure increased regulatory costs. For example, while 
public regulation governing the disclosure of climate change risks helps address material interests 
among institutional investors, publicly listed firms are forced to absorb the costs associated with 
implementing the new reporting obligation. These costs include training managers to measure and 
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evaluate how production processes and supply-chains create climate change risks, and hiring 
accountants to provide audits and assurance services to make sure the firm adequately fulfills the new 
reporting obligation. In addition, disclosure exposes publicly listed firms to a higher level of scrutiny 
among investors and other stakeholders on issues, such as climate change risks, that may not have 
been a priority.  
At the same time, some forward-thinking firms may support an expansion of public 
regulation governing climate change risks because they stand to benefit comparatively to their rivals. 
Firms that have implemented strategies to reduce their exposure to climate change risks through GHG 
mitigation or increased spending on strengthening physical infrastructure stand to benefit from 
increased scrutiny over their exposure to climate change risks. To cultivate support for public 
regulation, financial firms must engage with these firms external to the industry that are likely to 
support such regulation.  
In addition to support from corporate stakeholders within and external to the industry, 
finance-led initiatives such as the INCR and CDP must also generate support within the 
environmental community. Paterson points to the necessity of generating political legitimacy within 
the environmental community for financial actors to engage in climate governance strategies that 
promote capital accumulation.57 He even suggests that initiatives such as the CDP and INCR, and 
“marketised climate governance” more broadly, are designed to generate political legitimacy for 
implementing strategies that promote capital accumulation. Although he does not go into detail on the 
nature of these strategies, he observes that these initiatives in part recognize that “allying 
accumulation and legitimation is a central aim”.58 Legitimacy, from Paterson’s perspective, is 
necessary to demonstrate that financial actors who pursue climate governance strategies  “informed 
primarily by the search for accumulation” support environmental integrity in order to avoid political 
                                                     
57 Most of Paterson’s argument is based on evidence that intermediaries in voluntary carbon markets must 
generate reputational credibility in their capacity to verify and measure the commodification of carbon 
emissions into tradeable financial products. But this credibility is explicitly driven by a business case that while 
verification and measurement services improve the environmental integrity of the market, they also expand 
demand for services offered by these intermediaries. Paterson does link the CDP and INCR to this strategy. But 
his argument is even more relevant in the case of the CDSB and ClimateWise, where there is a business case to 
expand public regulations governing climate change risks to create new demand for their risk-management 
services. The difference is that the CDSB and ClimateWise must overcome more robust challenges than 
opposition within the environmental community to implement this regulation, whereas “private” climate 
governance strategies are often more narrowly exposed to opposition from within the environmental 
community. See Paterson, “Legitimation and Accumulation in Climate Change Governance,” 358-360. 
58 Ibid., 360. 
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opposition among environmentalists who oppose the “commodification of the environment.”59 
Paterson’s analysis is important because he demonstrates that, while initiatives like the CDP and 
INCR are primarily climate governance strategies within financial markets, the process they use to 
facilitate their objectives involves political constituency building as a strategy for generating 
legitimacy. In particular, he recognizes that political support within the environmental community is 
an important precursor to the success of finance-led climate governance.  
As Paterson suggests, environmental groups have challenged finance-led climate governance 
strategies, such as the implementation of emissions trading or voluntary emissions trading, but have 
yet to directly challenge the INCR and CDP.60 There is, however, evidence to suggest that the INCR 
and CDP are in part designed to reflect concern within the environmental community that these 
initiatives will sacrifice environmental integrity for capital accumulation.  To address these concerns, 
the strategy adopted must be able to demontrate that it is conducive to effective mitigation and 
adaptation to avoid opposition among environmental groups. The decision to co-regulate where an 
ENGO governs compliance through a reflexive mechanism rather than pursue a unilateral “private 
regime” provides evidence that corporate actors are aware that their strategies must be conducive to 
legitimacy climate governance.  
 
Table 3.1 Generating technical and political consensus in governing climate change risks 
Technical Consensus Political Consensus 
Financial firms must generate a technical consensus that 
there is a business case for governing exposure to 
climate change risks, and that expanding public 
regulation is the optimal strategy for governing these 
risks. 
Financial firms must generate an intra-industry 
political consensus that collective action potentially 
limiting access to certain markets is necessary to 
govern climate change risks. 
Financial firms must also generate political support 
outside of the industry among stakeholders likely to 
oppose expansion of public regulation or contest its 
environmental integrity. 
 
An examination of the CDP and INCR demonstrates how collaboration can help to generate a 
technical and political consensus and facilitate a constituency of support behind the disclosure of 
climate change risks.61 To support the business case that institutional investors are exposed to climate 
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change risks, institutional investors must generate a technical consensus over how a regulation, or 
mandatory standard will measure the conversion of climate change uncertainty into a financial risk. 
Without this information that climate change uncertainty can be converted into a measurable financial 
risk, institutional investors face few incentives to support public regulation as a strategy to reduce 
exposure to these risks. Indeed, investors are unlikely to take additional action at all without evidence 
that their investment strategy can be improved by taking these risks into account.62  
 The development of a method to measure climate change risks is known as 
“commensuration”, which is a technical process that involves measuring and disclosing a myriad of 
links between potential costs associated with climate change and the impacts of these costs on firm’s 
corporate accounts. The key challenge that investors, in addition to accountants and insurers, face in 
facilitating commensuration is that of generating a useful methodology for measuring exposure to 
future-oriented risks that can be used to inform present day decision-making. Ans Kolk, David Levy, 
and Jonathan Pinkse highlight two central challenges in generating a comparable measure of climate 
change risk that investors can use to inform their decision making: 1) investors need a comparable 
measure of a firm’s GHG emissions, and 2) investors need a comparable measure to evaluate a firm’s 
climate risk “profile”.63 
 Because the conversion of GHG emissions into a commodity that can be priced is a political 
project, there is wide variation in how different jurisdictions approach this conversion. In addition to 
developing an “exchange rate” between different GHG emissions compared to CO2, political 
authorities must establish “boundaries” around a firm’s production process to determine which 
emissions should be included on its corporate accounts. There must also be a measure for comparing 
the differences between each jurisdiction’s baseline from which emission reductions are counted 
against. The development of a measurement on how investment into new technologies is likely to 
reduce emissions also represents a significant difficulty.64  
 The second central challenge involves translating uncertainty around the economic impacts of 
climate change into “assessments of risks and market opportunities with clear financial implications 
for firms and investors.”65 As Kolk et al’s analysis confirms, the generation of a comparable measure 
of future exposure to financial risk through climate change involves a great deal of ambiguity across 
                                                     
62 Kolk, Levy, and Pinkse, “Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The Institutionalization and 
Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure,” 729. 
63 Ibid., 727-728. 
64 Ibid., 728. 
65 Ibid., 728. 
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different firms and industries. For example, certain firms are likely to face greater risks than others 
depending on their geographic location, exposure to regulatory risk, and the GHG intensity of their 
production process or supply-chain. The generation of a metric that investors can use to compare 
these variables in ways that lower exposure to climate change risks represents a significant 
challenge.66  
 Even with a technical consensus on how to measure exposure to climate change risks, 
investors must be able to convince their rivals to support disclosure, and convince the firms they 
invest in to disclose information that has the potential to damage their financial reputation. A 
technical consensus on how to measure climate change risks is an important precursor to both of these 
political efforts. If investors can demonstrate that including climate change risks in investment 
decision-making improves the efficiency of these decisions, rivals will be incentivized to do the same.   
 The CDP and INCR both offer a platform for institutional investors to collaborate in 
generating a technical and political consensus by using voluntary best-practice standards to cultivate a 
constituency of institutional investors and publicly listed firms that support climate change risk 
disclosure. The CDP’s disclosure survey provides a vital tool in facilitating commensuration and 
generating a technical consensus on how to measure climate change risks. The survey provides a 
common metric that uses standardized benchmarks to compare the risk profile of various corporate 
emitters participating in financial markets. This comparable benchmark provides a market signal that 
institutional investors can use to improve their investment decision-making by directing capital 
towards firms with a lower risk profile in a carbon-constrained economy.67 
 The CDP’s approach to generating a political consensus relies on its ability to “socialize” 
other investors and publicly listed firms into joining the effort. By demonstrating that it can facilitate 
disclosure among a wide range of publicly listed firms, more investors are incentivized to participate 
to gain access to the CDP’s database on climate change risks. As more institutional investors have 
joined, the CDP has been able to “wield influence” over publicly listed firms by leveraging its 
network of institutional investors to facilitate increasing levels of disclosure through its survey.68  
                                                     
66 Ibid., 734. 
67 Ibid., 727. 
68 Macleod and Park, “Financial Activism and Global Climate Change: The Rise of Investor-Driven 
Governance Networks,” 68. 
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Indeed, corporate boards have started to recognize that investor scrutiny over climate change 
risks could hurt the firm’s reputation without efforts to track and reduce exposure to these risks.69 
Forward-thinking firms can join the survey as a strategy to identify exposure throughout the 
production process in order to channel resources to these areas to reduce risks. In addition, disclosure 
also allows managers to compare their firm’s exposure to these risks relative to other firms in their 
sector.70As the next section will describe, the CDP’s effort to expand a constituency supporting 
disclosure has proved quite effective. For example, the 2010 survey achieved a response rate of 82 
percent for firms listed in the global 500, and 70 percent response rate for firms listed in the S&P 
500.71  
 Whereas the CDP focuses more of its efforts towards generating a technical consensus 
through its annual disclosure survey, the INCR is a more advocacy-oriented example of co-regulation. 
Similar to the CDP, the INCR has adopted a set of voluntary best practice standards to facilitate the 
building of a constituency willing to govern climate change risk disclosure. Although the INCR 
“Action Plan” asks that members investigate how to measure financial risks associated with climate 
change, and convince the firms they invest in to disclose this information, its primary focus is on 
leveraging these investors to engage in political advocacy. The key distinction is that the INCR’s 
“Action Plan” attempts to build a constituency around mandatory, instead of voluntary, climate 
change risk disclosure.72 
There are two key prongs to this strategy. First, the INCR directly engages with firms who 
refuse to provide information on their exposure to climate change risks by filing shareholder 
resolutions. As the next section will discuss, the INCR is responsible for a majority of climate change 
shareholder resolutions filed against US companies.73 The second prong to this strategy involves 
leveraging the INCR constituency to lobby US security regulators in implement a mandatory climate 
change risk disclosure standard as a part of its annual financial reporting requirements.74  
                                                     
69 Kolk, Levy, and Pinkse, “Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The Institutionalization and 
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70 Ibid., 728. 
71 CDP, “Carbon Disclosure Project 2010: Global 500 and S&P 500 Report Highlights.” 
72 INCR, “Investor Network on Climate Risk Action Plan: Capitalizing the New Energy Future: Minimizing 
Climate Risks, Seizing Opportunities.” 
73 Macleod and Park, “Financial Activism and Global Climate Change: The Rise of Investor-Driven 
Governance Networks,” 66. 
74 Ceres, “Investors Managing $2.1 Trillion in Assets Praise SEC for Climate Disclosure Guidance,” March 10, 
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Both the CDP and INCR demonstrate how inter-firm collaboration can be used to cultivate a 
constituency willing to support climate change risk disclosure as a strategy for advancing material 
interests among institutional investors.  In particular, the INCR has recognized that mandatory 
disclosure enforced by public regulators represents the optimal approach for institutional investors to 
advance their material interests in governing climate change risks. Although accountants and insurers 
support the use of public regulation in governing climate change risks for different material interests 
than institutional investors, they too are unsure about the design of effective regulation and whether 
there is enough political support for implementation. This uncertainty is conducive to collaboration in 
generating a technical and political consensus that supports the implementation of these regulations.  
As Chapters 4 and 5 will describe, the CDSB and ClimateWise share a key similarity with the INCR; 
they use voluntary best practice standards to cultivate a constituency willing to support an expansion 
of public regulation to govern climate change risks.  
For accountants, the CDSB provides a platform to generate a technical and political 
consensus necessary to support the implementation of an international accounting standards 
governing climate change risk disclosure. For insurers, collaboration through ClimateWise provides 
an opportunity to build a technical consensus around regulations that are effective in defending the 
industry from climate change risks, and political support within the industry and among firms paying 
for insurance services.  
Although this analysis explains why financial firms support inter-firm collaboration, such as a 
private regime, as a strategy for generating a technical and political consensus supporting the 
implementation of public regulations in governing climate change risks, it does not explain why co-
regulation with ENGOs is an optimal strategy for achieving this objective. Given the financial 
industry’s material interests in governing these risks, a case can be made that an inter-firm regime that 
supports collective lobbying efforts might be sufficient for advancing these interests. The next section 
will argue that ENGOs have developed important expertise and political capacity that can help firms 
generate a technical and political consensus and cultivate constituencies willing to support the 
governance of climate change risks.   
3.3.3 ENGO Expertise and Capacity in Governing Climate Change Risks 
 
ENGOs have interests in providing technical expertise and political capacity in implementing co-
regulation as a strategy for promoting their environmental agenda. Specifically, these actors 
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contribute expertise to the design of the standards, and capacity by governing the reflexive 
mechanism used to facilitate compliance in generating a technical and political consensus associated 
with governing climate change risks. This expertise and capacity plays an important role in generating 
legitimacy within key constituencies, such as rival firms, the end-users of financial services, and even 
the environmental community. An ENGO with explicit expertise in cultivating a constituency around 
the governance of an environmental issue provides important bargaining leverage in convincing firms 
to support co-regulation.  
 Interestingly, the use of co-regulation was initially developed by ENGOs as a strategy for 
promoting environmental norms within the global economy. The analysis in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.1) 
described the emergence of co-regulation as a strategy by ENGOs to increase a firm’s accountability 
to commitments made in implementing a voluntary environmental program. By providing oversight 
to these commitments through third party monitoring or external audits, ENGOs could target 
“laggards” which failed to uphold their obligations to strengthening their environmental 
performance.75  
 The adoption of more collaborative approaches among ENGOs towards encouraging TNCs to 
govern their environmental performance represents a distinct departure from the way that scholars 
initially described ENGO behavior. At a broad level, ENGO strategy in engaging with TNCs can be 
divided into “confrontational” and “collaborative” approaches. “Confrontatinoal” ENGOs use 
adversarial campaigns to “shame” TNCs to adjust their behavior, or make a case for state 
intervention.76 “Collaborative” ENGOs attempt to engage the market system by developing standards 
and practices that guide markets towards the provision of environmental goods.77    
 According to Paul Wapner, who analyzed the growing influence of NGOs in global 
environmental politics, NGOs initially targeted corporations as a strategy to increase the 
accountability of these firms to civil society concerns.78 These ENGOs mostly embraced a 
“confrontational” approach towards corporate behavior and initiated adversarial “name and shame” 
campaigns. As chapter 2 described, while adversarial campaigns have proven effective for many 
                                                     
75 Utting, “The Struggle for Corporate Accountability,” 965. 
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ENGOs in convincing TNCs to improve their environmental performance, ENGOs have also started 
to recognize the limitations of this approach.  
 In response, some ENGOs started to experiment in their approach to engaging with TNCs by 
adopting a ”collaborative” strategy.79 John Elkington and Sebastian Beloe suggest that ENGOs have 
been able to test out different strategies that attempt to regulate the environmental performance of 
TNCs “with each additional response growing in sophistication, building on the experiences of the 
previous one and working in parallel to drive business and market change.”80 The emergence of the 
CDP and INCR reflect a refined approach among ENGOs to the “collaborative: strategy. Rather than 
targeting an individual firm for collaboration, ENGOs use their expertise to encourage an entire 
industry to adopt voluntary standards that collectively improve environmental performance.  
ENGO expertise and capacity has been critical in helping institutional investors develop best 
practice standards that target the generation of a technical and political consensus necessary to 
advance their interests in governing climate change risks. To help institutional investors govern 
exposure to climate change risks, the CDP Secretariat provides both technical expertise and political 
capacity. The CDP Secretariat’s (CDP) first step in promoting a technical consensus was to develop a 
strategy to convince both institutional investors and corporations that the disclosure of climate change 
risks could improve the efficiency of decision-making for both actors. Based on consultations with 
the investment community, the Secretariat decided to create a questionnaire with seven questions.  In 
May 2002, the CDP wrote to the chair of the board of each of the 500 largest publicly listed 
companies and asked for answers to the questionnaire. After organizing these responses, the 
Secretariat made the report public by making presentations in London, New York and Hong Kong. 
This oversight by the Secretariat has continued for each of the consecutive surveys. In 2010, the CDP 
released its 9th survey.81  
In addition to inventing the idea of using a survey, the most important output from this 
exercise has been the gradual refinement of the CDP’s survey in generating a technical consensus on 
how to measure climate change risks. The CDP has developed a reflexive mechanism by engaging 
with investors and emitters on weaknesses in their ability to incorporate disclosure information into 
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investment decisions in the case of the former, or comply with disclosure requirements in the case of 
the latter. 
This effort has narrowed down the survey to capture four key categories of information. 
These categories include: corporate strategy for reducing exposure to climate change risks, regulatory 
risks, physical risks, and a measure of a firm’s GHG emissions.82 Because the CDP now has the 
support of over 211 investors worth $31 trillion in assets, these categories are widely recognized as an 
almost universal benchmark for measuring climate change risks.83   
The CDP’s expertise and capacity in designing and administering the survey demonstrates the 
organization’s contribution to overcoming technical obstacles faced by institutional investors in 
governing climate change risks. According to Macleod and Park’s analysis, the CDP is now 
recognized as an “information depot for one sector of the business community (investors) concerned 
with the actions of another sector (corporations) and the health of the overall economy.”84  
In addition to expertise and capacity governing the disclosure survey, the CDP has also 
demonstrated important political capacity in encouraging a consensus supporting voluntary climate 
change risk disclosure.  To facilitate this consensus, the CDP puts pressure on preparers through a 
CDP “Leadership Index”. Each CDP report compares the leading ten percent of companies in terms 
of disclosure and their efforts to reduce risks to other firms which participate in the survey. This index 
helps institutional investors to target their shareholder petitions against firms that provide inadequate 
levels of disclosure.85 The singling out of corporate emitters that provide inadequate disclosure can 
also create reputational risks among the institutional investors who support the CDP, and encourage 
strengthened efforts to improve disclosure. Before the development of the leadership index, the CDP 
even reported the names of non-responsive firms to its annual survey on a “wall of shame.”86 In 
addition to consensus building among the largest 500 publicly listed firms, or the FT500, the 
Secretariat has also targeted corporations in the US 500, Electric Utility 265, Canada 300, Germany 
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200, Japan 150, Australia 100, New Zealand 50, France 120, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and the Brazil 
50.87  
As the last section described, the INCR has focused its efforts in generating a political 
consensus that supports mandatory climate change risk disclosure. This strategy is largely informed 
and organized by Ceres, the INCR’s ENGO partner. As one of the original examples of an ENGO 
implementing disclosure frameworks through the Ceres Principles, Ceres has a great deal of expertise 
necessary for effective consensus building.   
Ceres’ work on climate change risk disclosure initially focused on research necessary to 
support a technical consensus, specifically a business case that climate change risks are material for 
financial markets. Based on Macleod’s assessment, Ceres has produced over 26 reports since 2003 on 
the impacts of climate change risks for businesses and investors.88 These reports typically examine 
securities and financial statements to track whether companies disclose their financial information on 
climate change risks. By measuring disclosure efforts and reporting this information publicly, Ceres 
acted as a “knowledge producer and knowledge broker” by developing research on the exposure of 
institutional investors to climate change risks.89 Ceres expertise in using voluntary best practice 
standards to help institutional investors govern exposure to potential environment risks, and its 
research on climate change risks in particular, contributed to the design and substance of the INCR’s 
Action Plan.  
The INCR has also benefited from Ceres’ political capacity in facilitating a constituency 
willing to support mandatory disclosure. Since the 2003 Summit, for example, Ceres initiated three 
more summits in 2005, 2008 and 2010. These meetings are critical for bringing together a 
constituency of institutional investors to support the use of public regulation in governing disclosure 
to climate change risks. These efforts have resulted in four notable successes. First, Ceres’ political 
capacity has proved successful in expanding its membership to represent over 90 institutional 
investors with assets that exceed $9 trillion.90 Second, this constituency was able to convince the SEC 
to include guidance on how to disclose climate change risks in annual 10-k financial reports.91 Third, 
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INCR has helped organize a majority of the “record 101 climate-related shareholder resolutions” filed 
by investors in 2010.92 Fourth, these meetings resulted in the expansion of the INCR’s strategy to the 
international level, where, along with other institutional investors, it lobbied governments to 
implement an international regulation on GHG emissions.93  
The CDP and INCR demonstrate how access to ENGO expertise and capacity in developing 
disclosure frameworks and public policy advocacy can help institutional investors generate a 
technical and political consensus necessary to advance their interests in governing climate change 
risks, whether through voluntary or mandatory disclosure. The expertise and capacity of these 
“specialist” ENGOs helps to explain why these firms are willing to partner with ENGOs to advance 
their own material interests in governing climate change risks.  
In addition to initiating the idea behind using co-regulation to overcome obstacles in 
governing climate change risks through financial markets, these ENGOs host and provide the 
logistical support for each co-regulatory initiative. They have expertise in implementing voluntary 
environmental programs by acting as a third-party monitor in an effort to incorporate reflexivity and 
continually improve compliance. In the case of the CDP and INCR, this expertise is critical in 
generating a technical consensus on how to measure climate change risks, specifically a business case 
that disclosure can improve investment decision-making. ENGOs have also developed political 
capacity in mobilizing intra-industry consensus and support among external stakeholders to legitimize 
efforts by financial actors to cultivate a constituency willing to support an expansion of public 
regulation governing climate change risks.  ENGOs can also overtly “shame” poor compliance 
towards a co-regulative agreement, as the CDP demonstrates through its leadership survey. In 
addition to generating support among corporate constituents, the oversight provided by these ENGOs 
by governing the reflexive mechanism represents an important signal for legitimizing an effort by 
financial actors to engage in climate governance strategies that promote capital accumulation within 
the environmental community. Even through these initiatives have yet to face environmental scrutiny, 
the role of ENGOs in their strategy suggests implicitly that support within the environmental 
community is a key goal in political consensus building. Perhaps more importantly, however, ENGOs 
have developed important expertise in public policy advocacy. Ceres demonstrates this expertise 
through its efforts in coordinating lobbying on behalf of the INCR to implement SEC guidance on the 
disclosure of climate change risks.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 will describe how the ENGOs involved in the CDSB and ClimateWise also 
play a significant role in coordinating both financial firms and other corporate actors to support an 
expansion of public regulation to govern climate change risks. These ENGOs provide important 
logistical support in harnessing expertise among these actors to facilitate a technical consensus, and 
use their political capacity to leverage this consensus in cultivating a more robust constituency willing 
to support the governance of climate change risks throughout the economy. 
3.3.4 Possible Post-Westphalian Critiques? 
 
The analysis of both the form of co-regulation adopted by the CDSB and ClimateWise in chapter 2, 
and the conditions that explain this unique approach identified in this chapter, constitute an important 
critique of scholars who invoke a “post-Westphalian” perspective on private governance. Co-
regulation using cognitive governance in the form adopted by the CDP, INCR, CDSB and 
ClimateWise to influence the expansion of public authority challenges the post-Westphalian 
assumption that private governance is designed to generate “governance beyond the state.” The latter 
three initiatives in particular (INCR, CDSB and ClimateWise) that formally identify the expansion of 
public regulation as a part of their mandate constitute an important challenge for these “post-
Westphalian” assumptions. Rather than a strategy to facilitate “greenwash”, the use of voluntary 
standards in these cases is designed to cultivate constituencies that support public regulation. This 
analysis in this chapter of the factors that might explain the adoption of this unconventional approach 
also challenges post-Westphalian explanations for the emergence of private governance. Particularly 
important is the identification of the material interests among financial firms that support the use of 
public regulation, interests that are quite different than the kinds of short-term reputational concerns 
or efforts to preempt official regulation that post-Westphalian analyses point to when explaining 
business interest in co-regulation. The next two chapters provide further evidence of these distinct 
interests of financial firms in supporting CDSB amd ClimateWise. 
 But before launching into the more detailed study of the CDSB amd ClimateWise cases, it is 
necessary to explore very briefly some potential post-Westphalian counter-arguments. Because the 
CDSB and ClimateWise are voluntary, it is certainly possible to question whether the participants 
involved really do support each initiative’s “unconventional” objectives of strengthening public 
regulation. These robust objectives could be seen to represent simply a sophisticated strategy on the 
part of each initiative’s members to strengthen their reputation or preempt official regulation.   
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My research suggests, however, that the use of voluntary standards is more accurately seen as 
a strategic component of cognitive governance: that is, each initiative is designed to “ratchet-up” 
compliance to standards that target best practices in generating a technical and political consensus 
necessary to implement public regulation governing climate change risks. Even if the voluntary 
design is strategic, skeptics might still ask whether voluntary commitments are able to overcome 
short-term market interests that might work against supporting the governance of climate change 
risks. In other words, scholars embracing a more post-Westphalian perspective might question 
whether the corporate actors involved really do have legitimate material interests in using public 
regulation to govern climate change risks.  
One way of evaluating these “post-Westphalian” critiques is to examine each initiative’s 
participation rates and enforcement strategy. Weak enforcement strategies and low rates of 
participation constitute important accountability deficits and evidence for “greenwash.” Effective 
enforcement strategy in co-regulation usually involves some form of third-party accountability or 
“reflexive” mechanism, such as an audit on compliance, or public disclosure, where stakeholders such 
as ENGOs or consumers have an opportunity to scrutinize compliance. The most robust example of 
an enforcement mechanism is a minimum requirement on compliance in supporting the initiative’s 
objectives. If participants fail to meet this standard, their membership is at risk of being revoked by 
the core participants running the initiative.   
In the case of the CDSB and ClimateWise, low rates of participation within the accounting 
and insurance industry (in addition to institutional investors and corporate emitters in the case of the 
CDSB) could be used as evidence to demonstrate that existing members are involved for reputational 
reasons, rather than legitimate interests in governing climate change risks. If accountants and insurers 
are legitimately concerned about pursuing their interests in governing climate change risks, 
participation rates should be quite high given that they target reforms within these industries to 
strengthen global climate governance. Low rates of participation would also contest the argument that 
both industries share similar cognitive expectations that climate change uncertainty should be treated 
as a financial risk. 
An analysis of participation rates and enforcement strategies in the CDSB and ClimateWise is 
provided at the end of the detailed analyses of these initiatives contained in Chapters 5 and 6. As we 
shall see, this analysis helps to buttress the argument that the use of co-regulation (ie. a voluntary 
approach) is strategic and designed to “ratchet-up” compliance to cognitive governance and the 
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This chapter’s goal was to hypothesize a framework that might help to address the second central 
research question of this study which asks what explains the emergence of the co-regulation 
initiatives embodied in the CDSB and ClimateWise. To develop this framework, the chapter first 
reviewed the most common explanations for the emergence of environmental co-regulation which 
focus on:  1) a structural shift toward market-based governance linked to the influence of economic 
globalization and neoliberal ideology; 2) the role of transnational non-state actors in pushing for co-
regulation as an alternative for official regulation; and 3) the use of co-regulation as a strategy for pre-
empting public regulation or generating reputational credibility among corporate actors. Scholars who 
invoke these explanations embrace a “post-Westphalian” perspective that links co-regulation to 
preferences among TNCs and ENGOs to generate “governance beyond the state.” But in the cases of 
the CDSB and ClimateWise, it is necessary to explain the use of co-regulation as a strategy to 
encourage the state to take on more authority in governing climate change risks.  
The second section of this chapter attempted to develop such an explanation by taking a 
closer look at the factors behind the emergence of other better studied “unconventional” co-regulation 
in the financial industry. This analysis revealed that this form of co-regulation emerged in response to 
three such factors. First, financial firms had material interests in using public regulation to govern 
climate change risks. Second, those same firms recognized that collaboration in technical and political 
consensus building was necessary before public regulation can be expanded to these risks. Third, 
ENGOs existed that had interests in using their expertise and political capacity to help generate this 
consensus and build constituencies willing to support this regulation. Chapters 4 and 5 apply this 









This chapter’s goal is to explain the unique approach to co-regulation that the CDSB has adopted to 
achieve its objectives, and identify the factors that influenced the actors involved to support this 
approach. The CDSB represents the “strong” case for the use of co-regulation as a strategy for 
expanding public regulation because it is targeting the reform of financial regulation governing 
accounting markets. ClimateWise is similar, but uses cognitive governance to target an array of 
public policies and regulations that indirectly influence the insurance sector’s capacity to govern 
climate change risks. Despite the difference, both the CDSB and ClimateWise use co-regulation to 
contest existing market expectations for the economic value of corporate environmental performance 
by linking this performance to financial risks that can improve the efficiency of market decision-
making. 
The first two sections of the chapter explains the emergence of the CDSB by using the 
framework hypothesized in chapter 3 to identify factors that influenced the actors involved to adopt 
its unconventional approach to co-regulation. This analysis identifies three factors that explain the 
emergence of the CDSB, including; 1) the existence of material interests in using public regulations 
to govern climate change risk disclosure among accountants, institutional investors and corporate 
emitters; 2) the need to collaborate in generating a technical and political consensus that supports 
public regulation; and, 3) the prominence of ENGOs that had interests in using their expertise and 
political capacity to implement strategies to help cultivate this consensus. The chapter then describes 
the CDSB’s use of cognitive governance as a strategy for generating the technical and political 
consensus necessary to expand regulation governing the disclosure of climate change risks at the 
international level. Once this unique approach to co-regulation is outlined, the chapter will briefly 
evaluate the CDSB’s capacity to hold its participants accountable to its robust objectives in order to 
evaluate potential criticisms that the initiative is merely a sophisticated version of “greenwash.” 
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4.2 Harmonizing Voluntary Climate Change Risk Disclosure Standards 
 
The formation of the CDSB is the first coordinated attempt to leverage the international accounting 
sector to strengthen global climate governance. It emerged out of a patchwork of existing voluntary 
climate change risk standards that created inefficiencies for the institutional investors and 
corporations using these standards to measure climate change risks. Richard Samans, the Managing 
Director of the World Economic Forum (WEF), founded the CDSB by allying the core players 
involved in these existing standards with the accounting industry in an effort to harmonize these 
standards through an international mandatory standard.1  
 As described in Chapters 2 and 3 (section 2.2.1 and 3.3.3), ENGOs recognized throughout the 
1990s that collaboration with corporate actors in the formation of disclosure frameworks represented 
an important strategy in strengthening corporate accountability to voluntary environmental programs. 
Co-regulation represented an important platform for advancing norms that corporate environmental 
performance had important financial implications. Ceres was the first ENGO to promote co-
regulation supporting the disclosure of corporate environmental performance by framing its link to 
financial performance within the US investor community. But other ENGOs soon replicated this 
strategy.  
The benefits of using co-regulation to support disclosure had been realized by a number of 
ENGOs who believed these frameworks could be used to strengthen efforts to frame uncertainty 
around the impacts of climate change as a financial risk. The result was an emergence of various 
disclosure standards designed to support this cognitive frame. Although the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) is the most successful global sustainability reporting framework, the most popular 
framework reporting on climate change issues, specifically GHG emissions, is the GHG Protocol.2 
Established through a co-regulative agreement between the World Resources Institute (WRI) and 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development’s (WBCSD) in 2001, the GHG Protocol has 
enjoyed a wide adoption among corporate emitters and constitutes a de facto global standard for GHG 
emissions measurement and disclosure.3  
                                                     
1 Anonymous B. Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, August 27, 2010.  
2 Halina Szejnwald Brown, Martin de Jong, and Teodorina Lessidrenska, “The Rise of the Global Reporting 
Initiative: A Case of Institutional Entrepreneurship,” Environmental Politics 18, no. 2 (2009): 182-200, 182. 
3 Jessica F. Green, “Private Standards in the Climate Regime: The Greenhouse Gas Protocol,” Business & 
Politics 12, no. 3 (2010): 1-37, 4. 
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The GHG Protocol developed two innovative measuring methodologies for counting a firm’s 
emissions.4 First, the Protocol established organizational boundaries by defining how a firm with full 
ownership over its production should count emissions, and how firms with an equity share in a 
different entity or operation should count emissions.5 Second, the Protocol established operational 
boundaries by creating three categories that capture emissions at different points of the production 
process. Scope 1 emissions count the direct combustion or release of GHGs from the "end of the 
pipe." Scope 2 emissions cover the GHGs emitted further upstream from the purchase of energy. 
Scope 3 emissions cover more abstract sources such as business travel, external logistics, transport, 
supply chain and product.6 These categories were designed to help managers understand how 
regulations implementing a price on GHG emissions impact all aspects of their business, and how 
their firms compare to others.  
The GHG protocol’s widespread use is a result of other emissions frameworks adopting its 
organizational and operational accounting methodology.  The California Climate Action Registry was 
the first public organization to adopt the GHG Protocol’s approach in 2001.7 The Climate Registry, a 
nonprofit organization created to harmonize different US voluntary and mandatory reporting 
frameworks, also adopted the GHG protocol.8 In 2006, the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) adopted the GHG Protocol as the accounting methodology in its ISO 14046 
standard on the “Quantification and Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals.”9  
Although the GHG protocol represents the most recognized and effective framework for 
emissions accounting, and has indeed generated an important technical and political consensus behind 
                                                     
4 GHG Protocol, “What is the GHG Protocol?,” About the GHG Protocol, 2010, 
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp. WRI and WBCSD decided to develop the GHG protocol in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol when political momentum in many industrialized countries was growing 
in support of regulating a price on GHG emissions. For the WRI, this momentum represented an opportunity to 
pressure companies into measuring and disclosing their emissions levels as a way of learning how to manage 
the potential costs associated with regulation. In 1998, the WRI and WBCSD formed a steering committee with 
ENGOs, such as WWF and the Pew Centre on Global Climate change, and TNCs, such as Norsk Hydro, Tokyo 
Electric, and Shell. 
5 WRI and WBCSD, “The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard” (World 
Resources Institute and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2001), 
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghg-protocol-2001.pdf, 15. 
6 Ibid., 21. 
7 California Climate Action Registry, “California Climate Action Registry: General Reporting Protocol 3.1” 
(California Climate Action Registry, 2009), 
http://www.climateregistry.org/resources/docs/protocols/grp/GRP_3.1_January2009.pdf, 13 and 21. 
8 The Climate Registry, “Mission,” May 2011, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/mission/. 
9 Kevin Boehmer and Aleg Cherp, “ISO 14064: An Emerging Standard on Greenhouse Gas Accounting and 
Verification,” ISO 14064, 2008, http://web.ceu.hu/envsci/aleg/research/ISO-EnvFinance110503.pdf. 
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voluntary GHG emissions disclosure, other disclosure frameworks have emerged that are designed to 
capture a wider range of material risks associated with climate change uncertainty. Chapters 2 and 3 
(section 2.2.2 and 3.3.3) described several of these initiatives including Ceres, the INCR and CDP. 
Although these initiatives are described as examples of environmental co-regulation in financial 
markets, they are all technically classified as “non-profit” institutions or ENGOs. In both the US and 
UK, these organizations are classified as tax exempt non-profits, or charities.10 Although the 
definitional boundary between “co-regulative initiative” and “ENGO” is somewhat “fuzzy”, these 
initiatives will be referred as ENGOs or Board members when describing their role in the CDSB.  
These ENGOs emerged in response to policy entrepreneurs who proposed co-regulation to 
institutional investors as a strategy for addressing their interests in reducing exposure to climate 
change risks in their portfolios. Policy entrepreneurs in the UK were able to take advantage of these 
interests to form the CDP. In the US, Ceres was able to establish the INCR. To address these 
interests, both initiatives have developed disclosure frameworks that can be used to measure exposure 
to climate change risk across their investments.11 While innovative for their ability to measure 
material risks in addition to GHG emissions, they added a layer onto an existing patchwork of 
voluntary and mandatory standards.  
Although the CDP and INCR were both designed to advance the material interests of 
institutional investors, corporations also have similar interests in supporting disclosure. Disclosure 
helps identify strategies that firms can use to increase their competitiveness as climate change impacts 
increase and the regulation of GHG emissions becomes more prevalent. The most significant benefit 
for disclosure, however, is protecting a firm’s reputation among institutional investors concerned 
about climate change risks. Withholding disclosure can lead to shareholder resolutions, and 
potentially even investment switching among investors concerned about climate change risks.12   
Despite the success of these efforts to encourage the voluntary disclosure of climate change 
risks, the proliferation of these standards has led to a “patchwork” of different requirements for 
                                                     
10 See INCR, “About INCR”; CDP, “What We Do,” Carbon Disclosure Project, September 2010, 
https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/WhatWeDo/Pages/overview.aspx. 
11 CDP, “What We Do”; CDP, “Carbon Disclosure Project 2010: Global 500 and S&P 500 Report Highlights”; 
Ceres, “Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure: A Statement of Investor Expectations for 
Comprehensive Corporate Disclosure.” 
12 Kolk, Levy, and Pinkse, “Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The Institutionalization and 
Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure,” 727. 
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preparers and risk information available to end-users.13 This patchwork reveals that institutional 
investors and corporate emitters trying to govern climate change risks lack a technical and political 
consensus on an effective framework for facilitating disclosure. The messy nature of this patchwork 
was compounded by the emergence of a variety of emissions trading systems each embracing their 
own reporting framework, including the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ 
ETS).14 Although some of these frameworks are mandatory, they embrace different measurement 
approaches, and are usually focused towards emissions accounting, rather than decision-useful 
aspects of climate change risks.15  
For the preparers and end-users of climate change risk information, the spread of this 
patchwork has generated inefficiencies associated with climate change risk disclosure.16 For large 
corporate emitters, it created transaction costs associated with filling out multiple external surveys 
and with learning new methodologies involved in each framework. For example, the CDP’s efforts to 
improve the survey by changing or adding additional questions has hampered consistent year-on-year 
disclosure as firms try to understand how to incorporate the changes.17 Taking different approaches 
often “discourages disclosure because preparers are uncertain about what they should report and how 
to comply with user needs.”18  
For institutional investors, this patchwork created an “imperfect and incomplete picture both 
in what is said and in the rules dictating what should be said.”19 Without comparable information on 
the impact of climate change risks between firms using different standards, institutional investors are 
unable to determine how to adjust their investment strategy to minimize climate change risks. This 
                                                     
13 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, “Building Trust in Emissions Reporting: Global Trends in Emissions Trading 
Schemes,” 2007, http://www.pwc.com/en_KH/kh/publications/assets/building-trust-in-emissions-reporting-
final.pdf. 
14 Alexandre Kossoy and Phillippe Ambrosi, “States and Trends of the Carbon Market” (World Bank, May 
2010), 10. 
15 Jeffrey, A. Smith, Matthew Morreale, and Michael E. Mariani, “Climate Change Disclosure: Moving 
Towards a Brave New World,” Capital Markets Law Journal 3, no. 4 (2008): 469-485, 2. 
16 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, “Building Trust in Emissions Reporting: Global Trends in Emissions Trading 
Schemes,” 7; Smith, Morreale, and Mariani, “Climate Change Disclosure: Moving Towards a Brave New 
World,” 470. 
17 Kolk, Levy, and Pinkse, “Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The Institutionalization and 
Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure,” 735. 
18 CDSB, “Basis for Conclusions in Exposure Draft: The Climate Standards Disclosure Board Reporting 
Framework,” 3. 
19 Smith, Morreale, and Mariani, “Climate Change Disclosure: Moving Towards a Brave New World,” 2. 
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frustration was shared by ENGOs, whose efforts to leverage institutional investors to improve climate 
change risk disclosure were undermined by the lack of a comparable market signal. For example, in 
their analysis of the CDP, Ans Kolk, David Levy and Jonathan Pinkse argued that while NGO efforts 
to encourage institutional investors to support disclosure have been effective, “there is no real 
evidence that the information is helpful and is being used by investors.”20 To improve disclosure, the 
authors argued for “stricter carbon disclosure” that follows transparent guidelines capable of 
facilitating comparability and disclosure of relevant data as “an essential input for good decision 
making.”21 Jeffrey Smith, Matthew Morreale and Michael Mariani drew a similar conclusion arguing 
that “effective climate change disclosure will require both a universal language and a standardized set 
of rules, as well as the will to make these rules stick.”22 This analysis suggests that stakeholders 
participating in disclosure started to recognize the limits of a voluntary approach. As chapter 3 
(section 3.3.1) described, initiatives such as the INCR even started to incorporate the demand for 
mandatory disclosure into its strategy by lobbying the SEC to implement interpretive guidance.  
Concerns about inefficiency created by this patchwork emerged at the 2007 World Economic 
Forum (WEF) held in Davos, Switzerland. Richard Samans, the Managing Director of WEF, decided 
to hold a meeting between the core players involved in developing and supporting the existing 
patchwork. The first meeting included the CDP, Ceres, the Climate Registry, and the WRI and 
WBCSD (the founders of the GHG Protocol), in addition to a group of corporations and emitters 
concerned about exposure to climate change risks.23 Other interested parties involved in climate 
change risk disclosure were also invited into further meetings, including The Climate Group, and the 
IETA. After agreeing that some form of harmonization was necessary to resolve problems with the 
existing patchwork, these actors announced the formation of the Climate Disclosure Standards Board 
on January 26th, 2007. 
The first important decision by CDSB Board members was to find a secretariat with the 
logistical capacity to facilitate the harmonization of these standards. According to one interviewee, 
many Board members agreed that the CDP represented the logical institution to host the CDSB.24 As 
                                                     
20 Kolk, Levy, and Pinkse, “Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The Institutionalization and 
Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure,” 741. 
21 Ibid., 742. 
22 Smith, Morreale, and Mariani, “Climate Change Disclosure: Moving Towards a Brave New World,” 485. 
23 These companies included Alcan, Alcoa, Anglo American, Cemex, Coca-Cola Company, Holcim, HP, 
Lafarge, Petrobras SA, RAO UESR, RWE, Santas, ScottishPower, Swiss Re Insurance, Vattenfall, and Vitro.   
24 Anonymous B. 
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Chapter 3 (section 3.3.3) discussed, the CDP Secretariat has important technical expertise and 
political capacity in facilitating climate change risk disclosure.  
In terms of technical expertise, the CDP had important experience in using its survey to 
generate a comparable market signal on the exposure to climate change risks among publicly listed 
firms. Since 2002, the CDP Secretariat has collected information from both investors and corporate 
emitters and evaluated the effectiveness of its survey in providing a market signal that both actors can 
use to reduce their exposure to these risks. The CDP’s most important contribution to developing a 
technical consensus was the development of four categories of financial information related to climate 
change risks that institutional investors now widely define as the “de facto” international climate 
change risk disclosure standard.25 
In terms of political capacity, the CDP Secretariat had successfully established a broad 
network of important support within the institutional investment community. This network presently 
includes over 551 institutional investors, and over 3000 companies. Because these actors already 
support climate change risk disclosure, the CDP governs a large constituency that is critical to 
broadening support throughout the economy in support of climate change risk disclosure. The CDP’s 
technical expertise in facilitating disclosure and its wide network of support constituted valuable 
assets in facilitating the effort to harmonize existing climate change risk standards.26  
Despite the expertise and capacity of the CDP in facilitating its own standard, initial efforts to 
harmonize existing standards generated frustration among many of the key players. In particular, 
these players were concerned that the CDSB would take precedence over their own standards and 
institutional investors and corporate emitters worried that another standard would just add another 
layer onto the existing patchwork.  In fact, several members voiced concerns that the new standard 
largely replicated the CDP’s survey.27 
Samans addressed these concerns by proposing that the CDSB develop a standard that, while 
harmonizing existing approaches, could be incorporated into existing mandatory national and 
international accounting standards. This idea emerged after consultations with representatives from 
the accounting sector in early 2007, who agreed to join the CDSB through the formation of the 
Technical Working Group (TWG). According to Samans:  
                                                     
25 CDSB, “Basis for Conclusions in Exposure Draft: The Climate Standards Disclosure Board Reporting 
Framework,” 17. 
26 Anonymous B.  
27 Anonymous D. Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, May 10, 2010. 
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[T]he development of a single set of universal standards on climate change related disclosure 
will bring some welcome order to the communication challenges that inevitably occur as the 
discipline of climate change reporting evolves. The active involvement of the accounting 
profession is essential to achieving this standardization.28  
The accounting profession represented an ideal target for collaboration for two reasons. First, as noted 
in the next section, the industry had material interests in expanding its markets through the 
implementation of a mandatory climate change risk disclosure standard. Second, the accounting 
industry had a great deal of experience and expertise in collaborating to harmonize different national 
accounting standards. In particular, the industry had expertise in facilitating inter-firm collaboration 
as a strategy to design and embed international accounting standards within mandatory national 
accounting standards.29  
Co-regulation provided an opportunity to combine this international standard setting expertise 
with that of the ENGOs, institutional investors, and corporate emitters who have considerable 
expertise and political capacity generating climate change risk disclosure frameworks.  As the next 
section will describe, this expertise and capacity were welcomed by the accounting industry as 
important assets in generating the technical and political consensus necessary to implement an 
international accounting standard governing climate change risks.  
4.3 Governing Climate Change Risks in Accounting Markets 
 
Before describing the importance of a technical and political consensus in implementing international 
accounting standards, it is important to describe in more detail why the accounting industry 
represented an important ally for ENGOs, institutional investors and corporate emitters pushing for 
the mandatory disclosure of climate change risks. Particularly important were the material interests of 
the accounting sector in implementing an international accounting standard to expand its markets by 
developing services throughout the economy to govern climate change risks.  
4.3.1 Material Interests in Challenging International Accounting Standards 
 
The implementation of a mandatory climate change risk disclosure standard presents significant 
opportunities for accountants to expand their market boundaries as the demands for the valuation, 
                                                     
28 Rachel Singh, “Cracks Appear in Carbon Emissions Accounting,” Accountancy Age, November 12, 2009, 
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1750852/cracks-appear-carbon-emissions-accounting. 
29 Anonymous B. 
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measurement, and auditing of climate change risks increase.30 But as the analysis in this section will 
demonstrate, these opportunities are contingent on the expansion of public regulation, specifically the 
implementation of a mandatory international accounting standard. Examples of these opportunities 
include accounting services for the financial implications of transactions under regulated emissions 
trading schemes, developing new performance metrics, and providing robust disclosure on risks and 
performance to capital markets. Boards of Directors and managers will require new performance 
measures to identify strategies for reducing exposure to climate change risks and costs. Investors will 
also require a great deal more information on how physical, regulatory, reputational and legal risks 
are likely to impact their investment strategy as the impacts of climate change increase.31 The Big 
Four have recognized this potential new market and have all dedicated resources to exploring and 
developing opportunities in providing services necessary to reduce uncertainty around the impacts of 
climate change.32  
This market behavior is informed by cognitive expectations within the accounting industry 
that climate change economic uncertainty represents a financial risk that can be governed through 
accounting services. Within the accounting profession, market uncertainty associated with climate 
change must be treated as a risk in a firm’s corporate accounts. The accounting industry’s core 
business model is based on selling services that corporations and investors use to generate a neutral 
communication on a firm’s financial value. Although the financial impacts of climate change remain 
uncertain, accountants are predisposed to treat this uncertainty as a risk as a precautionary measure to 
protect the legitimacy of their expertise.   
The development of expertise on how to accurately measure value has been the core business 
model for accountants since limited liability laws were first introduced requiring the use of an auditor 
to protect the interests of investors. First created in Great Britain in 1862, limited liability laws 
                                                     
30 Nathaniel Gronewold, “The Big Four of Accounting Will be Among the Big Winners if U.S. Adopts Climate 
Law,” New York Times, July 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/07/07climatewire-the-big-four-
of-accounting-will-be-among-the-77758.html. 
31 Julie Desjardins and Alan Willis, “Low-Carbon Economy: The Business of Climate Change,” CA Magazine, 
December 1, 2009. 
32 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, “Global Sustainability,” PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2010, 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/sustainability; KPMG, “Climate Change and Sustainability Services,” KPMG, 2010, 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/WhatWeDo/Advisory/Risk-Compliance/Internal-Audit/Climate-Change-
Sustainability-Services/Pages/default.aspx; Deloitte, “Climate Change and Carbon Markets,” Deloitte, 2010, 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GX/global/industries/energy-resources/climate-change-carbon-markets/; 
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legislated that public companies had to produce an annual balance sheet verified to be ‘fair’ by an 
accountant. To ensure bookkeeping provided maximum transparency, accountants developed 
standards that define how to communicate a fair disclosure on a firm’s economic value.33 These 
standards are designed to represent a code that sets the minimum requirement for the quality of data 
incorporated into a financial statement to be considered “decision-useful” to investors.34  
Debates about whether a firm’s environmental performance fulfills the requirements to be 
included in a firm’s accounts first emerged during the 1970s through the efforts of Professor Anthony 
Hopwood, who founded the journal Accounting, Organizations and Society as a forum for research 
exploring the social and environmental impacts of accounting.35 Among financial accountants, these 
debates have traditionally remained on the periphery because of a natural conservatism embedded 
within the sector towards reforming the way “decision-useful” information is defined.36 Despite this 
conservatism, accountants have started to emerge who question this perspective.37 
According to Rob Gray and Jan Bebbington, accountants are driven to question why existing 
disclosure requirements discount a firm’s environmental performance based on their professional 
obligations. As neutral arbiters in communicating a firm’s financial information, accountants are 
beginning to realize that discounting a firm’s environmental performance means their “accounts” of 
an organization are flawed and misleading. As a consequence, management and investors are making 
decisions based on the financial information that does not reflect a “fair” valuation of a firm’s 
financial performance.38 In the event that a firm or investor links a decision to this incomplete 
disclosure, the firm who provided the audit is exposed to reputational risk as their clients turn to their 
rivals.  
Because the accounting profession depends on its credibility as a neutral arbiter of financial 
information, it often invokes the “precautionary principle” in response to conditions of economic 
                                                     
33 Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 136. 
34 For example, the mission of the IASB is “to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, 
understandable and enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparent and 
comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting to help participants in the world’s 
capital markets and other users make decisions.” See IASB, “IASC Foundation Constitution” (IASB, 2000), 
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/2007revisedconstitution.pdf. 
35 Rob Gray, “Thirty Years of Social Accounting, Reporting and Auditing: What (if anything) Have We 
Learnt?,” Business Ethics, A European Review 10 (2001): 9-15. 
36 See Schmidheiny and Zorraquin, Financing Change: The Financial Community, Eco-efficiency, and 
Sustainable Development, 131. 
37 Gray and Bebbington, Accounting for the Environment, 221. 
38 Ibid., 222. 
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uncertainty by trying to reduce this uncertainty into a measureable financial risk.39 For the accounting 
profession, economic uncertainty constitutes an opportunity to develop metrics and valuation 
techniques that managers and investors can use to reduce uncertainty and improve their market 
decision-making. This analysis confirms the important influence of financial knowledge in shaping 
the accounting industry’s material interests in using public regulation to govern the measurement and 
disclosure of climate change risks. Not only is this knowledge conducive to questioning whether 
environmental information should be measured in a firm’s corporate accounts, but it is also 
generating market services that are able to make these calculations. Indeed, as Chapter 2 (section 
2.3.2) described, accountants govern powerful “knowledge structures” that can be used to reduce 
uncertainty around the measurement of a firm’s environmental performance, such as exposure to 
climate change risks.  
For this reason, accountants are increasingly aware of demands among ENGOs, investors, 
and firms seeking disclosure about a firm’s environmental performance. These demands have led to 
concerns that the accounting industry has failed in its core business strategy by neglecting the 
measurement and disclosure of a firm’s environmental performance. According to Michael Izza, the 
Chief Executive of the ICAEW, the financial crisis was an important reminder of the accounting 
industry’s professional obligation to expand disclosure beyond strict financial performance. In a 
speech to the Cardiff Business School in November 2010, Izza explained that “this crisis should have 
taught us, our long term-economic well-being and indeed our survival can no longer just rely on the 
performance of markets as measured in financial terms.”40 He concluded by arguing that measuring a 
firm’s environmental performance represents one of these key factors in preserving “our long-term” 
well-being and that this belongs to “the domain of the accountant who can make a significant 
contribution to businesses becoming more sustainable and gaining the benefit as a result.”41 
The disclosure of climate change risks has become a significant target for accountants with 
material interests in expanding disclosure. As one member of the CDSB argued in an interview, the 
spread of these voluntary reporting and disclosure standards represents an important signal that the 
“relevance of the [accounting] industry” is under threat if it fails to act.42 These cognitive expectations 
for the use of accounting markets in measuring future oriented environmental risks reveal how 
                                                     
39 Geoff Lamberton, “Sustainability Accounting: A Brief History,” Accounting Forum, no. 29 (2005): 7-26, 20. 
40 Robert Llewellyn, “Time to Stop Living off the Earth's Capital - Before it's all Used Up,” Western Mail, 
November 25, 2010, http://www.walesonline.co.uk/business-in-wales/business-news/2010/11/25/accountants-
chief-talks-in-cardiff-on-sustainability-91466-27711514/. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Anonymous G. Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, March 7, 2010. 
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accounting knowledge can influence the way actors perceive their material interests. But for the 
industry to capitalize on the opportunities created by demands for improved disclosure, it must 
engage in collective rule making through the IASB to implement a mandatory standard. Similar to the 
ENGOs (ie. CDP, INCR, GHG Protocol), institutional investors and corporate emitters involved in 
existing standards, the accounting industry sees voluntary disclosure as insufficient for governing 
these risks.  
For an international market, the accounting sector must reform existing international 
accounting standards (the IFRS) implemented by the IASB. These standards establish the market for 
accountants to audit and advise the measurement and disclosure of financial information to ensure 
publicly listed firms comply with international accounting standards. The implementation of a 
mandatory international standard by the IASB would require all publicly listed firms in the IASB’s 
120 member states to measure and disclose their climate change risks.  
Without a mandatory standard, the market for accounting services in auditing climate change 
risks would be marginal and insufficient to justify developing these services. As Gray and 
Bebbington explain, the reason why accounting markets have failed to generate services capable of 
measuring the market value of a firm’s environmental performance is that “the majority of companies 
(and, indeed, the majority of accountants) will not willingly undertake voluntary disclosure.”43 In 
other words, accountants do not have the authority to force firms to provide disclosure and stimulate 
demand for accounting services. This analysis suggests that implementing a mandatory standard is 
really the only way the accounting industry can promote its material interests in governing climate 
change risk disclosure. 
In addition to the supporting mandatory disclosure for material reasons, accountants support 
mandatory disclosure because promoting “voluntary disclosure” could expose the industry to 
reputational and regulatory risks. As a coordination service firm that produces closely substitutable 
“semi-public” goods (ie. auditing), a mistake by one firm can easily create reputational and regulatory 
risk for the entire industry. For example, an accounting firm’s reputation as a neutral communicator 
of financial information is compromised if it is caught providing a voluntary audit that misleads 
investors about a firm’s exposure to climate change risks. Because there are no standards establishing 
how to measure these risks, accounting for a firm’s environmental performance is a “minefield” 
according to Gray and Bebbington.44  
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While accountants have the knowledge and expertise to measure this performance based on 
“traditional” auditing practices, accountants rely on standards sanctioned by the industry and public 
regulators to ensure their reports reflect “economic reality”. Without these standards there is “no 
definition of an environmental report and therefore less clarity on what it is the auditor is trying to 
attest to.”45 In the event that investors or the audited firm complains to regulators about an 
accountant’s conclusion of its exposure to climate change risks, the firm and potentially the entire 
industry could be exposed to regulatory risk if other firms are caught providing similar audits.  
To prevent a situation where an accounting firm extends its services to provide audits that are 
misleading, the industry has developed accounting standards backed by public regulators. In addition 
to securing the support of regulators, the IASB’s standard setting process also exposes new standards 
to potential opposition among firms participating in the accounting supply-chain. This process 
ensures that the services accountants provide have legitimacy among both preparers and end-users. 
By standardizing the range of services each firm can provide to ensure compliance with these 
standards, the accounting industry can avoid reputational and regulatory risks and maintain its 
technical legitimacy or “abstract system of knowledge in order to claim professional stature.”46 The 
combination of the need to defend the industry from potential reputational and regulatory risks 
associated with the expansion of its services, and the material benefits associated with mandatory 
disclosure, generate support for the implementation of a mandatory standard. 
4.3.2 Technical and Political Consensus in Governing Climate Change Risks 
 
The accounting industry represents an important ally for ENGOs because it views public regulation as 
useful for advancing its material interests. These material interests are informed by the accounting 
sector’s predisposition to cognitive expectations that climate change uncertainty constitutes a 
financial risk that must be measured within accounting markets.  But why did the industry decide to 
pursue co-regulation with these ENGOs as an optimal strategy for expanding this regulation?  
Because the IASB or national accounting standard setters have yet to initiate a standard 
setting process for climate change risks, accountants must generate evidence for a “business case” 
that climate change risks are “decision-useful” and justify disclosure, and determine an effective 
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design for a disclosure standard. This requires that the accounting profession establish a technical 
consensus for a standard that captures “decision-useful” financial information related to the economic 
uncertainty created by climate change. The accounting industry then also needs to generate political 
consensus in support of a mandatory standard. As section 4.3 described, the CDSB Board members, 
specifically the CDP Secretariat, has important expertise that can help the accounting industry address 
these challenges.  
4.3.2.1 Measuring “Decision-Useful” Risks 
 
The accounting profession’s interests in supporting the implementation of a new disclosure standard 
are informed by cognitive expectations that financial information must meet to be considered 
“decision-useful” for investors by improving the efficiency of their decision-making.47 These 
expectations are identified in IASB’s Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting. The first 
expectation is that financial information supports “relevance”, which stipulates “information is 
relevant if it is capable of making a difference in the decisions made by users in their capacity as 
capital providers.”48 The second expectation is “faithful representation”, which stipulates, 
“information must be as faithful representation of the economic phenomena that it purports to 
represent.”49  
While this guidance helps the accounting profession identify information that is decision-
useful, there are also two “constraining” expectations that limit the information provided by financial 
reporting. The first is “materiality”, which sets a qualitative threshold for identifying “decision-
useful” information by arguing that information must be disclosed if its “omission or misstatement 
could influence the decisions that users make on the basis of an entity’s financial information.”50 The 
second is “cost”, which stipulates that “the benefits of financial reporting should justify those costs.”51 
This latter “constraining” characteristic represents a critical condition for implementing a mandatory 
standard. If preparers and end-users are unable to justify that disclosure generates some form of 
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material gain relative to the cost of measuring climate change risks, it is difficult to argue that 
governing these risks leads to a material gain in the first place.  
Although these expectations provide thresholds or tests for determining whether financial 
information should be measured and disclosed, they are flexible and intended to challenge 
accountants to make the case that information does or does not satisfy these thresholds.  For this 
reason, the accounting industry, as well as CDSB Board members, must generate a technical 
consensus that climate change risks are decision-useful for investors and financial markets more 
broadly to implement an international standard.52 As the previous analysis suggested in this section, 
many actors within the accounting industry support “progressive” cognitive expectations that 
accounting knowledge can be used generate a technical consensus on how to measure climate change 
risks in ways that are decision-useful. This “progressive” stance, however, must overcome opposition 
among accountants who support more “conservative” cognitive expectations towards the use of 
accounting knowledge in governing future-oriented risks. These accountants believe that a more 
pragmatic approach to dealing with the requests of ENGOs and institutional investors would be to 
wait for evidence that these risks are decision-useful before they are measured and counted on a 
firm’s balance sheet. When these risks become decision-useful, the rule-makers in the accounting 
sector, such as the IASB, will implement a standard addressing the demand for more disclosure.  
This conservatism is based on the argument that climate change risks constitute a long-term 
issue that remains too uncertain to satisfy the profession’s cognitive expectations for decision-useful 
information.53 Accountants have a difficult time measuring future-oriented risks in a financial 
statement because there is often no “present obligation” or measurable outflow of assets to be 
valued.54 Without a quantitative measure that a risk has materialized into a cost, there is little 
evidence that accountants can point to that such a risk requires disclosure. The implementation of a 
standard that forces this disclosure could communicate information on a firm’s financial performance 
that is misleading to investors without this evidence. In the event that standards are proven to reveal 
flawed financial information, standard setters and the accounting firms that audit these standards are 
exposed to high levels of regulatory, reputational and legal risks.  
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For example, the Enron crisis was the result of auditing using accounting standards that 
disclosed misleading information to investors about the location of liabilities in Enron’s corporate 
accounts. Under the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), firms could create 
Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and then sell their debt to the SPE as a way of lowering liabilities in 
their account. Once the debt is sold to the SPE, it is no longer recorded on the seller’s account as a 
liability. The only stipulation according to GAAP is that 3 percent of the SPE’s equity is owned by a 
third party for it to be considered a separate firm. Enron could easily attract outside financiers to 
contribute 3 percent (even though they often just listed their own employees as 3 percent stakeholders 
in the SPE) and used this as a simple way to erase liabilities and improve its appeal among 
investors.55 In this instance, US GAAP failed to capture significant liabilities on Enron’s balance 
sheet that were highly material to their investors and financial markets.  
Although these financial practices were technically allowed under US GAAP, Arthur 
Anderson – one of the Big Five accounting firms – was forced to declare bankruptcy as its clients fled 
worried about its poor reputation.56 This popular backlash spread to the US Congress, which 
implemented the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an attempt to address the loopholes that led to the Enron 
crisis. The Act significantly increased the operating cost for the remaining Big Four accounting firms 
by asking them to significantly change their due diligence approach.  
The Enron crisis is one example showing how the accounting sector and its standards can be 
targeted for disclosing misleading information on a firm’s financial value. These consequences fuel a 
constant debate within the accounting sector on how to improve the standards that govern accounting 
practices. It is in this context that debates emerge about whether a firm’s environmental performance 
and risks are decision-useful. Whereas standard setters may argue that a standard on climate change 
risk disclosure could produce misleading information, investors and ENGOs would argue the 
opposite, that the omission of such a standards and adequate disclosure of climate change risks is 
misleading.57 
The CDSB represents a useful platform for the accounting industry to try and generate a 
consensus on how a standard should be designed. As the previous section discussed, CDSB Board 
members have been working hard to generate this consensus on their own and have developed 
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established frameworks widely recognized for their technical capacity to reduce uncertainty around 
climate change risks. Because these frameworks are widely recognized as “decision-useful” in 
measuring climate change risks among institutional investors and corporate emitters, accountants 
have evidence that the measurement of climate change risks at least partially fulfills the industry’s 
cognitive expectations for decision-useful information. In other words, a technical consensus on how 
to measure climate change risks is already emerging, albeit in an ad hoc or piecemeal manner.  
4.3.2.2 The Politics of a Mandatory Climate Risk Standard 
 
Even if CDSB Board members, with the help of the accounting industry, are successful in generating 
a technical consensus, these actors must generate a political consensus that a mandatory regulation is 
necessary to govern these risks. It is particularly important to generate political support among 
stakeholders that could oppose the implementation of a mandatory standard, and even withdraw 
support for the IASB itself. Among the IASB’s major constituencies, investors are usually willing to 
side with accountants pushing for a higher level of disclosure to improve their decision-making when 
allocating capital. Many TNCs, however, tend to oppose rigorous disclosure, citing the costs of 
compliance, as well as concerns that excessive disclosure of information can damage their 
competitiveness by revealing market strategy to their competitors, and that investors could disinvest 
based on misleading information.58 
National securities regulators represent potentially the most important interest group in the 
IASB standard setting process. Because these regulators have the authority to implement international 
standards, their support is necessary for the IASB to be effective in its mandate. Any move by the 
IASB to implement a standard on climate change risks would likely face opposition from various 
national securities regulators who might refuse to implement the standard based on opposition within 
their domestic constituency. This opposition would likely take two forms. First, publicly listed firms 
who are required to comply with the IASB’s standards tend to oppose increased disclosure of 
environmental information. Most of these firms take this position because “disclosure could expose a 
firm and its officers to prosecution where there is evidence of non-compliance with regulations.”59 
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This opposition is particularly strong among small and medium sized enterprises (SME) which often 
cannot afford to allocate more resources to increased disclosure.60  
Second, popular opposition could also emerge against an extension of the IASB’s authority 
into climate change politics. Although the politics of international accounting standard setting are 
arguably confined to a narrow group of technocrats, politicians and readers of the Financial Times, 
issues involving the “global governance” of climate change are heavily politicized in many countries, 
especially the US, which is one of the IASB’s most important constituents. The US has a history of 
delaying its support for the international harmonization project led by the IASB. On numerous 
occasions, the US SEC has pushed backed the date that it will adopt the IASB’s standards.61 The 
IASB’s focus on convincing regulators governing the world’s largest capital market to adopt its 
standards is likely to make it hesitant to adopt projects such as climate change risk disclosure that 
could generate popular opposition among US regulators and domestic firms.  
According to Richard Spencer of the ICAEW, a member of the CDSB, the IASB is also too 
overwhelmed with its efforts to respond to more immediate accounting priorities, and consequently, 
has yet to identify a strategy for winning global agreement for such a climate change standard.62 In 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, the decision-making formula used by the IASB was attacked by 
the G-20 leaders for its lack of accountability to the IASB’s member-states. More specifically, the 
IASB has faced increased scrutiny from G-20 leaders over its decisions supporting the use of “fair-
value” accounting, which critics argue contributed to the worsening of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis.63  
In addition to this scrutiny, the IASB must also focus on its convergence project attempting to 
integrate the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), with its International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS).64 Integrating the two most widely used accounting standards represents a 
tremendous political and technical task for the IASB. As a matter of priority, it must focus on more 
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“mainstream” accounting issues that its core constituents are looking to resolve before addressing 
concerns such as climate change risk. The IASB did, however, recently join the International 
Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC), a separate green accounting initiative which focuses on 
effective disclosure of a wider range of sustainability issues. This move demonstrates that 
environmental concerns are gaining some traction within the IASB.65  
Although the accounting industry has extensive experience in implementing international 
accounting standards through the IASB, the initiation of a similar effort to govern climate change 
risks is likely to fail without support among key stakeholders impacted by such a standard, and the 
IASB itself. The CDSB provides an opportunity for the accounting industry to leverage the political 
capacity of the various Board members who have developed constituencies already supporting 
climate change risk disclosure.  
For example, frameworks such as the GHG Protocol and CDP survey both enjoy support 
among a wide constituency of actors external to the accounting industry. In particular, many 
corporate and environmental actors believe that these frameworks will be effective in shifting the way 
market actors perceive the economic value of climate change risks. This constituency represents an 
important base for cultivating political support among external stakeholders including the 
environmental community necessary for the IASB or national accounting standard setters to 
implement a mandatory standard governing climate change risks.  
In addition to generating a technical consensus within the accounting community that climate 
change risk disclosure is decision-useful, it is also necessary to ensure that the framework enjoys 
legitimacy within the environmental community.66 In particular, it is necessary to demonstrate that the 
any disclosure framework developed by the CDSB is able to capture information that can stimulate 
further investment in economic behavior that supports mitigation and adaptation. As chapter 3 
(section 3.3.2) suggested, ENGO oversight that involves the use of a reflexive mechanism is an 
important signal that environmental concerns are important for the CDSB along with the more 
material interests related to climate change risks. 
This analysis reveals that the advancement of the accounting industry’s interests in expanding 
its markets to facilitate climate change risk is contingent on accounting knowledge that these risks 
must be governed through public regulation, rather than short-term concerns about reputation as 
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suggested by post-Westphalian arguments. But to facilitate this regulation, the industry must 
collaborate to generate a technical and political consensus. Although accountants are beginning to 
support “progressive expectations” that accounting markets can govern climate change risks in ways 
that generate material gains, there is still hesitation among some within the industry in pushing for 
mandatory disclosure. The hesitation is based on technical uncertainty involved in attributing value to 
a future-oriented risk, the design of a standard that could be effective communicating this risk, and 
potential political opposition to engaging collective rule making through the IASB. ENGOs, 
specifically the “specialist” finance-oriented organizations that joined the CDSB Board have a “head 
start” in generating this technical and political consensus, and thus make valuable partners with the 
accounting industry.  
4.4 Co-Regulation and Cognitive Governance in the CDSB 
 
This section will outline how co-regulation established by the CDSB between the accounting 
industry, ENGOs, institutional investors, and corporate emitters harnesses the expertise and 
experience of these actors in generating the technical and political consensus necessary to facilitate 
mandatory climate change risk disclosure. By breaking down the CDSB’s approach to co-regulation, 
this analysis will demonstrate how its strategy for achieving influence involves two stages that 
demonstrate the two core characteristics involved in cognitive governance (see Figure 4.1). These 
characteristics include: 1) the use of voluntary best-practice standards to engage in technical and 
political consensus building to cultivate constiencies willing to support an expansion of public 
regulations to govern climate change risks; and, 2) the use of a reflexive mechanism to govern 
compliance to these standards. 
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Figure 4.1 The CDSB as cognitive governance 
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Before explaining the two-stage process, it is necessary to outline how the CDSB embraces a 
reflexive mechanism to facilitate cognitive governance. This analysis is also useful to provide a 
defense against potential criticism by demonstrating how voluntary standards governed by this 
mechanism can facilitate its objectives. The CDSB’s use of voluntary standards is designed to 
encourage an expansion of its membership as a part of its technical and political constituency building 
process. The flexibility associated with voluntary standards is particularly important to encourage 
corporate emitters to join the initiative without concern that their obligation to provide disclosure will 
be too burdensome in terms of cost or potential external scrutiny. As the CDSB improves the CCRF’s 
capacity to capture decision-useful information, emitters will be able to determine their own rate of 
compliance and over time build the expertise and capacity necessary to provide disclosure at a level 
that satisfies a mandatory standard. 
The reflexive mechanism developed by the CDSB combines the expertise of the accounting 
sector in implementing international accounting standards, and the capacity of CDSB Board 
members, which also have experience in implementing climate change risk disclosure standards using 
external audits and third party monitoring. For example, the CDSB’s approach represents a more 
formal and sophisticated strategy than the reflexive mechanism that the CDP uses to govern technical 
and political consensus building.  
In addition to building on the CDP’s existing expertise in governing a reflexive standard 
setting process, a reflexive mechanism governed by an ENGO is important evidence that the 
negotiators recognized the importance generating legitimacy within the environmental community. 
Although the CDSB has yet to face any opposition from within the environmental community, 
interviews confirmed that the decision for the CDP to host the initiative was in part made to ensure it 
had ENGO support. In fact, the WEF initially hosted the first meetings on the CDSB but  “there was 
not a lot of enthusiasm about having [it] move into an operational role” based on concerns among 
participants that it reflected the interests of the corporate community.67 Board members thought the 
CDP was an optimal host because it was a “neutral” body with the “largest footprint” in climate 
change risk disclosure.68 
The CDSB mirrors the standard-setting process designed by the IASB. This design gives 
autonomy to accounting experts in designing the standards through the TWG before getting feedback 
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from the Advisory Group, and then final consent from the Board.69 Once a standard is approved, it is 
released as an ED where actors external to the CDSB can offer their input on its effectiveness in 
capturing “decision-useful” information on climate change risks. After gathering feedback on the ED, 
the TWG attempts to incorporate feedback in ways that balance accounting cognitive expectations for 
the effective disclosure of these risks with the concerns expressed by the Board, Advisory Committee 
and public feedback. 
 The most significant improvement to the reflexive mechanism employed by the CDSB 
compared to the CDP is the addition of an external group of accounting experts to moderate feedback 
from participants on the capacity of disclosure to produce “decision-useful” information. The CDP 
relies on external research reports and its own internal expertise and capacity for improving its 
survey. Although this process provides an important source of reflexivity in facilitating technical and 
political consensus building, it has also been accused of being ad hoc and at times disruptive to the 
disclosure of comparable information on climate change risk exposure among the CDP’s 
participants.70 The CDSB has made a distinct effort to strengthen the reflexivity of its approach by 
leveraging the partnership between the Board and the TWG as a mutual source of expertise and 
capacity in facilitating technical and political consensus building. The reflexive mechanism is the first 
example of how the CDSB has benefited from the partnership between its key constituents. The 
contribution of this critical partnership to facilitating consensus building is examined in the following 
analysis.  
4.4.1 Technical Consensus Building 
 
The first step in cognitive governance involves the attempt to establish a technical consensus on how 
to accurately measure climate change risks using a mandatory disclosure standard that improves 
market-decision making. To generate this consensus, the CDSB embraces a process where efforts to 
measure and disclose climate change risks using a voluntary disclosure framework are “cycled” 
through a reflexive mechanism to capture weaknesses identified by preparers, end-users and auditors 
using the framework. These weaknesses are then addressed by consulting the expertise of the TWG, 
and other CDSB’s constituents. The goal for this process is the “continuous improvement” of the 
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CDSB’s framework by using accounting knowledge so that “disclosures about climate change may be 
made more decision-useful by adopting relevant principles from the financial reporting model.” 
(emphasis added).71 As the design of standard improves, and it is able to capture information that 
improves market-decision making, so to does the business case behind supporting mandatory 
disclosure.   
 The CDSB has so far been through one cycle of the first stage of cognitive governance. The 
CDSB released an ED of its first disclosure framework in May 2009 and closed the comment period 
in December 2009.72 In May 2010, the CDSB released the Climate Change Reporting Framework 
(CCRF) Version 1.0. The CCRF provides instructions for how auditors, preparers and end-users can 
measure climate change risks associated with a firm’s production process.73 By breaking down the 
decision-making behind several of the more important provisions within the CCRF, it is possible to 
see how technical consensus building attempts to reduce uncertainty around the measurement and 
disclosure of climate change risks.  
 Although there are a variety of areas within the CCRF currently debated for their ability to 
measure and disclosure climate change risks, the following will focus on three of the more significant 
in terms of the CCRF’s capacity to measure and disclose climate change risks. The first provision is 
the adoption of the IASB’s characteristics for decision-useful information. The second provision is 
the design of the CCRF as a standard to be implemented in a financial statement’s “management 
commentary” section. The third provision involves the decision to use two disclosure content 
requirements developed by the CDP and GHG Protocol. The following analysis will show how 
technical consensus building played an important role in the emergence of these key provisions, and 
how they remain contested aspects in facilitating effective disclosure of climate change risks.  
The CCRF uses the IASB’s “qualitative characteristics for decision-useful information,” 
specifically, “relevance”, “faithful representation”, “materiality,” and “cost” as a benchmark that 
preparers, end-users and auditors can use as a threshold for determining whether climate change risk 
information is decision-useful.74 For example, in defining “relevance” the CCRF establishes the 
following:  “Information is relevant if it is capable of making a difference in the decisions made by 
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users in their capacity as capital providers.”75 Faithful representation ensures that preparers disclose 
information from a position of neutrality with “no material errors”, whereas materiality ensures that 
this representation of information is not presented in a way that misleads for investors.76 Cost 
stipulates that “the benefits of reporting information are likely to justify the costs incurred to provide 
and use that information.”77 
Incorporating the IASB’s qualitative characteristics for decision useful information is an 
important technical decision necessary if the CCRF is to be adopted by the IASB and various national 
securities regulators because they follow the same definitions.78 Indeed, as analysis in section 4.3.2.1 
described, these characteristics have been developed by the IASB based on consensus within the 
accounting profession for the minimum requirements for the implementation of an accounting 
standard to capture decision-useful information. The support for the adoption of this “financial 
reporting model” was evident in the feedback produced through the comment period.79 The decision 
to adopt the IASB’s qualitative characteristics, however, has created some debate over whether 
climate change risk disclosure will be able to meet these characteristics  
One of the most important of these contested characteristics is cost. In the 2009 ED, the 
CDSB excluded the IASB’s “cost” characteristic as a qualification for decision-useful information 
arguing that “the Board is confident that the benefits of disclosure outweigh any additional marginal 
costs associated with information collection and assessment for reporting under the framework.”80 
This assumption was an important source of debate in the comment papers received by the CDSB. 
Many respondents argued that including the “cost” characteristic was critical if a climate change risk 
standard is to become mandatory. For example, Deloitte argued that “a decision on whether these 
disclosures should be mandatory” cannot occur until a “cost-benefit analysis is performed.”81 
In response, the CDSB included the IASB’s “cost” characteristic in the CCRF. Preparers and 
end-users must now determine how the information they disclose or interpret can be used to 
maximize material gains. But the CDSB also recognized that an even more aggressive effort is 
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required to fulfill this cost threshold. In their 2010 “Work Plan”, the CDSB suggests that it “takes 
seriously the recommendation from the public consultation that it should conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis in order to evidence the value/benefit of climate change related disclosures and assess the 
costs to various industries.”82 As a consequence, the Work Plan now incorporates a cost-benefit 
analysis on the benefits of climate related disclosures for both corporate emitters and institutional 
investors.83 Although the CDSB can then use this evidence to demonstrate that disclosure improves 
the efficiency of market decision-making, the process to make this case remains an ongoing challenge 
in fulfilling its mandate.   
The second problem identified in using the IASB’s characteristics for decision-useful 
information that remains unresolved even after the publication of the CCRF is ensuring the GHG 
emissions fulfill the “faithful representation” requirement.84 Because the quantitative measurement of 
GHG emissions is an imprecise exercise, several comment papers argued that it would be impossible 
to meet the faithful representation criteria, which requires that disclosure is “free from material error.” 
Similar to concerns about the “cost” characteristic, the CDSB responded by including a subsection in 
the CCRF suggesting that “in the context of climate-change related disclosure, faithful representation 
does not imply total freedom from error.”85  
To compensate for the gap between GHG emissions disclosure and “faithful representation”, 
the CCRF requires that disclosure of GHG emissions includes a “description of the main effects of 
uncertainty”, including data gaps, assumptions, extrapolations.86 By including this guidance, the 
CCRF attempts to generate evidence that GHG emissions can fulfill this characteristic to contest 
opposition. Despite this guidance, debates about whether measurements on GHG emissions fulfill the 
“faithful representation” criteria will continue as the CCRF goes through future cycles of the reflexive 
mechanism. 
 The second important provision that is currently being debated by the CDSB is the location 
for disclosure of climate change risks within the financial statement. Location is an important factor 
in disclosing any “business risk”, such as climate change risks, that are future-oriented because they 
do not qualify as “present obligations”, or transactions that are recorded on the balance sheet. Without 
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a concrete measure on an “outflow of resources” from a firm, an accountant faces a great deal of 
ambiguity in determining an accurate communication of financial data. 
For this reason, the 2009 ED argued that the “management commentary” section is the 
desired location for climate change risk disclosure.87 The Basis for Conclusions document for the ED 
explains that this location is the most effective because it provides preparers, end-users and auditors 
with flexibility in disclosing or interpreting information that is often difficult to measure in the 
financial statement. Disclosure through the management commentary encourages preparers to provide 
a more qualitative discussion of climate change that can help “investors evaluate and assess the 
impact of climate change on a company’s current and future financial conditions, results of operations 
and cash flows.”88  
In addition to these technical benefits, management commentary also receives a high level of 
scrutiny by management within the firm and investors. The provision of a management commentary 
in addition to the financial statement is required for publicly listed firms participating in U.S. and 
E.U. capital markets – the two largest in the world.89  As a consequence of these requirements, the 
CFO must approve the content of the commentary before it is publicly disclosed. Because of this 
scrutiny in addition to its inclusion with the financial statement, investors are much more likely to 
evaluate climate change risks if they are included in the management commentary. Disclosure 
through management commentary also provides a vital learning experience by “mimicking” the 
experience preparers will face if the CDSB is successful in its mandate.  
The decision to use the management commentary approach reflected these regulatory 
requirements and the potential for a higher level of scrutiny among internal and external 
stakeholders.90 Despite these justifications, only a third of the respondents supported the use of 
management commentary as the location for risk disclosure.  In fact, respondents proposed two other 
locations. The first proposal was for disclosure through a separate “climate change report” as an 
attachment to the annual report, while the second proposal was for “limited” disclosure in the 
management commentary based on information compiled in a separate report.91 Because it is exposed 
to the highest level of external scrutiny, the ED’s requirement for disclosure through management 
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commentary is the most robust in terms of linking a firm’s exposure to climate change risks and 
financial performance in a mandatory standard.  
The CCRF reveals that the CDSB was forced to back down from its position favoring the use 
of management commentary. The language used to describe the position of information for the 
disclosure of climate change risks in the CCRF was more diffuse than in the 2009 ED. In the ED, the 
CDSB wrote that “companies that adopt the framework are required to disclose in the management 
commentary that accompanies their financial statements”.92  In contrast, the CCRF suggests that 
“information shall be reported in a place and in such a way as to explain the links between the 
organization’s strategy, operations and climate change impacts.”93 Similar to other important debates 
involved in technical consensus-building, the CDSB suggests that it will continue to follow regulatory 
developments on the management commentary in order to “refine its view over time” about the 
“placement of information and management of detail in mainstream disclosures.”94 
Whereas the first two provisions reveal the accounting industry’s contribution to technical 
consensus building, the provision outlining the “disclosure content” to be included in the management 
commentary demonstrates the important role of CDP and GHG protocol’s expertise and capacity in 
designing disclosure frameworks. One of the most important challenges faced by the CDSB is to 
balance the interests of its Board members who have developed their own widely used disclosure 
frameworks with the process of harmonization into a mandatory standard. As previously discussed in 
section  4.2, there was hesitation among many of the stakeholders that the CDSB’s effort might take 
precedence over their own frameworks.95 To appease these concerns, the CDSB made sure to explain 
that its framework “does not supersede, duplicate, or change the work of missions of its individual 
Board members.”96 Rather, the CDSB’s framework is designed to include existing frameworks as best 
practices that contributes “towards the model” that will inevitably be “prepared for inclusion in 
mainstream financial reports.”97  
This effort to include expertise developed by stakeholders supporting existing frameworks is 
demonstrated by the CDSB’s decision to adopt the CDP and GHG Protocol’s framework as the 
benchmarks for disclosure content. Specifically, the CDSB included the GHG protocol, which is 
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recognized as the “de-facto standard on GHG emissions monitoring and reporting.”98 Under the GHG 
emissions category, the CCRF establishes the GHG Protocol as its standard by applying its concept of 
organizational boundaries, specifically its innovative “scope 1, 2, 3” for counting emissions.99 The 
CDP investor survey was also included to contribute to disclosure content because it is the “de-facto 
template for disclosure content that is useful for investors.”100 The CCRF incorporates the important 
work of the CDP in the CCRF as benchmark for disclosure content. Specifically, the CCRF requires 
that disclosure include a short-term and long-term statement on potential risks, and that these risks are 
categorized into regulatory, physical, reputational and legal risks.101 
The CDSB’s decision to incorporate the CDP’s survey and GHG Protocol demonstrates how 
technical consensus-building benefits from the existing expertise of these initiatives. Because each of 
their frameworks is so widely used, the CDSB can take advantage of existing knowledge among 
preparers and end-users with experience in using these frameworks. The adoption of these two 
disclosure content requirements also demonstrates an important trade-off involved in technical 
consensus building. By agreeing to include these frameworks, “CDSB Board members, including the 
CDP, intend to adopt and endorse the CDSB reporting framework as representing best practice in 
climate change-related disclosure, and will increasingly aim to align their work programs to reflect 
the requirements of the CDSB Framework.”102 
The adoption of these three provisions demonstrates how technical consensus building 
benefits from the partnership between the CDSB and the TWG in producing a framework that reduces 
uncertainty associated climate change risk disclosure. But perhaps the most significant benefit to this 
partnership is the capacity to cycle the CCRF through the reflexive mechanism to continually contest 
the above mentioned provisions until a technical consensus can emerge. When the CCRF was 
announced, the CDSB was clear that “the CCRF is not intended to represent the final Framework, 
rather it is the latest iteration based upon the best available information as at the date of 
publication.”103 The CDSB will now “undergo cycles of post implementation testing and revision as 
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part of the continuous improvement process, whilst balancing this against the implications of tracking 
and implementing changes for users and preparers.”104 This analysis demonstrates how the CDSB 
uses its reflexive mechanism to identify and address weaknesses so that in the long-term a technical 
consensus can emerge in support of a mandatory standard that improves market-decision making.  
4.4.2 Political Consensus Building  
 
The second stage involved in cognitive governance focuses on political consensus building to 
generate legitimacy for overcoming potential opposition to implementing a mandatory disclosure 
standard. By promoting a technical consensus developed by the first stage throughout market 
participants in accounting markets, the CDSB attempts to build support for the IASB to implement a 
standard setting process. This strategy is informed by the experience of CDSB Board members, who 
have engaged in political consensus building to spread their own frameworks and agendas to 
encourage climate change risk disclosure. By joining the CDSB, these members also share access to 
the preparers and end-users currently using existing standards, such as the CDP and GHG Protocol. 
The accounting industry also has experience in trying to develop relationships with financial 
regulators, such as the International Organization of Securities and Exchange Commissions (IOSCO) 
and the SEC, as a strategy for generating political legitimacy for the IASB.105   
This stage of cognitive governance is outlined in the CDSB’s “Work Plan.” Because the plan 
was implemented in 2010, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the CDSB’s efforts have been 
contested by outside actors. But as section 4.3.2.2 discussed, the CDSB’s mandate still faces 
significant political challenges, including resource and time constraints faced by the IASB, and 
potential popular opposition to implementing a mandatory climate change risk standard. The INCR 
and Ceres, for example, had to file over six petitions with the SEC before it agreed to offer 
“guidance” on climate change risk disclosure, which is a much less stringent requirement compared to 
a mandatory regulation.106 The “Work Plan” does, however, demonstrate the type of consensus 
building the CDSB expects will be necessary to implement a mandatory standard.   
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The CDSB’s “Work Plan” describes three “engagement programs” designed to support 
political consensus building. These programs are designed to be reflexive and capture feedback that 
improves technical and political consensus building.107 To build support outside of accounting 
markets, the first engagement program targets constituency building among corporations who would 
incur the costs associated with the implementation of a mandatory standard. The corporate program 
will contact a sample of publicly listed TNCs based in Europe, Asia and North America and interview 
members of each firm’s personnel involved in financial and corporate disclosure. The goal of this 
outreach is to identify “opportunities for and barriers against disclosure” using a mandatory 
standard.108 
The second program follows a similar approach to the corporate program but targets the 500 
largest global institutional investors in an effort to determine what types of climate change 
information are decision-useful for their portfolio allocation decisions. To gather this information, 
investor engagement attempts to identify preferred metrics for measuring these risks and generate 
approval for the implementation of these metrics into the CDSB’s framework. Surveying investors 
about their preferred metrics demonstrates how stage two of political consensus building provides 
information that can be used to strengthen efforts at producing a technical consensus in stage one. The 
most important aspect of investor engagement for cognitive governance, however, is to collect 
evidence from investors of “demand for climate change-related disclosures to encourage adoption of 
the CDSB Reporting Framework by securities regulators and stock exchanges.”109 
The third engagement program targets consensus building among national securities 
regulators and accounting standard setters. To facilitate this process, the Work Plan outlines a 
“regulatory review” that will create a “digest of regulatory developments” on GHG reporting and 
climate change risk disclosure frameworks that are already in place or emerging. By collecting this 
data, the CDSB hopes to identify “synergies and gaps,” strengths and weaknesses, and the scope and 
scale of existing securities regulation and accounting standards that can be used to improve and 
support the implementation of the CCRF.110 In addition, the digest will be made public and include a 
forum where different regulatory constituencies can network with the CDSB’s constituents. Once 
developed, the regulatory review will be used to develop arguments that the CDSB can employ to 
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demonstrate how the CCRF “supplements and complements regulatory disclosures without 
duplicating them.”111  
This “work plan” outlines the “political consensus building” stage used by the CDSB to 
support cognitive governance. By engaging key constituencies to support an emerging technical 
consensus that climate change uncertainty can be governed as a risk, the CDSB attempts to expand its 
influence in ways that secure political legitimacy for mandatory implementation of a climate change 
risk disclosure standard. Once implemented as a mandatory standard, any firm wishing to list their 
shares publicly or more broadly access private capital will be asked by their auditors whether they 
have measured and accounted for their exposure to these risks.  
The examination of the CDSB’s approach to cognitive governance reveals how it is designed 
to generate a technical consensus, and leverage this consensus to cultivate a constituency of market 
participants in accounting markets willing to implement a mandatory standard governing disclosure 
of these risks at the international and national level. By developing a technical consensus that 
exposure to climate change uncertainty constitutes a measurable financial risk, “hidden links” are 
revealed that demonstrate the market value of economic behavior supporting mitigation and 
adaptation governing these risks. Once embedded within financial knowledge through the expansion 
of public authority (ie. by implementing a mandatory standard), these “links” will incentivize market 
behavior throughout the global economy to reward the governance of these risks. At that point, 
environmental co-regulation using cognitive governance would have achieved its main objective. 
4.4.3 The Limitations of the CDSB? 
 
This analysis of the CDSB confirms the dissertation’s argument that the CDSB’s approach to co-
regulation is “unconventional” as an example of private governance in its advocacy for stronger 
public regulation. The analysis suggests that the use of voluntary standards are an important strategic 
component in facilitating constituency building through the CDSB in support of a mandatory 
standard. The argument that the CDSB is voluntary for strategic reasons is, however, vulnerable to a 
potential “post-Westphalian” counter-argument. Without evidence that the CDSB has been successful 
in facilitating its objectives, scholars could argue that the corporate actors involved are not 
accountable to these objectives and support the initiative as a sophisticated reputational strategy, or 
“greenwash”. Ultimately, future research will be required to address this criticism by demonstrating 
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the CDSB’s ability to implement mandatory disclosure that is effective in incentivizing investment in 
behavior supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation. In the meantime, it is possible to 
defend against this counter-argument by providing evidence that the CDSB recognizes that 
accountability is a weakness and has implemented an enforcement strategy. Analysis of participation 
rates also helps defend the CDSB’s strategy by suggesting evidence that the corporate actors involved 
have legitimate material interests in supporting co-regulation to expand public regulation.  
 Although the enforcement strategy employed by the CDSB does not include a mandatory 
requirement for compliance, the initiative does recognize accountability is a weakness and it employs 
an enforcement strategy to improve compliance. The enforcement strategy used by the CDSB is a 
voluntary requirement that any corporate emitter using the disclosure framework  “apply the same 
rigor and management responsibility as is appropriate to all statements and disclosures in the 
mainstream financial report.”112 Under existing international accounting standards, an auditor is 
required to confirm that MD&A disclosure does not reveal any “material inconsistencies between it 
and the audited financial statements” and “to consider any observed material misstatements of fact in 
those disclosures.”113  
Although this measure is voluntary, it is designed to encourage best practice by creating 
similar reporting conditions to mandatory disclosure. To ensure compliance improves, the CCRF 
requires that participants provide a “statement of conformance” explaining which disclosure 
requirements were met, and which were too burdensome.114  While this enforcement mechanism does 
not explicitly require a minimum level of disclosure, it is designed to gradually improve compliance.  
This “comply or explain” approach is designed to give feedback to the TWG on aspects of the CCRF 
that need to be improved to facilitate higher levels of compliance. This reflexivity demonstrates that 
the CDSB is aware that facilitating robust compliance must occur over time. More directly, CDSB 
explicitly recognizes the weakness associated with asking corporate emitters to voluntarily submit 
their reports to external audits. Indeed, this is why mandatory disclosure (when auditing is required) 
has been adopted by the CDSB as its core mandate.   
In addition to questioning enforcement, skeptics could also question whether the accounting 
industry, institutional investors and corporate emitters have legitimate interests in devoting resources 
to expanding public regulation to govern climate change risk disclosure. Indeed, there is also no 
minimum requirement for the participation of the accounting or investor industry in the TWG. As a 
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consequence, the CDSB is exposed to potential criticisms that the accounting industry, institutional 
investors, and corporate emitters support the initiative merely for reputational reasons. One way to 
evaluate this argument is to examine the participation rate of these industries within the CDSB.  
The CDSB reveals an impressive rate of participation within the accounting industry, 
including the “Big Four”, Grant Thornton (the world’s fifth largest firm), and a plurality of national 
professional accounting bodies. All but one of the Big Four was established in the 19th century, and 
they currently audit the vast majority of public companies in major capital markets around the 
world.115  
The CDSB also enjoys a high rate of support among existing stakeholders involved in climate 
change risk disclosure frameworks. These stakeholders are all “Board” members, and include the 
CDP, the world’s most widely used risk disclosure framework, and the GHG Protocol, the world’s 
most widely used emissions disclosure framework. The CDP’s role on the Board, in addition to its 
logistical support as the Secretariat, is perhaps most pivotal given the claim that over $65 trillion of 
the world’s managed investment portfolios are members of the CDP, which roughly constitutes 75% 
of all managed funds in the global economy.116 The participation of these investors, albeit through the 
CDP, demonstrates that the CDSB enjoys a high rate of participation within the financial industry.  
Despite an impressive rate of participation within the accounting industry and among 
institutional investors, the CDSB still needs to find corporate emitters, or reporting organizations to 
adopt its framework - the CCRF. It is still too early to evaluate participation rates among corporate 
emitters because the CCRF was only released in 2010. But the CDSB recognizes that participation 
among these emitters could be a weakness and, through political consensus building using its 
corporate “engagement program”, it is attempting to improve participation. As its 2010 Work Plan 
outlines, the CDSB will launch an “engagement program” to target “investors, corporations, 
regulators and other sustainability practitioners” and identify how “their interests and practices may 
be aligned” with the CDSB’s objectives.117 This outreach is a key plank in cognitive governance, 
                                                     
115 Alex Hawkes, “Big Four Auditors Face OFT Consultation,” The Guardian, May 17, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/may/17/big-four-auditors-face-oft-consultation; Sarah Johnson, 
“Audit Costs Not Affected by Big Four's Stronghold: GAO,” CFO.com, January 14, 2008, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10522661. 
116 Macleod and Park, “Financial Activism and Global Climate Change: The Rise of Investor-Driven 
Governance Networks,” 11; CDP, “Carbon Disclosure Project 2010: Global 500 and S&P 500 Report 
Highlights,” 1. 
117 CDSB, “The Climate Disclosure Standards Board  - Work Plan 2010,” 3. 
 
  132 
necessary if the CDSB is going to cultivate constituencies willing to support mandatory 
implementation. 
Because the CDSB has yet to demonstrate that it can facilitate the mandatory implementation 
of climate change risks, it remains exposed to post-Westphalian criticisms. The use of a reflexive 
mechanism as an enforcement strategy demonstrates, however, the CDSB is addressing accountability 
issues. In addition, high rates of participation suggest that the corporate actors involved have 
legitimate material interests in using the CDSB to implement a mandatory standard governing the 
disclosure of climate change risks. But future research will be required to provide a more robust 
assessment of the CDSB’s capacity to hold its members accountable in cultivating constituencies 
willing to support the implementation of a mandatory climate change risk disclosure standard.    
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the form of co-regulation adopted by the CDSB and explained the factors 
that that led to its creation. The analysis revealed that the CDSB adopts the two characteristics 
outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.3) for cognitive governance, including the use of voluntary best 
practice standards to encourage technical and political consensus building and the adoption of a 
reflexive mechanism that governs compliance to these standards. This technical and political 
consensus building targets the cultivation of constituencies willing to support the implementation of a 
mandatory climate change risk disclosure standard through the IASB or national accounting standard 
setters. Once embedded in public regulation, this standard has the potential to create a market signal 
that links a firm’s exposure to climate change risks to its financial value. In other words, the CDSB 
uses co-regulation to contest existing market expectations for the economic value of a firm’s 
environmental performance by linking this performance to climate change risks that can improve the 
efficiency of market-decision making within financial markets.   
This form of co-regulation emerged in response to the three factors hypothesized in a 
framework identified in chapter 3. The first factor was the support from business actors – in this case, 
the accounting industry, institutional investors and corporate emitters - for expanding public 
regulation as a strategy to advance their material interests in governing climate change risks. The 
accounting industry supports the implementation of a mandatory international standard to expand its 
markets in climate change risk services. Institutional investors and corporate emitters support a 
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mandatory international standard to harmonize the existing patchwork of standards that fail to 
generate a comparable market signal necessary to govern climate change risks. 
 The second factor was a need to generate a technical consensus on the design of an effective 
climate risk disclosure standard, and a political consensus that this standard should be mandatory. 
Technical consensus is necessary to determine how to measure “decision-useful” information on a 
firm’s exposure to climate change uncertainty. The political consensus is necessary within and 
outside of the accounting industry to support the implementation of a mandatory standard.  
The third factor was the expertise and capacity of ENGOs involved in the existing patchwork 
of standards. Specifically, these ENGOs had accumulated important expertise and political capacity 
by working with institutional investors to implement disclosure standards that generate market 
incentives for publicly listed firms to reduce their exposure to climate change risks. For the 
accounting industry, this expertise and capacity was a vital resource in cultivating technical and 




Pricing Climate Change Risks: The ClimateWise Principles 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter’s goal is to explain the unique form of co-regulation adopted by ClimateWise to achieve 
its objectives, and identify the factors that influenced the actors involved to support this approach. 
Compared to the CDSB, ClimateWise is a weaker example of co-regulation in terms of its efforts to 
expand public regulation over insurance markets. Rather than targeting the expansion of regulation 
over insurance markets, ClimateWise targets the expansion of other forms of regulation that are 
necessary to defend insurance markets from rising weather-related losses linked to climate change.   
These regulations attempt to govern the risks that insurers could face as climate change 
impacts increase by regulating GHG emissions, implementing adaptation policy to encourage “loss-
prevention”, and adopting national climate risk reduction plans. Although these policies do not 
directly “regulate” the insurance industry, they do defend the industry by strengthening global climate 
governance in ways that will offset growing and potential losses. More specifically, these regulations 
assist insurers by offsetting their risk exposure to weather-related losses. Without these regulations, 
increasing weather-related losses could lead to higher rates and market pullbacks, both of which can 
generate reputational and regulatory risk. At the same time, however, insurers are also using 
ClimateWise to develop expertise on how to price climate change risks in their own services, or 
implement a “climate premium” on economic behavior that contributes to increasing insurance losses.   
In this respect, ClimateWise and the CDSB champion a similar objective in trying to contest 
existing market expectations that discount the economic value of a firm’s environmental performance 
by linking this performance to financial risks vis-à-vis public regulation. The key difference, 
however, is that ClimateWise attempts to internalize these risks by strengthening global climate 
governance in addition to using their own markets, whereas the CDSB targets the internalization of 
these risks through accounting markets alone. From this perspective, although ClimateWise is a 
“weaker” example in terms of influencing regulation over insurance markets, it is a “stronger” 
example in terms of its overall regulatory objectives. 
The chapter’s first two sections describe the emergence of ClimateWise by using the 
framework hypothesized in chapter 3 to identify factors that explain its unconventional approach to 
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co-regulation. This analysis identifies three factors that explain the emergence of ClimateWise, 
including; 1) material interests within the insurance industry in using public regulation to govern 
climate change risks, 2) the need to collaborate in generating a technical and political consensus that 
supports public regulation; and, 3) the existence of ENGOs with interests in using their expertise and 
political capacity to help cultivate this consensus through co-regulation. The chapter then describes 
ClimateWise’s use of cognitive governance as a strategy for cultivating constituencies willing to 
support public regulation protecting the insurance industry from climate change risks. Once this 
strategy has been outlined, the chapter then provides a brief evaluation of ClimateWise’s ability to 
fulfill its objectives. 
5.2 Leveraging Insurers in Governing Climate Change Risks    
 
Although ClimateWise emerged in response to the Prince of Wales’ initiative, its approach to co-
regulation reflects much of the existing expertise and capacity developed previously by ENGOs and 
policy entrepreneurs working on climate change issues in the insurance industry. As chapter 2 
described, the first significant effort by these groups to leverage insurance markets as a means of 
strengthening global climate change governance came in 1993 when Jeremy Leggett, the head of 
Greenpeace’s international climate change campaign, spearheaded a campaign he called “solidarity 
among the risk community”.1  
Leggett’s objectives largely reflect those of ClimateWise, although it was established 15 
years later. In particular, he tried to convince insurers to implement and use their premiums and 
deductibles to price behavior that contributed to climate change, or was exposed to climate change 
risks, and to encourage climate change risk assessment in their investment strategy. Such a premium 
would increase rates on large GHG emitters, which contribute to these risks, and on property in areas 
exposed to increasing weather-related losses, which are exposed to these risks. Similar to institutional 
investors involved in climate change risk disclosure, the implementation of climate change risk 
assessment within insurer investment decisions would increase the risk profile of economic activity 
contributing or exposed to climate change risks.2  
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Insurers started to respond to concerns about their exposure to climate change risks by 
agreeing to form the United Nations Environmental Programme’s (UNEP) Insurance Initiative at the 
first and second Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Berlin 1995 and Geneva in 
1996.3 UNEP-II was formed in 1995 after insurers - including General Accident, Gerling Global Re, 
National Provident, Storebrand, Sumitomo Marine & Fire, and Swiss Re - agreed to sign the “UNEP 
Statement of Environmental Commitment by the Insurance Industry”.4 Although UNEP II was the 
first collaborative effort among insurers to take a stand on climate change, Leggett argues that the 
initiative was quite weak. In particular, he argues that their statement at both COP 1 and 2 failed to 
include a benchmark for GHG reductions. Instead, insurers put their support behind a vague statement 
that governments should reduce emissions from their business-as-usual level. Based on Leggett’s 
account, the insurers “disappeared” after presenting the statement at COP2 in Geneva, leaving the 
fossil fuel lobby to spin “mischief for the full two weeks.”5 By the end of the 1990s, Leggett admits 
that only a “small cadre of well-informed individuals” within the insurance sector recognized the 
value of his proposal for a self-regulatory strategy to govern climate change risks.6  
Their inaction was informed by regulatory challenges associated with pricing these risks, and 
a widespread perception that insurers could innovate around increasing weather risks associated with 
climate change.7 Indeed, insurers had just established strategies for securitizing large or mega-
catastrophe (mega-CAT) risks by selling risk-linked bonds called “insurance-linked securities” (ILS) 
or CAT bonds to capital markets. By using CAT models to predict the risk of significant weather-
related losses, insurers were able to create bonds that they could sell to capital markets in which the 
purchaser of the bond absorbs the risk of a major weather related event. If a catastrophe occurred, the 
investor would lose their money. If no catastrophe occurred before the bond matured, insurers would 
pay the investor the principal with interest.8 Because the risk associated with these bonds is not 
correlated to normal market fluctuations in financial markets, they are attractive to investors seeking 
to diversify their portfolio. By selling these securities, insurers could access a much larger pool of 
capital to offset losses that their models failed to capture, such as several mega-CATs in one year. 
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CAT bonds were first traded in the Chicago Board of Trade in 1992, but the market has grown and 
now bond issuances annually reach over $5 billion.9  
The development of ILS led to renewed confidence among insurers that they could continue 
to price weather risks, such as wind risk from hurricanes, likely to be impacted by climate change. 
Similar to accountants, many insurers embrace a conservative stance towards requests by policy 
entrepreneurs such as Leggett to use their premiums or investments to strengthen global climate 
governance. This perception is supported by cognitive expectations that insurance markets will 
remain robust because insurers will act rationally by raising their rates or securitize risk as weather 
related losses associated with climate change increase. If losses become too extreme, they believe 
insurers can always pull out of the market and find another market to compensate with a lower 
exposure to climate change risks.  
According to Evan Mills, a scientist researching the relationship between climate change and 
insurance for the US Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, this 
conservatism stems from the insurers’ belief that they are not a polluting industry, and their 
preference for avoiding taking positions on political issues. Paterson observed a similar conservatism 
by identifying how divisions within the industry and its involvement in a “transnational capitalist 
class” limited the industry’s willingness to collaborate with Leggett and the UNEP-II.10 This 
perception is driven by fears that, if insurers took vocal positions on climate change, the sector would 
become the target of increased scrutiny of their exposure to climate change. This scrutiny could 
convince regulators to increase their solvency requirements while forcing them to stay in markets 
exposed to uninsurable risks. For these reasons, many insurers maintained skepticism towards climate 
change regulation, specifically the efforts of UNEP II to publicly support this regulation at the first 
two COPs.11 
Despite Leggett’s setback and cognitive expectations among insurers that their markets could 
price climate change risks as they occur, other policy entrepreneurs started to research how insurance 
markets could be leveraged in strengthening the governance of climate change risks. Instead of a 
defensive approach emphasizing the “price-risk-as-it-occurs” strategy, these entrepreneurs argued in 
favor of an offensive strategy where insurers build capacity by collaborating in debates about the 
future of the industry as climate change risks increase. More specifically, they argued that insurers 
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needed to leverage the industry’s capacity for collective rule making to expand their political 
influence in climate change debates, develop expertise and capacity to justify policy that would both 
defend their markets from climate change risks, and look for ways of extending these markets to 
cover new risks.12  
In 2000, the Association of British Insurers (ABI), an insurer business association, began 
asking questions about the correlation between climate change and the historic flood losses that UK 
insurers experienced that year.13 ABI recognized that it was necessary to be pro-active in mobilizing 
government and public support for insurers facing climate change risks. This conclusion was 
informed by ABI’s success in engaging the insurance industry’s capacity for collective rule making 
by promoting the adoption of the Statement of Principles on the Provision of Flood Insurance. These 
Principles contained an ultimatum that UK insurers would withhold coverage for flood damage unless 
the UK Government intervened to minimize growing flooding risks.14 The UK Government 
responded by agreeing to continually improve flood defenses through further investment and 
improved land-use planning to limit development in areas highly exposed to flooding.15 The 
intervention of the government in managing flood risk represented an important blueprint for 
ClimateWise, specifically its principle two which seeks a similar outcome for using public authority 
to implement policy to govern climate change risks.16  
In addition to the recognition that public regulation is required to defend insurance markets 
against structural risks such as flooding and climate change, ABI argued that insurers needed to 
improve their communication strategy on climate change risk. Specifically, insurers needed to inform 
constituencies likely to oppose insurer efforts to defend their markets from climate change risks. 
Without such an effort - specifically communicating the justification for rate increase - ABI argued 
insurers could be exposed to “reputational risk”.17 In 2007, ABI released a communications strategy 
on climate change for insurers. The strategy made two important recommendations. First, insurers 
                                                     
12 See Evan Mills, “From Risk to Opportunity: Insurer Responses to Climate Change” (Ceres, April 2009); ABI, 
“Influential Insurance: A Guide to Communicating Climate Change for Insurers,” September 2007. 
13 ABI, “Climate Change: Implications for Insurers,” Insurance Trends, October 18, 2000. 
14 HM Government and ABI, “ABI/Government Statement on Flooding and Insurance for England,” 
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, July 20, 2008, 
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where the Government will continue to improve flood defenses in order to preserve insurability of flood 
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16 ClimateWise, “The ClimateWise Principles.” 
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need to help reduce uncertainty around climate change impacts by using their legitimacy as risk 
experts to support the scientific consensus that climate change will have significant impacts, and that 
humans are liable for these impacts.18 Second, insurers should educate their consumers on how rate 
decisions regarding weather risks are informed, and how consumers can take action to lower their 
own exposure to these risks in return for lower premiums.19 
At the same time that ABI was establishing its policy strategy on climate change, two US 
policy entrepreneurs were developing their own approach to mobilizing the insurance sector in the 
governance of climate change risks. In 2001, Evan Mills authored a paper with Eugene Lecomte, a 
former CEO and President of the Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction, and Andrew Peara, 
a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries and a climatologist for the US Department of Energy, which 
outlined the case for pro-active engagement on climate change risks. Mills and his colleagues argued 
that the case for taking action on climate change was not clear for insurers because they faced 
technical and political uncertainty about their ability to effectively price climate change risks.20    
The report made two important observations that have been adopted into ClimateWise’s 
strategy. First, insurers cannot act on climate change risks until they satisfy the “standards of 
insurability”, and there is a business case that proves private insurance is viable.21 Although CAT 
models can be used to inform exposure to short-terms risks on an annual basis, models that inform 
rates based on longer-term risks associated with climate change represent a significant technical 
challenge. Second, insurers face constraints in their “business and regulatory environment” and will 
not act without “climate change mitigation and sustainable development proposals such that they 
benefit insurers’ core business model.” For example, policies that “reduce the likelihood of claims” 
such as flexible rate setting, loss-prevention and mitigation appeal to this business model.22   
In the weeks before Hurricane Katrina hit the US Gulf Coast in 2005, Mills and Lecomte 
built on the strategy they outlined in their 2001 effort by working with Ceres to research the insurance 
sector’s response to climate change.23 Their report, titled the Availability and Affordability of 
Insurance Under Climate Change: A Growing Challenge for the U.S., supported conclusions that 
climate change represented a significant threat to the availability and affordability of insurance. But 
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the report also outlined a pro-active strategy in which insurers collaborated in engaging regulators, 
governments, and consumers “to build the structure for policy implementation, as well as good 
actuarial analysis and catastrophe modeling.”24  
Ceres used this research to spearhead a campaign lobbying the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) - the US regulatory body charged with oversight of state insurance 
markets - to implement a mandatory climate change risk disclosure framework for US insurers.25 
Although the NAIC agreed to support a mandatory survey, it has since backed down from this 
ambition and now supports a voluntary approach. Section 5.5 will explain in more detail why this 
decision was made, highlighting it as an example of the type of political obstacles insurers face in 
promoting global climate governance.  
During this period, Ceres continued parallel efforts to promote research on strategies to build 
capacity and technical consensus within insurance markets on the importance of climate change risks. 
Mills and Lecomte released a second report in 2006 sponsored by Ceres that refined the approach 
outlined in their first report by suggesting that insurers adopt a “ten point strategy” based on forward-
looking best practices.26 This list of best practices represented what Mills and Lecomte described as 
the “Risk to Opportunity” strategy where insurers collectively worked with regulators and consumers 
to establish the practices necessary to defend the sector from climate change risks. In other words, 
Mills and Lecomte outlined how insurers could build technical and political consensus that supports 
the use of insurance markets in governing climate change risks. 
These strategies included: 1) partnering with governments to protect the insurability of 
markets exposed to weather related losses; 2) improving modeling of climate change risks; 3) 
utilizing premiums to encourage risk mitigation among consumers and business by offering 
incentives; 4) developing new products to help businesses and consumers mitigate these risks; 5) 
exploring how insurer investments are exposed to climate change risks, and using these investments 
to encourage industries willing to participate in climate change solutions; 6) participating in carbon 
markets; 7) “leading by example” through the reduction of an insurer’s own carbon footprint; 8) 
educating consumers about climate change risks; 9) participating actively in public policy debates on 
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climate change; and, 10) only adjusting premiums or pulling out of markets as a final option after 
exhausting all the previous strategies for climate change risk mitigation.27   
By developing a set of voluntary best-practice standards that insurers could adopt to govern 
climate change risks that targeted public authorities, Mills and Lecomte’s work represented an 
important blueprint for ClimateWise. Many of the ClimateWise Principles incorporate aspects of the 
“Risk to Opportunity” best-practice standards, including: developing better risk modeling techniques 
(principle one); public policy advocacy (principle two); engaging customers and consumers on 
climate change risk awareness (principle three); recognizing climate change risks within investment 
portfolios (principle four); and, reducing the GHG footprint (principle five).28  
Although these policy entrepreneurs developed important ideas on how insurers could 
implement best practices for defending their markets from climate change risks, they did not outline a 
strategy for convincing insurers to adopt such an approach. Rather, it was the Prince of Wales, and 
Aled Jones, the Deputy Director of the CPSL, who first engaged insurers with an opportunity to use 
co-regulation as a strategy for harnessing the industry’s collective rule making capacity to develop 
best practice standards for governing climate change risks. 
The Prince of Wales and Jones knew that insurers represented a good target for collaboration 
given ABI’s vocal campaign on the impacts of climate change on UK insurers. According to one 
interviewee, the Prince of Wales was undoubtedly much aware of these issues through his good 
friend, Lord Levine, the CEO of Lloyds of London.29 The Prince of Wales made this sentiment clear 
in his speech announcing ClimateWise:  
                                                     
27 Ibid., 33. 
28 According to one interview, the Risk to Opportunity best practices standards were often referenced as a 
benchmark in the negotiations to form ClimateWise. Anonymous I. Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, March 
10, 2010. 
29 Anonymous J. Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, October 6, 2010. 
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[I] don’t need to remind you that no-one takes a longer term or more carefully calculated 
view of the future than the insurance sector. And there can be few other sectors which are so 
directly affected, at the end of the day, by climate change. It was for both these reasons – and, 
of course, because I could not resist another spot of meddling! – that it occurred to me about a 
year ago to ask the Association of British Insurers and leading insurance companies if they 
might consider working together to find ways of tackling global warming. It felt that if 
insurance companies could take a strategic view across all aspects of what they do and look at 
the problem as a part of the whole business, it just might make a difference.30 
The idea to formally approach insurers first emerged based on the success of the Prince’s Corporate 
Leaders Group on Climate Change (CLG). Although CPSL had been involved in supporting 
businesses to improve their environmental performance since 1994 when it established the Business 
for Sustainability Programme (BSP), the CLG was the CPSL’s first attempt to use co-regulation to 
influence government policy.31   
 The distinct strategy was informed by the CPSL’s recognition that voluntary approaches 
targeting improvement in a firm’s environmental performance were insufficient in generating the 
change required to govern issues such as climate change. This realization emerged through the 
CPSL’s seminars where UK business leaders would come to learn about the benefits of voluntarily 
adopting environmental programs.32 Many of these leaders would often return to take more seminars 
and update CPSL on their efforts. According to an official at CPSL, these business leaders would 
often argue that they understood how sustainable behavior could benefit their firm, but without a 
government policy they lacked direction and incentives to effectively incorporate these changes.33 
In 2004, CPSL initiated a study to update their approach for working with businesses. CPSL 
interviewed members of the CPSL’s various business groups, UK government ministries (DEFRA, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Office of Climate Change), NGOs (World Wildelife Fund 
(WWF), Oxfam), and a range of academic experts within the University of Cambridge community. 
The questions asked participants about the behavioral changes necessary for the private sector to 
improve its sustainability, to identify barriers to these changes, and how policy interventions could 
help remove barriers to these changes.34   
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 In 2009, Jones along with other CPSL members Irma Allen, Helen Rogers, and Mick 
Blowfielf, published the results of this research in a report called the “Transformational Change 
Model: Achieving a Low Carbon Risk Economy.” In the introduction, Jones argued that the 
Transformation Change Model (TCM) represented “a first attempt to move beyond the politics into 
policy frameworks and to identify a structure for policy implementation that will give business the 
certainty it needs to start the transformation to a low climate risk economy.”35  
The report outlined that, while the private sector has responsibility for GHG reductions and 
supporting adaptation, it also has the capacity for developing technologies and practices to help the 
process. But the report also noted how businesses have failed to embrace their capacity as potential 
sources of global climate change governance and that businesses face few incentives to voluntarily 
devote resources to this cause. To address this excess capacity within the private sector, the report 
argued that governments must take on the role of a “task manager” who could design policies that 
cater to specific sectors and areas of the economy, in addition to implementing an international cap on 
emissions.36 For example, governments could introduce regulations encouraging mitigation and 
adaptation, and buttress this effort by using insurance markets to implement a “climate premium” 
based on the industry’s expertise in using markets to spread and manage risk.  
The CLG was the CPSL’s first experiment in this new approach to leveraging private 
industry in supporting environmental protection. The CLG represented a group of 18 business leaders 
from major UK and international companies “who believe there is an urgent need to develop new and 
longer term policies for tackling climate change.”37 Since its creation, the CLG has been quite active 
in lobbying for the support of government leaders and policymakers in implementing policy 
necessary for businesses to implement their own measures to reduce GHG emissions and climate 
change risk exposure. For example, in addition to lobbying governments involved in the COP, the 
CLG has taken public positions supporting the UK Government’s Climate Change bill, which 
signaled the private sector’s support for such regulations.38 
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The success of the CLG in building a constituency of corporate interests supporting climate 
change policy convinced the Prince of Wales that the strategy could easily be extended to sectors 
particularly exposed to climate change, such as insurers. To implement this strategy within the 
insurance industry, the Prince of Wales approached ABI to coordinate a meeting between London-
based insurance CEOs and Jones, who would represent the CPSL. At the first meeting, Jones, and the 
CEOs from Lloyds of London and Swiss Re decided to form a working group with other insurer 
CEOs to assess the state of the sector’s response to climate change, and to determine the sector’s 
current ability to govern climate change risks.  
As these negotiations continued, the working group grew to include eight more insurers, 
including Allianz, Axa, Aviva, Lloyds, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and Friends Provident. 
During the next nine months, the working group engaged in issues that had never been addressed in a 
neutral or non-competitive environment, including how each insurer perceived climate change risks, 
and how policy could help them adjust to, or even take advantage of, climate change risks. 
Specifically, the working group identified the challenges that insurers faced in engaging the 
industry’s capacity for collective rule making to deal with uncertainty around the impacts of climate 
change on insurers. To address these challenges, the working group developed the best-practice 
standards outlined in the ClimateWise Principles, and agreed that insurers should speak with “one 
voice” on climate change issues. The CPSL agreed to host the ClimateWise Secretariat and provide 
important logistical support for implementing the standards. In the summer of 2007, the working 
group finalized the six governing principles and in September the Prince of Wales announced his 
latest effort in leveraging the private sector as an ally in the fight against climate change.39 
This analysis of the origins of ClimateWise reveals the influence of ENGOs and policy 
entrepreneurs in developing important expertise and political capacity designed to leverage insurance 
markets in supporting mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Although the Prince of Wales 
successfully initiated the first co-regulative agreement with insurers, the strategy adopted by 
ClimateWise has also been influenced by the work of the ABI and Evan Mills and Eugene Lecomte, 
as section 5.5 will confirm. Both of these entrepreneurs emphasized that insurers needed to be pro-
active in developing knowledge and strategies, and in engaging public authorities to defend their 
sector from climate change. Mills and Lecomte deserve important recognition because they developed 
the set of best practice standards designed to generate a technical consensus over how to price climate 
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change risks, and a political consensus on the regulations necessary to assist insurers in pricing these 
risks throughout the economy. 
It was the CPSL, however, that mobilized insurers to support best practice standards capable 
of harnessing the industry’s technical and political resources in developing strategies to leverage 
insurance markets in pricing climate change risks throughout the economy. The CPSL identified the 
insurance industry as an optimal target to expand its success with the CLG, but also to implement its 
“transformational change model” (TCM) by linking insurers with national and international 
policymakers with authority to implement regulations conducive to defending the industry from 
climate change.  
While it is clear that CPSL, other ENGOs and policy entrepreneurs, have developed 
important expertise and capacity that has been incorporated into ClimateWise, it is also necessary to 
explain the insurance industry’s support for this approach. The next section will describe how the 
industry has clear material interests in governing climate change risks, but that these material interests 
are contingent on the expansion of public regulation to protect the industry’s markets from rising 
weather-related losses linked with climate change. To implement these policies, however, insurers 
need to generate technical consensus on effective regulations and strategies for pricing these risks and 
political support.  These factors were conducive to generating support among insurers for co-
regulation with the CPSL, which could offer its expertise and capacity in generating this needed 
consensus.    
5.3 Governing Climate Change Risks in Insurance Markets 
 
Insurers have material interests in governing climate change risks using public regulation for different 
reasons than accountants. Whereas accountants have an opportunity to expand their markets through 
the provision of auditing services, insurers are trying to defend their markets from rising weather-
related losses associated with climate change. But these interests have emerged in response to similar 
cognitive expectations for what constitutes a “rational” market strategy in each industry in conditions 
of market uncertainty. Accountants and insurers perceive market uncertainty associated with climate 
change based on cognitive expectations that this uncertainty can be measured or priced as a risk to 
improve the efficiency of decision-making. For accountants, however, measuring climate change 
uncertainty as a risk represents a market opportunity. For insurers, pricing this risk is more of a 
defensive strategy that over time could materialize into opportunities. 
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Whereas accountants rely on cognitive expectations informed by the characteristics of a 
“decision-useful” risk, insurers draw on two important “standards of insurability” to determine 
whether market uncertainty constitutes a financial risk.  The first standard “is the ability to identify 
and quantify, or estimate at least partially, the chances of the event occurring and the extent of the 
losses likely to be incurred.” The second standard “is the ability to set premiums for each potential 
customer or class of customers.”40 Essentially, insurers will only enter a risk market if they can 
predict the probability and magnitude of the risk, if it can be priced at a level that consumers can 
afford, and if this price is sufficient to compensate the insured in the event of a claim. Both of these 
standards represent cognitive expectations based on professional expertise and experience in 
determining when a risk is insurable.  
In the event that an insurer fails to model uncertainty into its price for risk or undercuts a 
competitor by offering lower prices, insurers can suffer losses because they are not pricing risk 
according to the standards of insurability, or the “market rate.” When insurers are unable to provide 
compensation for a claim because they did not follow the standards of insurability, the consumer is 
likely to turn to a rival leading to reputational risk, or even worse, to convince regulators to intervene 
creating regulatory risks. At the same time, withdrawal from certain markets because risks are at the 
margins of the standards of insurability creates opportunities for rivals to move in and take up market 
share.41 As a consequence, the standards of insurability are conducive to invoking the “precautionary 
principle” as a market strategy where insurers price uncertainty as a risk to ensure these standards are 
met. The problem for both insurers and accountants, however, is that must generate a technical and 
political consensus that supports efforts to measure and price this uncertainty.  
Climate change threatens an insurer’s ability to price risk, specifically weather-related risks, 
based on the standards of insurability. As the next section will describe, insurers have started to 
develop cognitive expectations that insurance markets are exposed to climate change through rising 
weather-related losses.  Insurers have tried to maintain the standards of insurability in response to 
significant increases in weather-related losses. Price increases, market pullbacks and new modeling 
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techniques have all been employed to maintain the standards. These efforts have fuelled concern 
within the industry that without a robust effort to price climate change risks through public regulation 
supporting mitigation and adaptation policy, insurers could face a crisis where most of their markets 
are no longer insurable, or do not satisfy the standards of insurability. In response, insurers have 
developed cognitive expectations that public regulation in governing climate change risks constitutes 
a “rational” strategy for securing market efficiency in weather risk markets.    
5.3.1 Material Interests from Challenges to the Standards of Insurability 
 
Concern within the insurance sector on the potential link between climate change and increased 
weather risks began to spread in the late 1980s as the sector tried to cope with losses from the first 
billion dollar catastrophes, or mega-catastrophes (mega-CATs). In 1987, a European windstorm 
generated $2.5 billion in damage. In 1989, Hurricane Hugo generated $5 billion in damage. And in a 
five-week period during 1990, eight severe storms generated millions in damage across central and 
Western Europe. Then, in 1992, Hurricane Andrew hit Florida causing over $16.5 billion in insured 
losses.42 These losses caught many insurers off guard who had until this point maintained relatively 
low rates based on a historical record with few significant weather-related losses.43  
It was not long before major players in the reinsurance market started to correlate the 
emergence of mega-CATs with climate change. Lloyd’s of London admitted in 1993 that climatic 
changes “have already taken over as the main factors pushing losses upwards.”44 In the same year, 
Frank Nutter, the President of the Reinsurance Association of American summarized the perspective 
of reinsurers by suggesting that the re-insurance business was the first to be affected by climate 
change, and that it could bankrupt the industry. Munich Re, the world’s largest re-insurer, called for 
government regulation on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 1993. Swiss Re supported their rival’s 
conclusion in 1994 arguing that human activity could accelerate climate change and weather damages 
to a point where “society may no longer be able to adapt quickly enough.”45 
 At the time, Leggett was able to cite these rising losses as evidence that insurers should 
support his “solidarity within the risk community.” As section 5.2 discussed, however, Leggett was 
unable to overcome cognitive expectations among insurers that their markets could remain robust as 
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long as they could raise prices, pull out of exposed markets, or securitize these risks (or maintain the 
standards of insurability).  Speaking to Leggett at Kyoto in 1997, Gerhard Herz, Munich Re’s 
technical chief argued that any significant change among insurer perceptions towards climate change 
“will take two to three major disasters.”46 Herz’s observation would prove highly prescient. 
During the 2000s, the occurrence of “mega-CATS,” reached historic highs for insurers 
around the world.  In the UK, heavy rainfall doubled flooding losses to over 6 billion pounds between 
1998 and 2003, reaching a “stunning” 7 billion pounds in 2007.47 These losses prompted the ABI to 
make its first statement confirming a link between climate change and increases in insured losses.48 In 
2003, the European heatwave killed over 27,000 people generating significant increases in health 
insurance claims.49 In 2005, weather-related losses from Hurricane Katrina, Wilma and Rita totaled 
$80 billion – the highest payout in the sector’s history.50 
Howard Kunreuther and Michael Kerwan-Erwann’s analysis for the US National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) confirms “catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on insurers 
over the past 15 years than in its entire history.”51 Indeed, 80 percent of the 20 most significant loss-
events in the last 35 years are related to weather-related events, such as hurricanes, storms and floods. 
Kunreuther and Kerwan-Erwann claim that this “new era” in weather-related losses is even more 
evident in data that shows 10 of the 20 most costly events have occurred in the last five years.52  
Skeptics who maintain conservative cognitive expectations about these increasing losses have 
questioned this data suggesting that most of these losses can be explained by economic development 
and population changes.53 Essentially, these skeptics argue that more people and businesses have 
bought property that is exposed to weather-related events. Evan Mills and Eugene Lecomte were able 
to confirm, however, that these changes cannot account for the rise in losses, and that weather-related 
insured and total property losses in 2004 ($45 billion and $107 billion respectively), were “rising 
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faster than premiums, population or economic growth both globally and in the U.S.”54 Munich Re, the 
world’s largest reinsurer, provides up-to-date data on these weather-related losses and has confirmed 
its upward trend (see Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1 Munich Re's data on insured and overall weather catastrophe losses 1950-2010 
 
 
The impact of the historic “Katrina/Rita/Wilma” losses on global insurance markets has been 
described as a “stress-test of what might be expected under climate change”.55 Indeed, analysis of 
these losses revealed how they spread throughout global insurance markets. First, these losses spread 
among the world’s largest primary and reinsurers insurers (see Table 5.2).  
                                                     
54 Mills and Lecomte, “Availability and Affordability of Insurance Under Climate Change: A Growing Threat 
for the U.S.,” 2. 
55 Mills made this argument because the US is the world’s most lucrative P&C insurance market and most of 
the world’s largest insurers have exposure to weather-related risk in the US. Increasing weather related risks, 
compounded by potential regulatory and reputational risks, threatens to limit the availability and affordability of 
insurance in many US markets. In addition, market regulations are enforced at the national level, which means 
regulatory risk in the US impacts most of the industry. Mills, “From Risk to Opportunity - Insurer Responses to 
Climate Change,” 4. 
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Table 5.1 Katrina/Rita/Wilma primary and reinsurance losses56 
Insurer Type Country Losses 
Allstate Primary US $4 billion 
Lloyd’s of London Reinsurance UK $2.55 billion 
Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance US $2 billion 
Munich Re Reinsurer Germany $1.5 billion 
Swiss Re Reinsurer Switzerland $1.2 billion 
XL Capital Primary Bermuda $1.16 billion 
AIG Primary US $1.1 billion 
Travelers Primary US $1 billion 
Montpelier Re Reinsurer US $950 million 
IPC Holdings Primary Bermuda $800 million 
ACE Primary Bermuda $742 million 
Everest Re Reinsurer Bermuda $700 million 
Zurich Primary Switzerland $600 million 
Partner Re Reinsurer Bermuda $600 million 
Renaissance Re Reinsurer Bermuda $571 million 
Allianz Primary France $500 million 
Hannover Re Reinsurer Germany $494 million 
Endurance Primary Bermuda $450 million 
Chubb Primary US $415 million 
FM Global Primary US $300 million 
 
Second, these losses also led to credit ratings downgrades, which is often followed by a significant 
drop in share price as investors incorporate the higher cost of borrowing capital. For example, in 
response to Katrina, the insurer-rating agency AM Best downgraded thirteen insurers. Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s put several insurer giants under review, including Allstate, State Farm, ACE, 
Allmerica, Montpelier Re, and Swiss Re.57 Third, a series of large class-action lawsuits were launched 
                                                     
56 This table includes top 20 largest individual losses by insurer. See Towers Perrin, “2005 Catastrophe Losses 
Katrina/Rita/Wilma” (Towers Perrin Reinsurance Market Services, November 4, 2005), 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=REIN/USA/2005/200511/Hurricane_Report_11_04_0
5.pdf. 
57 AM Best, “AM Best's Annual Global Reinsurance Report: Counting the Cost of the Hurricanes,” Best's 
Insurance News, August 14, 2006; Daniel Hays and Caroline McDonald, “Downgrades Loom as Katrina Loss 
Grows,” National Underwriter Property and Casualty, September 19, 2005. 
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against primary insurers and their brokers in Gulf Coast markets. These lawsuits were a particular 
concern for reinsurers who were forced to pay for these losses under their coverage for primary 
insurers.58 Fourth, these losses challenged the credibility of risk-modelers who were forced to 
question the rigor of their CAT models.59 According to one interviewee, the failure of their models to 
capture the increased hurricane activity during the 2004-2005 season exposed to the industry to 
reputational risk.60 
Although there remains a great deal of uncertainty within the scientific community about the 
link between climate change and weather-related losses, the industry’s risk-management expertise 
predisposes insurers to the precautionary principle. For these insurers, this mindset justified taking 
action to defend the industry from these losses rather than ignoring the link between climate change 
and weather-related losses. Evan Mills, whose research for Ceres has been tracking insurer strategies 
in response to climate change, confirms this analysis by linking losses suffered during the 2000s to a 
“tipping point” in the insurance industry’s position towards climate change.61 In 2006, for example, 
John Coomber the former CEO of Swiss Re, stated that “climate change is the number one risk in the 
world ahead of terrorism, demographic change and other global risk scenarios”.62 Several surveys 
asking insurers to identify the strategic risks to their industry have revealed similar conclusions. A 
2007 survey by PriceWaterHouseCoopers of insurer executives and directors identified climate 
change as the fourth greatest risk facing the sector.63 In 2008, a survey by Ernst & Young asked 70 
insurance industry analysts to identify their top ten trends and uncertainties facing the sector in the 
next five years. Climate change emerged as the number one uncertainty beating out regulatory 
intervention, emerging markets and demographic shifts.64 This analysis confirms that insurers have 
developed cognitive expectations that insurance markets are exposed to climate change through 
                                                     
58 According to Peter Breitstone, the Chief Executive of Aon Insurance Environmental Services, one successful 
lawsuit could create a precedent that insurers are ultimately liable for losses associated with climate change 
risks. These losses would be in the billions of dollars and “make asbestos look tiny” by comparison. Andrea 
Felsted, “Insurers Exposed,” The Financial Times, December 1, 2008; Rick Cornejo, “Katrina Lawsuits Pose 
Serious Threat to Insurance Market, Experts Say,” Best's Insurance News, July 10, 2006. 
59 R Ceniceros, “Catastrophe Model Changes Tighen Market for Storm Risks,” Business Insurance, June 12, 
2006. 
60 Anonymous L. Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, March 23, 2010.  
61 Mills and Lecomte, “From Risk to Opportunity: How Insurers can Proactively and Profitably Manage 
Climate Change,” 4. 
62 Quoted from Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, “Working Paper 12821,” 3. 
63 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, “'Too much regulation' Tops Insurance Risks,” May 2007, 
http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/Content/Detail.asp?ReleaseID=2350&NewsAreaID=2. 
64 Ernst & Young, “Strategic Business Risk 2008: Insurance” (Ernst and Young, March 2008), 
http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?a=top_pc&id=92201. 
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increasing weather-related losses. These expectations inform material behavior that supports 
governing the industry’s exposure to climate change risks in order to maintain the standards of 
insurability in many existing markets.  
5.3.2 Technical and Political Consensus in Governing Climate Change Risks 
 
Because insurers, their regulators and governments have yet to implement policies capable of 
defending the standards of insurability, insurers are unsure about the regulations that are necessary to 
effectively govern these risks and whether they have the political support necessary to take action. 
First, the insurance industry needed to generate a technical consensus on how climate change risk 
threatens the industry, and that these risks can be modeled and priced to demonstrate how climate 
change can lead to a crisis of availability and affordability. This consensus is an important to identify 
effective loss prevention or adaptation policies to defend specific markets from rising losses and 
justify implementation of international regulations governing GHG emissions. Second, a political 
consensus is needed among insurers and stakeholders throughout the industry that supports the use of 
public regulation to defend their markets.  
5.3.2.1 Modeling Climate Change Risks  
 
The increase in weather-related losses during the 1980s and early 1990s signaled to the insurance 
risk-modeling community that their models were not accurately capturing losses linked with low 
frequency, high impact natural hazards, such as hurricanes. In response to this technical uncertainty, 
actuaries and risk modelers put a greater focus on the use of catastrophe models (CAT models), which 
at the time remained untested as tools for predicting natural hazards.  
Risk-modelers including AIR Worldwide, Risk Management Solutions (RMS) and Eqecat 
were able to capitalize on this growing demand for CAT models by developing the first computer 
software capable of efficiently producing CAT models for different risk markets. CAT models were 
able to combine measures of a location’s vulnerability with measures of the likelihood of an event 
impacting that location based on historical weather records.65 By creating a transferable product that 
insurers could use to price risks associated with large natural hazards, the actuarial community was 
able to respond to, and minimize uncertainty about, the impacts of these rising losses.  
                                                     
65 Anonymous M. Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, March 22, 2010.  
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 As section 5.2 discussed, the emergence of CAT models coincided with the invention of CAT 
bonds as a strategy for hedging significant weather-related losses in capital markets. Although these 
markets are promising for insurers, according to several interviews indicated that they have proven 
too marginal to adequately cover the magnitude of the losses experienced throughout the 2000s. 
These contracts are largely geared to investor demands that for a payout a multiple of “triggers” need 
to be met, such as certain thresholds for insured losses, and even specific wind speeds or weather 
phenomenon.66 For example, in 2005, insured losses totaled over $80 billion, whereas total weather 
related CAT bond issues only reached approximately $1 billion.67 Research by Andrew Dlugodecki, 
an insurance and climate change expert, confirms that CAT bonds for weather related risks (ie 
excluding earthquakes, which are not affiliated with climate change) “could account for between 5% 
and 7% of the total values at risk in relation to a peak weather event.”68 In addition to their small size, 
the other limitation of CAT bonds is that insurers must be able to accurately predict their exposure to 
mega-CATs in order to determine how much they should hedge risk for these events.  
In the aftermath of the Katrina/Rita/Wilma losses, actuaries and risk-modelers started to 
question whether their models could adequately capture changes in mega-CAT magnitude and 
frequencies as climate change impacts increased. Many insurers began asking risk modelers to 
incorporate climate change into their models for markets in North American and Europe where data 
on these events is robust.69  
In 2006, all three of the world’s largest risk modelers, including AIR WorldWide, Risk 
Management Solutions (RMS), and Eqecat, introduced what is known as a “near-term” or “short-
term” model that predicted the intensity and probability of windstorms (hurricanes, winterstorms, 
thunderstorms) based on climate conditions in the last 5 years, instead of the last 100.70 These models 
attempted to compensate for recent changes in climate conditions, which become diluted when 
tracking events across a 100 year period.    
For example, the model produced by RMS predicted that landfall for category 3, 4 and 5 
hurricanes would increase by 30 percent, generating an increase in insured losses of around 40 
percent.71 Consequently, insurance rates for areas exposed to these higher risks would increase. 
                                                     
66 Anonymous N. Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, February 12, 2010; Anonymous L. 
67 Andrew Dlugodecki, Coping with Climate Change: Risks and Opportunities (London: Chartered Insurance 
Institute, 2009). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Jakki May, “Climate Change - Green For Go,” Post Magazine, November 20, 2008. 
70 Karen Eeuwens, “Have Near Term CAT Risk Models Failed?,” Reactions, June 15, 2009. 
71 Ibid. 
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Although an impressive attempt to incorporate climate change into modeling, these models are quite 
controversial because they only take into consideration the spread of events during a small “near-
term” period of time, which means they are not as statistically robust as 100 year CAT models.  
For most regulators, rate increases in weather risk markets must be justified on the historical 
record.72 The State of Florida, for example, has developed a formal review process for these models 
led by the Florida Commission on Hurricane Prediction Methodology. In 2007, this Commission 
rejected the use of near-term models in Florida markets. According to a senior official at Lloyd’s of 
London in their Emerging Risks division, the rejection of the model was a “sad day” for the actuarial 
and risk-modeling profession, which was trying to address the weaknesses in the models that led to 
the insurance sector’s losses during 2004 and 2005.73  
The innovations within actuarialism that led to the use of CAT models and the more recent 
turn to “near-term” models revealed how insurers were trying to generate a technical consensus on 
strategies to maintain the standards of insurability. Although near-term models are more effective at 
compensating insurers for mega-CATs, they still fail to incorporate the influence of climate change 
on weather risk.74 According to Celine Herweijer, the Director of Climate Change Practice for the 
risk-modeler RMS, climate change will force modelers to shift from using purely historic data to 
“having to forecast for a different world.” She warned against those who believe risk can be priced as 
it happens, arguing that if insurers “close their eyes and wait until 2030, doing nothing to help 
adaptation, we could be in a situation where insurance becomes unaffordable and unavailable.”75  
According to Mills, “a major obstacle to insurers taking action on climate change has been 
that the models the industry uses to manage and price risk have been backward-looking and thus, by 
definition, unable to take climate change into account.”76 Because their models are “blind” in 
determining whether climate change risks are increasing or decreasing, actuaries are uncertain on how 
to approach the governance of these risks. Once again, this uncertainty parallels the technical 
                                                     
72 Evan Mills, “A Global Review of Insurance Industry Responses to Climate Change,” The Geneva Papers 34 
(2009): 323-359, 330. 
73 Anonymous I. 
74 Mills argues more specifically that an “insurer’s traditional modeling techniques are still ill-suited for 
understanding the implications of climate change and fine-grain loss data are incomplete and under-utilised in 
understanding the trends.” See Mills, “A Global Review of Insurance Industry Responses to Climate Change,” 
338. 
75 May, “Climate Change - Green For Go.” 
76 Mills and Lecomte, “From Risk to Opportunity: How Insurers can Proactively and Profitably Manage 
Climate Change,” 27. 
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obstacles faced by accountants in determining how to measure climate change risks through 
international accounting standards.  
But as Chapter 2 (section 2.3.2) argued, insurers are predisposed to use their expertise to 
reduce uncertainty about climate change economic uncertainty by experimenting with models in order 
to generate a technical consensus on how to govern this uncertainty as a risk. Indeed, at one point, 
insurers were only able to price exposure to fire risk. Improvements in technology and actuarial 
science have expanded an insurer’s ability to incorporate weather uncertainty into premiums. But 
these efforts are expensive, face regulatory and reputational risk, and require a willingness to devote 
resources to research that is designed to protect insurers in the long-term.  
The allocation of resources towards modeling has tremendous potential in revealing a 
“hidden link” between a firm’s environmental performance and financial risks, and satisfying the 
standards of insurability for pricing climate change risks. But even with this technical consensus, 
insurers must fulfill the second standard and be able to price this risk at a level that is both affordable 
to the consumer and compensates the insurer to cover for potential claims. If consumers and the 
regulators that represent their interests disagree with a new technical consensus that climate change 
risks can be priced, insurers must also generate a political consensus that supports their efforts to use 
the standards of insurability to govern climate change risks. Indeed, opposition to the use of RMS’ 
“near-term” model demonstrates this point.  The following analysis will examine how insurer efforts 
to maintain the standards of insurability through price increases and market pullbacks justify the need 
to generate a political consensus.  
5.3.2.2 The Politics of Pricing Climate Change Risks 
 
In addition to attempts at reforming the modeling process to accommodate climate change risks, 
insurers have also turned to more traditional strategies, such as raising their rates or pulling out of 
markets to maintain the standards of insurability. Insurers, however, increasingly see these strategies 
as ineffective in the long-term partly because they lose market share and their ability to spread risk 
through diversification.77 But more significantly, these strategies create regulatory and reputational 
risks.78 If regulators and consumers are unwilling to pay for increased exposure to climate change 
                                                     
77 Anonymous N; See also Paterson, “Risky Business: Insurance Companies in Global Warming Politics.” 
78 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the market pullback strategy spread from one state to another as 
insurers realized that policies covering property on coastlines exposed them to increasing losses. In Florida over 
half a million policies were cancelled or not renewed in 2006. Along the Gulf Coast, Allstate, one of the largest 
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risks - which they may not perceive to exist - insurers are unable to maintain the standards of 
insurability.  
When insurers attempt to pull out of a market, insurance regulators can either impose 
moratoriums on nonrenewal of contracts, which forces the insurers to maintain their existing policies, 
or abandon private insurance and establish a government-operated insurance “pool.”79 Often insurers 
are forced to cover the losses suffered by these pools as a condition on providing any form of 
coverage in the state.80 Because these pools charge below the market price for risk, they continually 
lose money.  For example, in 2004, Florida’s public insurance pool lost $2.5 billion due to an increase 
in hurricanes.81 In Mississippi, insurers were forced to pay $545 million in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina to recover losses as part of their obligations to the pool.82  
 From a global perspective, insurers cannot continue to shift the insurance burden to 
government backed insurance pools and consumers because this threatens the long-term growth 
potential of the sector. Most of the world’s developed economies are currently saturated markets for 
insurers, who are now looking for market opportunities in developing countries. These countries are 
asymmetrically exposed to climate change impacts, which – when combined with increasing market 
pullbacks in already established markets - represents a significant threat to the insurance sector’s 
future growth.83  
Similar to the market pullback strategy, raising premiums often leads to regulatory 
intervention as regulators acting on behalf of consumers artificially suppress insurance rates.  Indeed, 
Florida’s intervention into the use of near-term models was widely considered a reaction to the 
corresponding increase rates forecast by the models.84 In addition to creating political opposition to  
rate increases, this regulatory intervention illustrates the importance of a technical consensus on the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
insurers in the US, suffered losses of $3.68 billion, which convinced it to not renew over 140,000 policies. See 
R. J. Lehmann, “A Catastrophic Battle,” Best's Review, October 10, 2006. 
79 Florida imposed a moratorium after Hurricane Katrina, and Lousiana and Mississippi imposed moratoriums 
after Hurricane Katrina. See Daniel Sutter, “Policy Uncertainty and the Market for Wind Insurance” (Mercatus 
Centre, George Washington University, June 2009), 14. 
80 Insurance pools currently exist in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina 
and Texas. See Ibid. 
81 Mills and Lecomte, “From Risk to Opportunity: How Insurers can Proactively and Profitably Manage 
Climate Change,” 10. 
82 Mills and Lecomte, “From Risk to Opportunity: How Insurers can Proactively and Profitably Manage 
Climate Change,” 13; Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas forced insurers operating in their state to 
recoup losses from state pools after the 2005 Hurricane season. See Sutter, “Policy Uncertainty and the Market 
for Wind Insurance,” 14. 
83 Mills, “From Risk to Opportunity - Insurer Responses to Climate Change,” 13. 
84 Brian Kern, “RMS Withdraws Five-Year Hurricane Model From Florida,” Insurance Journal, May 18, 2007. 
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use of new modeling techniques. Consumers and regulators can easily point to divisions in this 
consensus to justify intervention.  
Insurers view this form of regulatory intervention as a significant impediment in protecting 
insurance markets from increases in weather-related damage associated with climate change.85 
According to Robert Detlefsen, the Vice President of the US National Association of Mutual 
Insurance Companies (NAMIC), rate suppression creates “perverse incentives that lead to increased 
population growth and wealth concentration in precisely those areas must vulnerable to climate 
change-induced weather events.”86  
In the aftermath of the 2004-2005 hurricane season, regulators in several US states intervened 
in their markets by suppressing prices. In 2006, Florida insurance regulators suppressed rate increases 
by 16 percent for Allstate, 17.5 percent for Nationwide, and 23.7 percent for USAA. Further attempts 
by insurers to increase their rates were met with resistance from consumer advocacy groups, who 
pushed regulators to introduce legislation to reject new rate changes and roll back previous rate 
changes.87 For State Farm, the largest US P&C insurer, these regulatory risks forced the firm to 
abandon Florida homeowner insurance in 2009.88 Texas regulators have also increased their 
supervision of rate increases. In 2006 and 2007, State Farm was refused a rate increase of 11 percent, 
Allstate was refused a 5.9 percent increase, and Farmer’s Insurance failed to receive approval for a 
6.6 percent increase.89 
Within global markets, raising rates to accommodate increased physical risk will ultimately 
make insurance unaffordable even for most developed economies. ABI estimates that premiums 
would have to rise 67 percent in order to generate an additional $76 billion to cover for climate 
change related losses in Europe, Japan and the United States.90 Such a premium increase would 
diminish existing insurance markets by making private insurance unaffordable to both individuals and 
firms. The realization that market pullbacks and price increases create regulatory and reputational 
                                                     
85 Anonymous L; Anonymous M; Anonymous N. 
86 Detlefsen describes Florida population growth as an example of this perverse incentive suggesting that 
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risks has been compounded by increasing evidence that weather-related losses associated with climate 
change are likely to exceed a $1 trillion annually. As UNEP FI concludes in their survey on the 
insurance sector, such losses could easily “undermine the solvency of an insurance company and the 
long-term economic health of the insurance industry and its partners.”91  
In response, insurers have started to develop cognitive expectations that recognize public 
regulation and modeling reform in governing climate change risks is necessary to maintain the 
standards of insurability. The only way to ensure that premiums do not reach unaffordable levels 
creating a crisis of availability is if both insurers and governments start to price the behavior 
contributing to these risks. Insurers must be able to determine which markets are highly exposed to 
risks and begin to adjust prices to build up their reserves.92 At the same time, insurers must inform 
government policy to ensure that insurance markets do not become insolvent. These conclusions have 
influenced the emergence of material interests within the insurance industry in governing climate 
change risks through an expansion of public regulation. Rather than short-term concerns about 
reputation or preempting public regulation identified by “post-Westphalian” explanations of 
environmental co-regulation, insurers are predisposed to interpreting climate change uncertainty as a 
financial risk that must be governed through public regulation.  
But to advance these interests, insurers must collaborate in generating a technical and 
political consensus. First, the industry needs to foster a technical consensus that climate change 
uncertainty represents a significant risk for the industry, and that this risk can be modeled to inform 
premiums and demonstrate how these impacts could lead to a crisis of insurability in certain markets. 
This consensus can then be used to inform policy to help defend the industry. Second, insurers must 
use this technical consensus to overcome opposition to use of public regulation at the international 
and national level to implement climate change mitigation and adaptation policy.  
Although the generation of a technical and political consensus within the insurance industry 
is a precursor to effectively pricing these risks, an argument can also be made that this consensus 
must enjoy the support of the environmental community as well. Insurers must be able to demonstrate 
that the use of their markets to price climate change risk into the economy will be conducive to robust 
mitigation and adaptation. Indeed, the partnership between the CPSL and insurers suggests that 
generating support from the environmental community was a factor in shaping its strategy. Without 
this consensus, divisions within the industry can be exploited by opponents and limit the industry’s 
                                                     
91 UNEP FI, “The Global State of Sustainable Insurance.” 
92 Paul Davies, “Insurers Call to Action on Climate Change,” Financial Times, October 22, 2009. 
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ability to govern these risks. As previous analysis has suggested, however, insurers are incentivized to 
reform their markets in ways that capture a robust price for these risks if they want to maximize the 
provision of their risk-management services. As more firms require coverage or expertise in reducing 
exposure to these risks, insurane markets will grow. These factors help explain why the Prince of 
Wales and the CPSL found a receptive audience among insurers to his proposal for co-regulation as a 
strategy to harness the collective rule making capacity of the insurance industry in governing climate 
change risks.  
5.4 Co-Regulation and Cognitive Governance in ClimateWise 
 
The form of co-regulation adopted by ClimateWise reflects the CPSL’s expertise and political 
capacity in using voluntary best practice standards to harness the insurance industry’s resources in 
generating a technical and political consensus necessary to defend the industry from climate change 
risks. ClimateWise has similar objectives as the CDSB, but instead of requiring the disclosure of 
climate change risks as a condition on accessing accounting services, ClimateWise attempts to price 
risks into global economic activity through international regulations and insurance markets. The 
objective of this strategy is to create a climate change risk market where the insured are willing to pay 
for exposure to these risks, and in turn, support measures to reduce insurance costs associated with 
these risks, such as mitigation and adaptation policy.  
The following analysis breaks down ClimateWise’s strategy for achieving these objectives. It 
reveals that ClimateWise adopts the two central characteristics of cognitive governance through its 
two-stage process for technical and political consensus building (See Figure 5.2). In particular, 
ClimateWise uses voluntary-best practice standards to engage in technical and political consensus 
building to cultivate constituencies willing to support the governance of climate change risks in 
insurance markets through an expansion of public regulation, and uses a reflexive mechanism to 
govern compliance to these standards.  
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Figure 5.2 ClimateWise as cognitive governance 
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CPSL played a key role in promoting the key characteristics involved in cognitive 
governance. In particular, the CPSL promoted the idea of a flexible approach to implementing 
cognitive governance by using voluntary best practice standards to “ratchet-up” compliance to these 
standards. The CPSL offered to host the initiative by forming the ClimateWise Secretariat, which 
administers the standards, lobbies on behalf of insurers among national and international 
policymakers, and governs the reflexive mechanism by organizing a third-party audit.93  
Although the CPSL, or more specifically the ClimateWise Secretariat governs the 
implementation of cognitive governance, other ENGOs and policy entrepreneurs indirectly 
contributed to this strategy. Based on the efforts of previous policy entrepreneurs, described in section 
5.2, there are clear connections between Mills and Lecomte’s “Risk to Opportunity” strategy, ABI’s 
public policy advocacy, UNEP-II, and Leggett’s “solidarity” effort.  
Before explaining the two-stage process that ClimateWise uses to engage technical and 
political consensus building, it is first necessary to outline its reflexive mechanism for evaluating 
compliance to these efforts. Principle six, which asks insurers to comply with a yearly audit to 
measure their progress towards the ClimateWise Principles, helps to coordinate the implementation of 
this reflexive mechanism. Compliance is measured by a third-party auditor who reviews written 
submissions by each of the members outlining their progress toward each standard.94  
This audit evaluates compliance based on a “comply or explain” model, where members must 
either provide evidence of their efforts in working towards the standard, or explain why they are not 
complying. These responses are then assessed, assigned a “score” based on these efforts, reported 
back to the participant, and disclosed anonymously in a public report (ie. scores are disclosed but 
member names are removed).95 Similar to the CDSB, this auditing process is designed to “ratchet-up” 
each participant’s ability to comply in channeling resources towards a technical and political 
consensus by directing each member to address weaknesses in their voluntary efforts.  
Although ClimateWise has yet to face any scrutiny from the environmental community, an 
interviewee confirmed that the reflexive mechanism is also designed as a signal for the environmental 
community that ClimateWise would have “teeth”. This decision was based on a review of several 
existing initiatives including the Equator Principles and Ceres’ “Risk to Opportunity” best practices. 
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Participants in the negotiations agreed that delegating responsibility for the reflexive mechanism to 
the CPSL, represented an optimal strategy for ensuring that the initiative reflected the concerns of the 
environmental community.96 







Lead in Risk Analysis 91% 74% 80% 
Inform public policy making 91% 89% 85% 
Support climate awareness amongst our customers 89% 69% 59% 
Incorporate climate change into our investment 
strategies 
73% 61% 59% 
Reduce the environmental impact of our business 94% 82% 67% 
Report and be accountable 93% 82% 80% 
 
5.4.1 Technical Consensus Building 
 
The first step in cognitive governance is to generate a technical consensus that uncertainty around the 
impacts and liabilities associated with climate change can be governed as a risk, and identify 
strategies and regulations that can be effective in governing these risks. This consensus is important 
demonstrate how climate change challenges an insurer’s capacity to maintain the standards of 
insurability, and ultimately, preserve the efficiency of risk-transfer markets. Models can inform rates 
conducive to the reduction of climate change risks, but also help insurers identify markets where rate 
increases could make insurance unaffordable in order to inform and justify loss-prevention policy. 
Principle one and four target the facilitation of this technical consensus. Principle one commits 
members of ClimateWise to “lead in risk analysis” by: researching how climate change risks will 
impact future business, developing accurate climate change forecasts, generating models that inform 
premium levels and capital reserves, generating risk profiles for new green technologies, and most 
importantly, sharing research with stakeholders throughout insurance markets.98  
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Principle four asks ClimateWise members to evaluate how climate change risks can be 
implemented into their investment strategies.99 It is important that insurers understand how these 
returns may be impacted by climate change risks considering the important role that an insurer’s 
investments have in compensating for losses and maintaining profitability. By determining how to 
effectively model and price climate change risks, ClimateWise attempts to integrate this pricing into 
premiums (principle one) and into investment strategy in the same way as being developed by 
institutional investors involved in the CDSB (principle four).  
To accomplish this goal, principle one is designed to facilitate a partnership between the risk 
and climate modeling “epistemic communities” to improve how existing models incorporate climate 
change into their predictions for weather-related losses.100 The 2010 audit confirms this priority: “If 
these risks cannot be adequately modeled and built into underwriting and investing activities then the 
sector puts at jeopardy its financial integrity.”101 This effort to harness the expertise of the insurance 
industry in linking a firm’s environmental exposure to climate change risks can then be used to 
inform effective loss-prevention policies in markets over-exposed to losses, and eventually 
incorporate risks into premiums.  
Insurers face a great deal of technical uncertainty in using their expertise to incorporate 
climate change risks into the standards of insurability. The most significant obstacle is the resolution 
of a debate over how to model future oriented risks given that the industry uses historical models to 
inform its risk pricing. Resolving this debate is critical if insurers are to effectively inform loss-
prevention policy, and in the long-term gain approval from regulators for incorporating future 
oriented risks into a “climate premium”. As the discussion in section 5.3.2.1 revealed, regulators are 
hesitant to allow insurers to use models that price based on “near-term” assessments to climate 
conditions. At the same time, there is considerable debate in the industry whether these models can 
accurately inform risk exposure and premiums. RMS, for example, has faced criticism for arguing 
that rates must be increased based on its near-term models. According to a rival firm KC&C, the near-
term model developed by RMS predicts higher losses because it incorporates “improvements in 
observational technology, leading to better detection of tropical storms and hurricanes.”102 
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Consensus is also critical to convince consumers that rate adjustments are necessary to 
compensate for increasing climate change risks. If one firm implements higher rates based on 
improved modeling, other firms must embrace similar rates if a “climate premium” is to have any 
influence in promoting behavior conducive to mitigation or adaptation. Otherwise, consumers and 
businesses can avoid behavioral changes by turning to rivals who refuse require that climate change 
risks are priced into insurance coverage. The 2010 audit confirmed that most of ClimateWise’s 
participants have yet to link efforts to measure climate change risks with their models to premiums or 
investments.103 Without a robust price signal that informs the insured about their exposure, insurers 
are unable to generate adequate reserves for large weather-related risks linked to climate change, or 
make the case that loss-prevention policies are necessary to avoid further price increases. This 
hesitation is the result of the several obstacles insurers face in trying to price climate change risks.  
The first obstacle is associated with the costs and technical challenge involved in using 
climate models to inform CAT models. Whereas climate models track broad future changes in the 
climate, such as temperature and precipitation changes, CAT models forecast specific losses based on 
the historical record of damage caused by weather events in certain geographical areas. Because of 
this technical challenge, ClimateWise participants have tended to focus their efforts on “low-hanging 
fruit”, specifically modeling short-term weather changes impacting flood losses, which constitute the 
most material consequence of changing weather patterns for most insurers.104  
The second obstacle is that ClimateWise members have yet to link their research on climate 
change risks to premium increases. The audit argues that this hesitation is largely a consequence of 
competitive constraints. As the 2010 audit notes, “consumer decisions on policy selection are often 
driven by price alone, effectively punishing the insurance company that responsibly prices technically 
modeled climate risk into the premium charged.”105 
These obstacles demonstrate that, while insurers are researching how to price climate change 
risks, a technical consensus or business case that justifies devoting resources to modeling long-term 
risks, and implementing rate increases remains exposed to market pressures. Despite this challenge, 
members have demonstrated a high level of compliance to principle one (over 90%) in the last two 
audits. This level of compliance reveals that insurers are initiating efforts to generate a technical 
consensus that supports the modeling and pricing climate change risks.   
                                                     
103 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “ClimateWise Principles: Third Independent Review 2010,” 17. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., 14. 
 
  165 
At the same time, however, insurers are also struggling to integrate climate change risks into 
their investment strategies. Compliance to principle four is the lowest among the six at 73% in the 
2009 audit. Insurers often outsource decision-making over their investment portfolios to external 
firms, which limit the ability for the insurance side of the business to communicate its research and 
expertise on modeling these risks to the investment side. ClimateWise audits have targeted this barrier 
as a critical weakness to implementing principle four.106   
 This analysis demonstrates the important role that the ClimateWise Secretariat plays in 
generating a technical consensus by governing the reflexive mechanism. Based on analysis of the 
third party audit, the Secretariat can now confront members with information that they need to work 
hard at overcoming short-term concerns about devoting resources to long-term modeling projects. To 
make the case that insurers need to overcome these obstacles, the Secretariat often identifies strategies 
or best practices among its members as an example. In the 2010 audit, the Secretariat identified work 
by Lloyd’s of London, RMS and ABI in researching how climate change is likely to impact local 
weather patterns as best practices that other insurers should emulate. To help stimulate this process, 
the ClimateWise Secretariat facilitates workshops and seminars to create a more open and less 
proprietary environment for insurers to share information.107  
By identifying best practices for modeling the impact of climate change on the insurance 
industry, ClimateWise can work at pricing these risks in insurance markets, but also identify effective 
regulations necessary to reduce exposure in markets likely to face a crisis of availability and 
affordability. To ensure that a technical consensus is leveraged to generate political support for 
ClimateWise’s objectives, principle two includes an important standard that commits members to 
spread research among key constituencies, including businesses, NGOs, and governments.108 
Although these efforts to generate a technical consensus to inform effective regulation is still 
ongoing, analysis in the following section will show how ClimateWise has been able to identify 
several regulations that are supported by a technical consensus among its members.  
5.4.2 Political Consensus Building 
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Once a consensus is reached on the risks facing the industry, ClimateWise can leverage this 
consensus to generate political support for the regulations necessary to govern these risks.  According 
to an interviewee involved in the negotiations, the goal of this stage is to ensure that insurers “speak 
with one voice” on these issues.109 The primary goal for political consensus building within 
ClimateWise is to leverage the insurance industry’s risk-management expertise to help legitimatize 
the case that climate change risks are material to the industry and its customers. This effort is critical 
given the potential politicization that can occur when insurers try and promote climate governance. 
Indeed, US insurers have first hand experience in the consequences of such politicization based on the 
NAIC’s effort to implement a risk disclosure survey.  
 Although the NAIC’s effort was slightly more robust than ClimateWise because it supported 
a mandatory approach (whereas ClimateWise is voluntary), the survey was less prescriptive in its 
particular aims than ClimateWise’s six principles. Despite the difference, the NAIC effort 
demonstrates how an arcane initiative on the part of a relatively unknown financial regulator to 
address the issue of climate change can become politicized. In the lead up to the 2010 US elections, 
Republicans targeted US State Governors who had appointed an Insurance Commissioner that 
supported the climate risk disclosure survey.110 Legitimacy for this campaign came from a division in 
consensus within the insurance industry itself, specifically from the National Association of Mutual 
Insurance Companies (NAMIC). 
NAMIC contested the NAIC’s survey based on skepticism about climate change science and 
the link between rising climate change and rising weather-related losses for insurers. NAMIC 
explained its position in a letter to the NAIC:  
[T]here is simply too much uncertainty about the nature of climate change—e.g., the rate at 
which it is occurring, the extent to which it is caused by human activity, its relationship to 
natural catastrophes such as hurricanes and droughts, and the economic trade-offs that would 
be entailed by various actions that might be taken to prevent further warming—for regulators 
to assume that all insurers have a material exposure to “climate risk” sufficient to justify 
mandatory “disclosure” of this purported risk to regulators and the public.111 
To further buttress this position, the letter goes onto argue that the premise for implementing the 
survey is flawed based on the “Climategate” controversy, which allegedly confirmed that scientists 
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have colluded in subverting criticism to the global warming argument.112 The ease through which the 
US insurance industry’s effort to govern climate change risk became politicized demonstrates the 
importance of political consensus within the industry, but also the necessity of support among 
stakeholders outside of the industry.   
 ClimateWise has recognized the necessity of political consensus building in principles two, 
three, and five. The best practices outlined in these principles reflect the research that the CPSL has 
conducted to inform its “transformational change model,” and its experience in working with the 
CLG. As analysis in section 5.2 discussed, the CPSL argues that governments must assume the role 
of a “task manager” by implementing policy the leverages individual sectors in supporting the 
governance of climate change risks. Before these policies can be implemented, governments and 
stakeholders within individual sector must develop consensus on the policy necessary for mobilizing 
its resources and expertise in the governance of climate change risks. After consensus is established, 
the government and sector needs to communicate with the public about the impacts of the reforms 
and limits to their actions. Using this approach will ensure that when the government and industry 
takes action on issues such as climate change risk, they have political legitimacy.113 
Principle two asks insurers to collectively engage in public policy making by lobbying for 
regulations that mitigate climate change risks in the global economy. More directly, principle two is 
designed to inform policy at the international and national level to maintain the standards of 
insurability, or the efficiency of insurance markets. This principle was included in the political 
consensus building aspect of ClimateWise’s approach to cognitive governance because it targets 
public policy advocacy, but it could also be discussed as a contribution to technical consensus 
building. As the last section suggests, a technical consensus on how to maintain the standards of 
insurability through new models and pricing is an important precursor to informing effective policy. 
This consensus can be leverage to help governments “set and achieve national and global emissions 
reduction targets” and implement loss-prevention regulations to improve the resiliency of existing 
infrastructure and communities.114  
For example, ClimateWise champions policies such as a robust international emissions 
reduction treaty, an international adaptation treaty binding countries to build defenses to climate 
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change risks, and the creation of international risk databases so insurers can attempt to model these 
risks.115 ClimateWise makes these policy recommendations to “advance regulatory responses that 
protect the interests of consumers and the financial sustainability of insurer markets.”116 Some of the 
initiative’s more prominent policy efforts include supporting a 40 percent GHG emissions reduction 
by 2020, which is 20 percent more than the EU’s current goals.117 According to an interviewee, this 
strong position surprised the ClimateWise Secretariat, which had anticipated a 20 percent reduction 
target in line with the EU’s. It emerged in response to technical consensus building over the 
reductions required to avoid significant losses and subsequent premium increases.118  
ClimateWise has also made several other policy proposals based on technical consensus 
building. In the 2010 statement to UNFCCC negotiators, ClimateWise advocated for an global 
agreement on providing funds to developing countries to support adaptation.119 If these markets are to 
remain insurable, robust adaptation policies are required given the potential disproportionate impacts 
of climate change on these countries. The statement also argued for the implementation of 
“mandatory risk reduction” plans for every country participating in the UNFCCC.120 These plans 
included implementing a national database on climate change risks, and implementing land-use and 
loss prevention policies (or adaptation policy) based on exposure to these risks. The former policies 
are necessary because insurers lack the data necessary to inform new modeling techniques, whereas 
the latter is needed if markets are to remain insurable as climate change impacts increase.121 
The ClimateWise Secretariat has supported these efforts by identifying ABI’s engagement 
with the UK government, which involved threatening to pull coverage if the government does 
improve flood defenses, as an example of best practice. Outside of policy advocacy, principle two 
also encourages political consensus building within the insurance industry. The most robust effort 
includes a partnership with several other insurer environmental initiatives, including The Geneva 
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Association, Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), and UNEP Finance Initiative in supporting 
the development of an insurance pool to encourage developing countries to implement adaptation 
policy. This pool would be financed by the developed world and act as an insurance policy by 
covering 30 percent of losses from climate change impacts in developing countries.122 Although these 
groups may not explicitly target climate change, or have as many members as ClimateWise, they 
support the use of insurance markets to govern climate change risks and demonstrate how the 
constituency behind such policy is growing.123  
ClimateWise’s audit has identified that despite a high level of compliance to principle two at 
over 90%, insurers have experienced difficulty in converting their statements on greater use of public 
regulation in governing climate change risks into action. In response to the audit, the Secretariat 
argues that members need to ensure that their policy recommendations are harmonized to protect 
against redundancy and are informed based on risk-management expertise in carbon technologies and 
adaptation infrastructure. More broadly, these policy efforts should help identify “low carbon 
economic pathways and the required infrastructure needed to both mitigate and adapt to climate 
change, which would reduce risks for the sector and enable insurance cover to remain intact.”124 This 
diversity of opinion reveals that insurers have yet to generate a consensus on effective policy 
recommendations, which limits the ability of the industry to inform policy to help reduce climate 
change risks.  
Principle three asks members to work within their customer and stakeholder base to “inform 
customers of climate risk” and market their products and expertise within both developed and 
developing markets.125 This principle helps insurers build a constituency of support among their 
customers and stakeholders. According to Karl Russak, the senior Vice President of Environmental 
Risk at Ace, a “perception of risk on the part of the customer” is necessary before insurers can take 
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action to mitigate these risks.126 To accomplish this goal, insurers need to communicate to their 
customers the justification behind rate changes based on climate change risks. This principle is a key 
plank in the CPSL’s TCM because it recognizes that rate decisions by insurers are effectively 
communicated among key stakeholders. Without effective communication, ABI contends insurers are 
exposed to reputational risks “since they may be seen as the bearers of unpopular messages and 
blamed for factors which they alone cannot control.”127  
 In terms of best practice, the Secretariat has identified Zurich Insurance, which has launched 
a website to communicate how customers can identify exposure to extreme weather risks, and how to 
prepare before, during and after these events to reduce this exposure. Aviva has implemented policies 
supporting sustainable repairs where customers are provided with an option to pay a higher premium 
that will cover improvements to their property that protects against long-term climate change 
impacts.128 At 89 percent compliance, insurers are demonstrating progress in complying with 
principle three. Although an important accomplishment, the audit identifies that insurers still struggle 
to implement effective communications strategies that can communicate climate change risks in ways 
that are acceptable to the “mainstream.” One innovative recommendation is to engage downstream 
insurance market participants, such as brokers and loss adjusters, in communicating to their clients 
how climate change could exacerbate existing risks.129   
Principle five asks ClimateWise members to reduce the overall environmental impact of their 
business by mitigating GHGs across their supply-chain, and by publicly disclosing their emissions.130 
By agreeing to work towards reducing their emissions, ClimateWise attempts to send a reputational 
signal to the sector’s stakeholders and the environmental community that climate change risks are 
issues of strategic importance for insurers, requiring both regulatory and societal adjustments in 
behavior to mitigate these risks.131  This principle also reflects the CPSL’s TCM, which recognizes 
that legitimacy is critical if an industry has to impose costs on external actors in order to strengthen its 
efforts in governing climate change risks. According to an official with ClimateWise, signing up to 
ClimateWise without a principle that demonstrates the signatories’ own efforts to mitigate GHGs 
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would create a significant legitimacy problem when lobbying policymakers (principle two) or 
working to reduce climate change risks among customers and stakeholders (principle three).132 In this 
respect, policymakers and customers believe insurers are credible when they argue that climate 
change risks threaten the viability of their industry.  
 This examination of the six ClimateWise Principles demonstrates how ClimateWise is 
designed to employ cognitive governance in facilitating technical and political consensus building. 
The development of this consensus is critical as a strategy for maintaining the standards of 
insurability through the expansion of public regulation combined with the pricing of climate change 
risks within insurance markets. By developing a technical consensus that exposure to climate change 
uncertainty constitutes a financial risk that can be priced, “hidden links” are revealed that demonstrate 
the market value of behavior supporting mitigation and adaptation. For example, efforts to mitigate 
GHG emissions could lower insurance premium rates freeing up capital to invest in expanding new 
markets. Political consensus building attempts to embed these “links” using public regulation within 
insurance and financial knowledge so as to incentive market behavior that rewards the governance of 
climate change risks. It is at this point that cognitive governance achieves its key market objective.  
5.4.3 Limitations of ClimateWise? 
 
This analysis of ClimateWise confirms that its approach to co-regulation builds off of existing co-
regulatory initiatives in financial markets and is “unconventional” in seeking to strengthen public 
regulation. More specifically, the analysis has suggested that the use of voluntary standards is a 
strategic component in facilitating cognitive governance through ClimateWise, rather than an attempt 
at “greenwash”. Still, skeptics could argue that until ClimateWise has facilitated its objectives, there 
is no evidence to suggest that the insurers involved are accountable to their robust commitments in 
supporting this outcome. As with the CDSB, this criticism can only be resolved through future 
research evaluating the effectiveness of ClimateWise in achieving its objectives. In the meantime, it is 
possible to evaluate this potential criticism by examining ClimateWise’s enforcement strategy and 
rates of participation.  
The use of an enforcement strategy suggests that ClimateWise is aware that accountability is 
a potential weakness and has taken measures to strengthen the compliance of its members. 
ClimateWise does not adopt a minimum requirement for compliance, which parallels the approach 
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adopted by the CDSB. Despite this weakness, ClimateWise enforces compliance through its reflexive 
mechanism, specifically, a third party audit. ClimateWise also adopts the “comply or explain” 
approach that the CDSB uses. Participants are asked to provide reports that identify how they are 
working towards the standard, or explain why the standard is not relevant to their firm.133 Responses 
to the audit help the ClimateWise Secretariat identify obstacles insurers face in maintaining 
compliance. More specifically, these reports are used to “score” each firm based on its compliance 
and disclosure. These scores can then be used to identify weaknesses, and direct attention among the 
participants to address these weaknesses. 
Unlike the CDSB, however, disclosure is not made public. Instead, the ClimateWise 
Secretariat works with the auditor to provide feedback on each firm’s weaknesses and strengths in 
supporting the initiative. Public disclosure is an important source of accountability to members 
because it invites external scrutiny from stakeholders likely to put more pressure on insurers to 
improve their performance.  For the time being, however, membership expansion is a key priority for 
ClimateWise given the political obstacles it is trying to overcome.134 Anonymity provides flexibility 
required to encourage participation among firms that have yet to engage with many of the objectives 
outlined in the ClimateWise Principles. Because of ClimateWise’s emphasis on political advocacy in 
generating robust GHG mitigation and adaptation regulations, the facilitation of a broad constituency 
is a core concern that continues to justify anonymous reporting.  
 These efforts to expand the ClimateWise constituency have resulted in a fairly robust 
participation rate among the world’s largest insurers. Of the top 10 global insurance firms based on 
market value, five – including Allianz 1), Axa 2), Zurich 3), Aviva 8), and Prudential 10) – are 
members of ClimateWise. In addition, the Lloyd’s of London insurance market is also a member of 
ClimateWise.135 Although this rate falls short of the near universal participation of the accounting 
industry in the CDSB, and a high rate of participation among institutional investors, it demonstrates 
that insurers are legitimately concerned about climate change risks and support ClimateWise as a 
strategy to govern these risks. This support represents a significant accomplishment considering that 
insurers have previously resisted efforts by ENGOs and policy entrepreneurs to facilitate co-
regulation. Indeed, these participation rates reveal evidence of a shift in the industry’s position 
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towards climate change and awareness that pro-active measures must be implemented to reduce 
exposure to increasing losses.  
 Although  ClimateWise has yet to meet its objectives, the initiative is still relatively new. The 
use of an enforcement strategy demonstrates that ClimateWise participants are aware accountability is 
a priority. The impressive rate of participation also suggests insurers have legitimate material interests 
in governing climate change risks through co-regulation targeting an expansion of public regulation. 
But ultimately, future research will be required to determine whether ClimateWise can be effective in 
using cognitive governance to generate a constituency willing to support an expansion of public 
regulation governing climate change risks.  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter identified the form of co-regulation adopted by ClimateWise as a distinctive strategy to 
achieve influence, and identified factors that explain the emergence of this approach. ClimateWise’s 
form of co-regulation adopts the two characteristics of cognitive governance identified in Chapter 2. 
Specifically, ClimateWise implements a system of voluntary best-practice standards designed to 
harness expertise and resources in promoting technical and political consensus building. To govern 
these standards, ClimateWise also implements a reflexive mechanism governed by an ENGO as a 
third party monitor. The objective of this approach is to cultivate technical and political consensus 
that supports pricing climate change risks throughout insurance markets, and expand public regulation 
to assist insurers in these efforts through international regulations on GHG emissions and adaptation 
(ie. loss prevention). This strategy is ultimately designed to contest existing market expectations that 
discount the economic value of a firm’s exposure to climate change risks.  
Three factors identified in the framework developed in chapter 3 help explain the form of co-
regulation adopted by ClimateWise. First, the insurance industry had material interests in using public 
regulation to govern climate change uncertainty as a financial risk. During the 2000s, insurers 
realized that without robust international regulations on mitigation and adaptation, weather-related 
losses could increase to a point where existing markets are no longer insurable. In particular, insurers 
realized that regulation would be required to avoid reputational and regulatory risks associated with 
rate increases and potential market pullbacks. Second, efforts by insurers to maintain the standards of 
insurability to reduce weather-related losses revealed a need for a technical and political consensus 
before an expansion of public regulation could occur. Technical consensus is needed to demonstrate 
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that climate change risks could be modeled and priced to inform policy and implement a “climate 
premium” in order to preserve the standards of insurability. A political consensus is also required to 
address potential opposition to implementing measures likely to increase the cost of insurance 
services. The third factor was the existence of ENGOs, particularly the CPSL, with interests in using 
their expertise and political capacity in governing the implementation of voluntary best practice 
standards designed to leverage insurers in generating the consensus and political support necessary to 




Conclusion: Cognitive Governance and “Greening” Private Finance 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation has addressed two core research questions. First, how are the CDSB and 
ClimateWise designed to achieve their objectives? Second, what explains their emergence? The first 
section of this chapter reviews core answers to these questions that have been developed. The second 
section identifies how the arguments of the dissertation contribute to the advancement of knowledge 
in IPE and GEP literature. The chapter concludes by highlighting some future agendas for research on 
cognitive governance in financial markets.  
6.2 The CDSB, ClimateWise and Cognitive Governance 
 
How are the CDSB and ClimateWise designed to achieve their objectives? This thesis has argued that 
the CDSB and ClimateWise adopt an unconventional approach to co-regulation that I call “cognitive 
governance”. Rather than a strategy targeted at generating “governance beyond the state”, each 
initiative attempts to leverage accounting and insurance knowledge to support an expansion of public 
regulation. Although similar to existing non-state initiatives in climate change governance that 
support a stronger role for the state in protecting the environment, these initiatives have explicitly 
identified the goal of changing public regulation within their mandate. In this respect, they reflect an 
important trend whereby co-regulation within financial markets requires official regulatory change in 
order to be successful in governing climate change risks. Cognitive governance is the strategy these 
initiatives have adopted to implement these regulatory changes. It is designed to embed financial 
knowledge that links a firm’s environmental performance to financial risks related to climate change 
throughout the global economy vis-à-vis an expansion of public regulation.  
 Cognitive governance has two main characteristics. First, voluntary best practice standards 
are used to facilitate a two-stage process that targets technical and political consensus building. The 
objective of this process is to leverage financial knowledge that links a firm’s environmental 
performance to financial risks to cultivate a constituency willing to support the use of public 
regulation to govern climate change risks within accounting and insurance markets. The second 
characteristic of cognitive governance involves the use of a reflexive mechanism. This mechanism is 
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used to identify weaknesses in compliance to the CDSB and ClimateWise’s standards, and to direct 
participants to devote expertise and resources to address these weaknesses. 
The detailed studies of each initiative demonstrate how they are designed to facilitate the 
objective of expanding public regulation through cognitive governance. The CDSB targeted the 
implementation of a mandatory international accounting standard governing climate change risk 
disclosure. ClimateWise targets the implementation of several different policies at the international 
and national level that price climate change risks throughout the economy, and assist insurers in using 
premiums to price their own exposure to these risks vis-à-vis a “climate premium.” The CDSB and 
ClimateWise are designed to facilitate this strategy through a two-stage process.   
The first stage involves generating a technical consensus on how to measure and price 
climate change uncertainty as a financial risk using accounting and insurance knowledge. This 
consensus is a critical first step in convincing accountants and insurers that incorporating climate 
change risks into market decision-making can improve the efficiency of these decisions. But it is also 
important for determining how regulations can be designed to effectively govern these risks in ways 
that advance material interests. In the case of the CDSB, this process involves experimenting with 
voluntary best practice standards that attempt to capture the “decision-useful” aspects of climate 
change risk information. If the CDSB is to achieve its objective of a mandatory standard, climate 
change risk disclosure must be decision-useful for investors. This threshold constitutes a key 
cognitive expectation within the accounting profession and its regulatory institutions that justifies the 
implementation of a mandatory standard.  
In the case of ClimateWise, technical consensus must be established on how to model and 
price climate change risks. Without this expertise, insurers will be forced to increase premium prices 
or pull out of markets because they are unable to compensate their reserves to cover for increased 
losses. To facilitate this consensus, ClimateWise attempts to harness the expertise of insurers in 
researching new ways to map and link climate change risks to weather-related damage. In addition, 
this consensus is required to inform and justify government “loss-prevention” policy in areas exposed 
to high levels of risk.  
The second stage of cognitive governance involves political consensus building. Even if a 
technical consensus exists that measuring and pricing climate change risks improves the efficiency of 
market decision-making, the CDSB and ClimateWise must generate political support for international 
regulations that must be implemented before accounting and insurance markets can measure and price 
these risks. Most importantly, this political consensus must involve the regulators that govern each 
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market, consumers and firms using services within these markets, government policymakers, and 
environmentalists. Without this support, both accountants and insurers will be unable to advance their 
material interests in governing climate change risks. The CDSB approaches political consensus 
building through its “engagement plan” that targets key stakeholders in accounting markets with 
knowledge that climate change risks can be measured to improve the efficiency of market decision-
making. ClimateWise has a similar approach, including direct engagement with government 
policymakers and market participants.  
These two stages are governed by a reflexive mechanism that attempts to identify weaknesses 
in generating compliance to the standards, specifically the challenges that participants face in working 
towards a technical and political consensus. The CDSB Secretariat (hosted by the CDP) and the 
ClimateWise Secretariat (hosted by the CPSL) govern this mechanism. Each year, these bodies 
review the compliance and performance of the participants’ vis-à-vis the goal of measuring and 
pricing climate change risks. Weaknesses in compliance are targeted as areas that require further 
expertise and resources from the financial firms involved. This process incorporates reflexivity where 
efforts are made to gradually resolve the obstacles to facilitating a technical and political consensus.  
In the long-term, the CDSB and ClimateWise are designed to leverage this technical and 
political consensus to embed accounting and insurance cognitive expectations concerning climate 
change risks into the way market actors perceive their material interests. Because accounting and 
insurance services are key to accessing private capital, market actors using these services will be 
forced to measure and price climate change risks. The assistance of public regulation is critical to 
ensure that each industry is able to impose these conditions without suffering reputational or 
regulatory risks for their efforts. It is at this stage of cognitive governance that accounting and 
insurance knowledge which links climate change uncertainty to financial risks becomes “taken-for-
granted.” More directly, market actors throughout the economy then share the same cognitive 
expectations as accountants and insurers towards these risks, and are driven to reduce exposure to 
climate change through investment in mitigation and adaptation.    
What explains the emergence of the CDSB and ClimateWise? The answer to this second 
research question of the dissertation is that the CDSB and ClimateWise emerged in response to three 
factors. First, accountants (in addition to institutional investors and corporate emitters in the case of 
the CDSB) and insurers had material interests in using public regulation to govern climate change 
risks. Second, there was a need to collaborate in generating a technical and political consensus before 
public regulation governing climate change risks can be implemented. Third, ENGOs existed who 
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had interests in using their technical expertise and political capacity to help implement strategies for 
generating this consensus.  
Chapter 4 analyzed how the CDSB emerged in response to material interests in using public 
regulation to enforce the mandatory disclosure of climate change risks. Institutional investors and 
corporate emitters involved in an existing patchwork of standards saw public regulation, specifically 
the implementation of a mandatory standard, as a way to resolve inefficiencies in using this 
patchwork. The accounting industry had material interests in using public regulation to govern 
climate change risks as a strategy to expand their markets and services. These interests were also 
informed by cognitive expectations that climate change uncertainty should be measured and disclosed 
as financial risk for accounting markets to remain efficient in communicating financial information. 
But to implement a mandatory standard, the accounting industry had to generate a technical 
consensus within the industry that climate change risks were decision-useful, and standards could be 
designed to capture this financial information in ways that improve market efficiency.  In addition, 
the accounting industry had to generate a political consensus among market participants within and 
outside the industry who were willing to support the implementation of a mandatory standard. The 
ENGOs involved in the existing patchwork of standards had expertise in generating this technical and 
political consensus. The CDP and GHG Protocol, for example, were already widely used by both 
investors and corporations concerned about their exposure to climate change risks. These ENGOs 
also had a great deal of political capacity in promoting the business case behind climate change risk 
disclosure among these key constituencies.   
The partnership between the accounting industry and CDSB Board members helps explain its 
unconventional approach to co-regulation. The Board members provide important oversight in 
facilitating the reflexive mechanism designed to improve compliance among CDSB participants to 
forging a technical and political consensus. In terms of technical consensus building, the CDSB 
attempts to improve the capacity of the standards to capture “decision-useful” information and 
support a consensus on how to measure climate change risks. In terms of political consensus building, 
Board members partner with the TWG in cultivating political support through the CDSB’s 
“engagement plan.”  
Chapter 5 described how ClimateWise emerged out of an initiative on the part of the Prince 
of Wales, and his ENGO, the CPSL. The CPSL has over seventeen years of experience in working 
with corporations to generate strategies for improving their environmental performance. In 2004, the 
CPSL initiated a strategic review that determined co-regulation targeting the expansion of public 
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regulation governing climate change represented a more optimal approach than existing voluntary 
efforts to improve corporate environmental performance. ClimateWise emerged based on the CPSL’s 
effort to spread this strategy throughout the insurance industry. In addition, the CPSL was able to take 
advantage of existing expertise and capacity developed by other ENGOs and policy entrepreneurs in 
leveraging insurance markets to govern climate change risks.  
This expertise was welcomed by the insurance industry, which throughout the 2000s had 
developed material interests in governing climate change risks through public regulation. These 
interests were informed by cognitive expectations that climate change uncertainty must be priced to 
protect the efficiency of their markets. But to advance these interests, insurers had to generate a 
technical consensus on the regulations necessary to govern these risks and political consensus among 
stakeholders who might be opposed to such measures. First, the industry had to generate a technical 
consensus on how to model and price climate change risks if it was to incorporate these risks into its 
own premiums, and to inform government regulators and policy makers that adaptation and 
mitigation was necessary to avoid significant losses within the industry. In addition to this technical 
consensus, insurers had to generate a political consensus that supported their efforts in pricing climate 
change risks through the assistance of international mitigation and adaptation.  
The CPSL’s experience in using co-regulation to implement strategies in governing climate 
change risks and influence public regulation provided an important opportunity for insurers to 
generate the needed consensus and helps explain ClimateWise’s unique approach to co-regulation.  In 
particular, the CPSL formed and staffed the ClimateWise Secretariat to govern the voluntary best 
practice standards and the reflexive mechanism. These standards target technical consensus building 
by harnessing insurance expertise in modeling and pricing climate change risks. These standards also 
target political consensus building by harnessing the insurance industry’s political voice in national 
and international climate change regulatory debates.  
6.3 Contributions to the Advancement of Knowledge 
 
This analysis of the CDSB and ClimateWise’s unconventional approach to co-regulation, and the 
conditions that explain the emergence of this unique strategy makes important contributions to three 
sets of literature in IPE and GEP research: analyses of the link between financial markets and the 
environment, scholarship focused on the causes and significance of environmental co-regulation, and 
constructivist debates on the influence of ideas in shaping market behavior.  
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 First, the thesis contributes to IPE and GEP literature on the link between financial markets 
and environmental issues. Scholarship on this topic has so far ignored the creation of the CDSB and 
ClimateWise. This gap is unfortunate since both the CDSB and ClimateWise each represent 
important initiatives seeking to “green” financial markets in significant ways through innovative 
kinds of co-regulation. As Chapter 2 described, the most robust research on environmental co-
regulation in financial markets has examined the strategy and emergence of co-regulation among 
institutional investors. The extension of co-regulation to the accounting and insurance sectors through 
the CDSB and ClimateWise is an important development that deserves more attention.  
In some respects, the CDSB and ClimateWise are similar to the kind of “investor 
environmentalism” that is represented by co-regulatory initiatives such as the CDP and INCR. These 
initiatives all attempt to contest market expectations for the economic value of a firm’s environmental 
performance by linking this performance to financial risks, specifically climate change risks. In 
addition, both of these initiatives, like many others within non-state global climate governance, 
support stronger global climate change regulations. But the INCR is somewhat distinctive in this 
regard because it explicitly identifies specific regulatory change as necessary to achieve its mandate 
in governing global climate change risk disclosure. The CDSB and ClimateWise also explicitly 
identify specific regulations that must be implemented if the accounting and insurance industry are to 
successfully govern their exposure to climate change risk.  
The CDSB and ClimateWise are, however, distinctive in two respects. First, both initiatives 
adopt a more robust form of cognitive governance.1 Each use best practice standards to govern both 
technical and political consensus building with the goal of expanding public regulation to govern 
climate change risks. They also each govern this process through a reflexive mechanism. The CDP 
and INCR do not target both technical and political consensus building with the same consistency. 
Moreover, the CDP does not target the expansion of public authority, while the INCR does not use a 
reflexive mechanism.  
Second, the leveraging of accounting and insurance knowledge by CDSB and ClimateWise is 
unique. As noted below, this strategy has an important influence in dictating the way financial 
information on the environment is communicated, and how market actors perceive and respond to 
risks.  Although GEP scholars have analyzed the role of the insurance industry in climate change 
                                                     
1 Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3) outlines how the CDSB and ClimateWise have a more rigorous institutional design 
than the CDP and INCR. The CDP does not explicitly target an expansion of public regulation, and the INCR 
does not implement a reflexive mechanism. From this perspective, the CDSB and ClimateWise build from each 
of their predecessor’s approaches, but are more up-front and direct about the need for public regulation.  
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politics, they have largely discounted its potential in taking a political stance, or looking at ways to 
leverage its markets in pricing climate change risks. Based on the strategy adopted by ClimateWise, 
the insurance industry appears to have shifted its position on these issues. Both IPE and GEP scholars 
have also unjustly overlooked the potential role of the accounting industry in contributing to 
environmental governance. As this analysis of CDSB’s strategy demonstrates, the industry has strong 
interests and capacity to make a contribution in this area. 
 The second set of scholarly contributions that this dissertation makes is to debates within IPE 
and GEP on the emergence of environmental co-regulation and the strategy these initiatives adopt 
more generally. Many scholars adopt a post-Westphalian lens towards co-regulation by arguing that it 
is designed to facilitate “governance beyond the state.” This study of the CSDB and ClimateWise 
presents quite a different perspective. Instead of being designed as a replacement or subversion of 
public regulation, the CDSB and ClimateWise have the goal of strengthening public regulation. The 
argument presents a particular challenge to those scholars who suggest that co-regulation is designed 
to facilitate “greenwash” by simply improving a firm’s reputational credibility to avoid external 
scrutiny from ENGOs and regulators. The CDSB and ClimateWise each recognize that voluntary 
approaches are insufficient without an expansion of state authority.    
 The identification of the factors that led to the emergence of the CDSB and ClimateWise also 
challenges conventional, “post-Westphalian” explanations invoked by some scholars for the 
emergence of environmental co-regulation. Some of these explanations see the rise of co-regulation 
as part of a broader structural shift towards markets that is driven by globalization and neoliberal 
ideology. But this account fails to explain why the CDSB and ClimateWise seek to bolster public 
authority and it overlooks how co-regulation can emerge in response to conditions contingent on the 
actors involved rather than as a consequence of a “structural shift.” In fact, the CDSB and 
ClimateWise’s strategy demonstrates a “contradiction” within the structural influence of neoliberal 
ideology.2 The financial and corporate actors involved in these initiatives support an expansion of 
public regulation, which is generally opposed by neoliberal ideology, but with the goal of improving 
the efficiency of their markets, which is coherent with neoliberal ideology. Bernstein notes that 
invoking the “precautionary principle” to politicize decisions about “risk under uncertainty” has the 
                                                     
2 From this perspective, the CDSB and ClimateWise challenge a specific interpretation of neoliberalism that 
opposes regulation and favors privatization. Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism, 237. 
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potential to empower government regulation at the international level.3 This politicization is, indeed, 
the primary objective of the CDSB and ClimateWise.  
Others explain co-regulation as the product of ENGO pressure for a “second best” alternative 
to public regulation. But the CDSB and ClimateWise reveal that these actors do not always have to 
“settle” for a suboptimal outcome. In these cases, ENGOs were able to take advantage of material 
interests among financial firms in pushing for a more stringent objective than “governance beyond the 
state.” This analysis supports arguments made by scholars who point to the increasing influence of 
civil-society actors as a significant development in global environmental governance.4 But where that 
research mainly recognizes this influence through the creation of co-regulation as “governance 
beyond the state”, the CDSB and ClimateWise demonstrate how civil society actors can pursue more 
robust environmental objectives through financial market reforms. Although this strategy is a 
distinctive example of environmental co-regulation, it supports arguments by scholars who 
recognized private governance as a legitimate third pillar in global governance research alongside 
intergovernmental regimes and transgovernmental networks.5  
The emergence of the CDSB and ClimateWise also challenges “radical” scholars who argue 
that co-regulation emerges in response to short-term corporate incentives related to reputational 
credibility or pre-empting regulatory threats. Analysis of the incentives among the financial and 
corporate actors involved in the CDSB and ClimateWise suggests that the material interests of 
business actors in supporting co-regulation are not always driven by these kinds of short-term 
concerns. In these cases, the corporate actors involved welcomed the idea that co-regulation was 
designed to strengthen public regulation over the longer-term. This stance stemmed from their 
recognition that a voluntary approach was ultimately insufficient in advancing their material interests 
in governing climate change risks. Members of the CDSB recognized that they could not force 
mandatory disclosure through a voluntary framework, and insurers involved in ClimateWise 
recognized that they could not force firms to pay a climate premium to cover for rising climate 
change risks.  
At a more specific level, support for the use of public regulation among the financial and 
corporate actors participating in the CDSB and ClimateWise challenge scholars who link the 
emergence of co-regulation to neoliberal opposition to public regulation. This pursuit of public 
                                                     
3 Ibid., 273. 
4 See Wapner, “Governance in Global Civil Society”; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond 
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
5 See Dingwerth, “Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World.” 
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regulation as a strategy to advance material interests reveals that neoliberal opposition to such 
regulation is by no means coherent or absolute. The market interests of the accounting and insurance 
industry, in particular, are often linked to the influence of neoliberalism.6 But their support for public 
regulation to strengthen global climate governance within these industries reveals a potential divide 
within the “neoliberal hegemonic bloc” between financial markets and sectors within the “real” 
economy, such as oil and gas or mining, that often oppose climate change regulation.  
These challenges to “post-Westphalian” interpretations of the purpose and sources of 
environmental co-regulation will not necessarily be convincing to all. Without evidence that the 
CDSB and ClimateWise can actually hold corporate actors accountable to their robust objectives, 
skeptics may argue that these initiatives represent simply more sophisticated versions of “greenwash”. 
But the analysis of the last two chapters highlights how each initiative has demonstrated an 
impressive commitment to develop enforcement mechanisms aimed at holding their members more 
accountable to the voluntary standards. Those chapters also presented evidence of high participation 
rates in these initiatives among the key corporate constituents in each sector. This evidence suggests 
that the corporate actors involved have legitimate material interests in supporting these co-regulatory 
efforts designed to strengthen public regulation. Because each initiative is still relatively new, 
however, it is not yet possible to evaluate their success.   
 The third set of scholarly contributions made by this thesis are to constructivist scholarship 
that focuses on the role of ideas in influencing market actors’ behavior.  First, this analysis of the 
CSDB and ClimateWise contributes to an emerging strand of IPE constructivist literature researching 
the influence of “cognition” in shaping market behavior.  “Cognitive constructivism” explores the 
influence of knowledge as a lens or schema that defines the way market actors perceive economic 
information.	   Although scholars have described the link between financial knowledge and market 
perception, they have yet to employ cognitive constructivism to differentiate how different financial 
knowledge can influence these perceptions. The influence of “cognitive expectations” for rational 
market behavior have particular relevance in explaining support, specifically material interests, 
among accountants and insurers for the use of public regulation to govern climate change risks. More 
specifically, accounting and insurance knowledge predisposes these industries to take a precautionary 
approach and measure or price risk under conditions of market uncertainty.   
                                                     
6 See Perry and Nolke, “The Political Economy of International Accounting Standards”; Paterson, “Risky 
Business: Insurance Companies in Global Warming Politics.” 
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 A core argument within constructivism is that knowledge, and more broadly, ideas can 
influence a market actors’ behavior.7 Support for the use of public regulation as a strategy to advance 
rational interests among accountants (in addition to institutional investors and corporate emitters) and 
insurers demonstrates how knowledge can influence their behavior in ways that diverge from short-
term market concerns. Scholars often point to the influence of short-term market concerns as an 
explanation for co-regulation that supports “greenwash” and evidence that questions the legitimacy of 
a business case for improving environmental performance.8  The accounting and insurance industry’s 
material interests in using public regulation to internalize climate change risks demonstrates the 
influence of the cognitive qualities of financial knowledge in shaping market expectations that depart 
from these more short-term concerns. Both accountants and insurers interpret market efficiency 
through a cognitive lens informed by knowledge that any form of market uncertainty constitutes a risk 
to the industry, specifically their reputation as neutral communicators of financial information or 
expert risk-managers. In the case of climate change risks, these industries require the assistance of 
public regulation to maintain this reputation. This analysis provides evidence for constructivist 
scholars - specifically those researching the influence of cognition - that ideas can in fact shape 
market actors’ behavior.  
The second contribution to constructivist literature is based on analysis that confirms the 
political use of financial knowledge to strengthen global climate governance. This thesis has 
highlighted how the “cognitive governance” strategies of CDSB and ClimateWise make use of 
specific cognitive qualities within accounting and insurance knowledge. Literature on the political use 
of financial knowledge has yet to connect the influence of this knowledge to the environment. This is 
a significant oversight considering the powerful influence of financial knowledge in communicating 
and pricing a firm’s environmental performance within financial markets. The strategy adopted by the 
CDSB and ClimateWise is precisely designed to take advantage of this influence; that is to generate a 
technical and political consensus around the way accounting and insurance cognitive expectations 
treat climate change uncertainty. IPE scholarship on the political use of financial knowledge also 
generally assumes that this knowledge is designed to subvert state authority.9 In the cases of the 
                                                     
7 See Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons, “Introduction: Constructing the International Economy.” 
8 See Harmes, “The Limits of Carbon Disclosure: Theorizing the Business Case for Investor 
Environmentalism.” 
9 See Eleni Tsingou, “The Role of Policy Communities in Global Financial Governance: A Critical Examination 
of the Group of Thirty,” in Towards a Cognitive Mode in Global Finance: The Governance of a Knowledge-
Based Financial System, ed. Torsten Strulik and Helmut Willke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 
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CDSB and ClimateWise, however, financial knowledge is being used to try to strengthen political 
support for state regulation.   
6.4 Conclusion: Future Research Agendas  
 
The analysis in this thesis also suggests several future research and policy agendas. First, scholars 
need to perform a comprehensive analysis of the influence of financial knowledge in shaping 
cognitive expectations towards the market value of corporate environmental performance. The thesis 
has identified how ENGOs were successful in allying with industries that are trained to question the 
divide between “market” and “non-market” (ie. environmental externalities) financial information. 
These industries are receptive to arguments that market uncertainty associated with the impacts of 
climate change can and should be governed as a financial risk. Identifying other financial industries 
that embrace the use of knowledge in similar ways to accountants and insurers is an important next 
step in advancing the efforts of policy entrepreneurs and ENGOs to spread environmental norms 
within financial markets.    
For example, credit rating agencies may share a similar set of cognitive expectations towards 
market uncertainty as accountants and insurers. Credit raters depend on knowledge to reduce forms of 
market uncertainty into risks that are then used to rate a firm’s credit worthiness. In fact, Standard & 
Poor’s recently announced that it was going to introduce “climate risk” into its credit rating 
methodology.10 Research must also be focused on the banking industry in order to explain why a 
robust international effort similar to the CDSB and ClimateWise has yet to emerge in that industry. 
This outcome is somewhat puzzling given the exposure of banks to environmental risks. Indeed, one 
study of German banks by Olaf Weber et al. confirmed that about ten percent of all defaults on 
commercial lending are related to environmental risks.11  
After identifying industries that embrace financial knowledge conducive to supporting 
environmental norms, a second research agenda should demonstrate empirically how technical 
changes in the regulations governing accounting and insurance, and financial markets more broadly, 
can strengthen environmental governance. The CDSB and ClimateWise have emerged to challenge 
                                                                                                                                                                    
212-235; Tsingou, “Transnational Governance Networks in the Regulation of Finance - The Making of Global 
Regulation and Supervision Standards in the Banking Industry.” 
10 Mark Nicholls, “S&P To Integrate Climate Risk into Credit Ratings,” Environmental Finance, February 16, 
2011, http://www.environmental-finance.com/news/view/1550. 
11 Olaf Weber, Scholz, Roland W., and Georg Michalik, “Incorporating Sustainability Criteria into Credit Risk 
Management,” Business Strategy and the Environment 10, no. 1002 (2008): 1-30. 
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the way accounting and insurance markets measure and price the market value of climate change 
uncertainty. These industries are governed by regulations that need to be scrutinized to identify 
potential reforms that can strengthen these efforts. IPE and GEP scholars need to work closely with 
accounting and insurance scholars to identify how regulatory changes do actually cause shifts in 
financial flows and practices in ways that incentive the internalization of environmental externalities 
in a firm’s corporate accounts. This research should begin with a mapping exercise of existing 
financial regulations that identifies potential synergies between these regulations and environmental 
protection.  
The identification of how regulations can be changed to enhance the market value associated 
with “good” corporate environment performance leads to a third research agenda targeting the 
political drivers and motivations of different stakeholders involved in the financial regulatory process. 
IPE research provides an important platform for this inquiry by identifying the important stakeholders 
involved in the regulatory process, such as national securities regulators, standard setters and financial 
firms. This research can identify important actors within this regulatory process who may be 
interested in allying with environmental interests in targeting areas of regulation that can strengthen 
the market value of corporate environmental performance.  
These three research agendas are particularly important given the policy window for new 
ideas and regulations in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Two interviewees in this 
research project suggested that more could be done by ENGOs in framing the crisis as an opportunity 
to revisit the way financial institutions interpret environmental and climate change risks.12 Climate 
change has the potential to become an overlooked liability at the core of the global economic 
growth.13 It is for these reasons, among many others, that both environmentalists and the financial 
industry should recognize that their goals are mutually supportive, particularly in making markets that 
are more adaptive and resilient in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
This sentiment was echoed in a speech made by Ken Lewis, the former CEO of Bank of 
America, who argued that the financial industry finds itself in a situation “similar to the dawn of the 
fossil-fuel economy.” Private financial institutions were cautious about investing in the carbon 
                                                     
12 Anonymous A; Anonymous O. 
13 See Rob Gross and Ian Bragg, “The Financial Crisis: An Environmental, Social and Governance Perspective” 
(CR Strategies, June 5, 2009), http://crstrategies.ca/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/financialcrisis-
anesgperspective-cr-strategies-june2009.pdf; Michelle Chan, Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis: 
Designing Carbon Markets for Environmental Effectiveness and Financial Stability (Washington D.C.: Friends 
of the Earth, 2009); Doug Cogan, “Sub-prime and Carbon: An Eerie Similarity,” Responsible Investor, March 7, 
2008, http://www.responsible-investor.com/home/article/sub_prime_carbon/. 
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economy due to concerns about market instability and corresponding financial risks. But “today, as 
then” Lewis argues, private finance must overcome these challenges through the development of 
“new models for assessing and managing risk” and “new formulas to calculate economic costs and 
benefits.”  Only then, he argues, can private finance “help create a sustainable economy for future 
generations.”14  
Indeed, an alliance between the financial industry and environmental community has the 
potential to unlock the most significant obstacle in facilitating a sustainable balance between 
economic growth and environmental protection. Financial knowledge has the potential to price 
ecosystem services, which could lead to the creation as vast markets where value generation is 
dependent on environmental protection. This development is in fact quite likely given the constant 
push for innovation and market making in the financial industry.15 Although this is good news for the 
environmental movement in the financial industry, ENGOs and policy entrepreneurs encouraging this 
movement must be involved in advising how such markets are constructed to ensure they support 
environment integrity. As Paterson suggests, the environmental community must engage with 
financial markets to provide a critical perspective and shape the emerging regime “in ways which are 
both ecologically viable and, as important for many such actors, socially just on a global basis.”16  
The way market actors define economic value is deeply embedded within modern capitalism. 
This definition is rarely contested and often effectively taken for granted. This study demonstrated 
how an emerging environmental movement within financial markets is trying to challenge this 
definition of value. Stakeholders within financial markets and environmentalists more broadly should 
join this debate as an opportunity to construct a powerful constituency willing to advance the mutual 




                                                     
14 Ken Lewis, “Remarks to the North Carolina Emerging Issues Forum, "North Carolina's Energy Futures: 
Realizing a State of Opportunity,” Bank of America, February 12, 2008, 
http://mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1383078&highlight=. 
15 See UNEP-FI, “CEO Briefing: Demystifying Materiality: Hardwiring Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
into Finance” (UNEP-FI, October 2010), 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/CEO_DemystifyingMateriality.pdf; “Payments for Ecosystem 
Services: A Primer” (Forest Trends, The Katoomba Group, UNEP, May 2008), 
http://www.katoombagroup.org/documents/publications/GettingStarted.pdf. 
16 Paterson, “Legitimation and Accumulation in Climate Change Governance,” 364. 
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Appendix A 
The ClimateWise Principles 
 
Principles Standards 
1. Lead in risk analysis 1.1 Support and undertake research on climate change to inform our business 
strategies and help to protect our customers’ and other stakeholders’ interests. 
1.2 Support more accurate national and regional forecasting of future weather 
and catastrophe patterns affected by changes in the earth’s climate. 
1.3 Use research and improve data quality to inform levels of pricing, capital 
and reserves to match changing risks. 
1.4 Evaluate the risks associated with new technologies for tackling climate 
change so that new insurance products can be considered in parallels with 
technological developments. 
1.5 Share our research with scientists, society, business, governments and 
NGOs through an appropriate forum. 
2. Inform public policy 
making  
2.1 Work with policy makers nationally and internationally to help them 
develop and maintain an economy that is resilient to climate risk. 
2.2 Promote and actively engage in public debate on climate change and the 
need for action. 
2.3 Support work to set and achieve national and global emissions reduction 
targets. 
2.4 Support government action, including regulation, that will enhance the 
resilience and reduce the environmental impact of infrastructure and 
communities. 
2.5 Work effectively with emergency services and others in the event of a 
major climate-related disaster. 
3. Support climate 
awareness amongst our 
customers 
3.1 Inform our customers of climate risk and provide support and tools so that 
they can assess their own levels of risk. 
3.2 Encourage our customers to adapt to climate change and reduce their GHG 
emissions through insurance products and services. 
3.3 Increase the proportion of repairs that are carried out in a sustainable way 
through dialogue with suppliers and developers and manage appropriately. 
3.4 Consider how we can use our expertise to assist the developing world to 
understand and respond to climate change. 
 
4. Incorporate climate 
change into our investment 
strategies 
4.1 Consider the implications of climate change for company performance and 
shareholder value, and incorporate this information into our investment 
decision-making process. 
4.2 Encourage appropriate disclosure on climate change from the companies in 
which we invest. 
4.3 Encourage improvements in the energy-efficiency and climate resilience of 
our investment property portfolio. 
4.4 Communicate our investment beliefs and strategy on climate change to our 
customers and shareholders. 
4.5 Share our assessment of the impacts of climate change with our pension 
fund trustees. 
5. Reduce the environmental 
impact of our business 
5.1 Encourage our suppliers to improve the sustainability of their products and 
services. 
5.2 Measure and seek to reduce the environmental impact of the internal 
operations and physical assets under our control. 
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5.3 Disclose our direct emissions of GHG missions using a globally 
recognized standard. 
5.4 Engage our employees on our commitment to address climate change, 
helping them to play their role in meeting this commitment in the workplace 
and encouraging them to make climate-informed choices outside work. 
6. Report and be 
accountable 
6.1 Recognize at the Company Board level that risk has significant social and 
economic impacts and incorporate it into our business strategy and planning. 
6.2 Public a statement as part of our annual reporting detailing the actions that 
have taken place on these principles.  
 





Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons. “Introduction: Constructing the International 
Economy.” In Constructing the International Political Economy, edited by Rawi Abdelal, 
Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, 1-19. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. 
ABI. “Climate Change: Implications for Insurers.” Insurance Trends, October 18, 2000. 
———. “Influential Insurance: A Guide to Communicating Climate Change for Insurers,” September 
2007. 
Accounting for Sustainability. “Governance and Collaboration: Establishing an "International 
Integrated Reporting Committee",” 2009. 
http://www.accountingforsustainability.org/files/pdf/Governance%20&%20Collaboration.pdf
. 
AM Best. “AM Best's Annual Global Reinsurance Report: Counting the Cost of the Hurricanes.” 
Best's Insurance News, August 14, 2006. 
Andonova, Liliana B., Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet Bulkeley. “Transnational Climate 
Governance.” Global Environmental Politics 9, no. 2 (2009): 52-73. 
Arts, Bas. “Green Alliances of Business and and NGOs. New Styles of Self-Regulation or Dead-End 
Roads?.” Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 9, no. 1 (2002): 
26-36. 
Association of Chartered Accountants in the United States. “The CA Qualification.” Association of 
Chartered Accountants in the United States, April 11, 2011. 
http://www.acaus.org/content.aspx?page_id=22&club_id=825456&module_id=31760. 
BaFin. “Act on the Supervision of Insurance Undertakings (Insurance Supervision Act).” 
Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, November 1, 2010. 
http://www.bafin.de/cln_179/nn_721176/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetze/vag__ab__
070326__en.html?__nnn=true. 




Barnett, Michael, and Andrew King. “Good Fences Make Good Neighbours: A Longitudinal 
Analysis of an Industry Self-Regulatory Institution.” Academy of Management Journal 51, 
no. 6 (2008): 1150-1170. 
Barth, Mary, E, and Maureen McNichols. “Estimation and Market Valuation of Environmental 
Liabilities Relating to Superfund Sites.” Journal of Accounting Research 32 (1994): 177-209. 
Bernstein, Steven, and Benjamin Cashore. “Can Non-State Global Governance be Legitimate? An 
Analytical Framework.” Regulation & Governance 1 (2007): 347-371. 
Bernstein, Steven F. The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism. Columbia University Press, 
2001. 
Biersteker, Thomas, and Rodney Bruce Hall. “The Emergence of Private Authority in the 
International System.” In The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, edited 
by Thomas Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall. Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Boehmer, Kevin, and Aleg Cherp. “ISO 14064: An Emerging Standard on Greenhouse Gas 
Accounting and Verification.” ISO 14064, 2008. http://web.ceu.hu/envsci/aleg/research/ISO-
EnvFinance110503.pdf. 
 
  191 
Botzem, Sebastian. “Transnational Expert-Driven Standardisation: Accountancy Governance from a 
Professional Point of View.” In Transnational Private Governance and Its Limits, edited by 
Jean-Christophe Graz and Andreas Nolke, 44-57. Routledge, 2008. 
Brown, Halina Szejnwald, Martin de Jong, and Teodorina Lessidrenska. “The Rise of the Global 
Reporting Initiative: A Case of Institutional Entrepreneurship.” Environmental Politics 18, 
no. 2 (2009): 182-200. 
BSP. “About the Programme.” The Prince of Wales Business and Sustainability Programme, 
November 4, 2010. 
California Climate Action Registry. “California Climate Action Registry: General Reporting Protocol 
3.1.” California Climate Action Registry, 2009. 
http://www.climateregistry.org/resources/docs/protocols/grp/GRP_3.1_January2009.pdf. 
Canadian Institute of Actuaries. “About Actuaries.” Canadian Institute of Actuaries, April 11, 2011. 
http://www.actuaries.ca/actuaries/career_e.cfm. 
Canadian Underwriter. “RMS Fires Back At Report Criticizing Near-Term Hurricane Models.” 
Canadian Underwriter, January 28, 2011. 
http://www.canadianunderwriter.ca/issues/story.aspx?aid=1000400931. 
Carpenter, Guy. “World Catastrophe Reinsurance Market 2009.” Marsh, Mercer Kroll, Guy 
Carpenter, 2009. 
Carr, Sean. “Disaster Issues Dominate NAIC’s Fall Meeting.” Best's Review, September 20, 2007. 
Cashore, Benjamin. “Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State 
Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority.” Governance: 
An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 15, no. 4 (October 2002): 
503-539. 
CDP. “Carbon Disclosure Project 2010: Global 500 and S&P 500 Report Highlights.” CDP, 
September 21, 2010. https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/2010-G500-SP500-report-
highlights.pdf. 
———. “CDP: Assessing Risks and Opportunities.” CDP, 2010. https://www.cdproject.net/en-
US/Respond/Documents/2010%20webinars/Risks%20and%20Opportunities.pdf. 
———. “What We Do.” Carbon Disclosure Project, September 2010. https://www.cdproject.net/en-
US/WhatWeDo/Pages/overview.aspx. 
CDSB. “Advisory Committee.” Climate Disclosure Standards Board, 2010. http://www.cdsb-
global.org/technical-working-group/. 
———. “Basis for Conclusions in Exposure Draft: The Climate Standards Disclosure Board 
Reporting Framework.” CSDB, 2009. 
———. “Climate Change Reporting Framework - Edition 1.0.” CDSB, September 2010. 
———. “Report on Consultation About CDSB's Reporting Framework.” CDSB, April 6, 2010. 
———. “Technical Working Group.” Climate Disclosure Standards Board, 2010. http://www.cdsb-
global.org/technical-working-group/. 
———. “The Board.” Climate Disclosure Standards Board, 2010. http://www.cdsb-
global.org/index.php?page=the-board. 
———. “The Climate Disclosure Standards Board  - Work Plan 2010.” CDSB, April 6, 2010. 
http://www.cdsb-global.org/uploads/tim_roots/Work%20Plan,%20April%202010.pdf. 
———. “The Climate Disclosure Standards Board Reporting Framework,” May 2009. 
http://www.cdsb-global.org/uploads/pdf/CDSB_Reporting_Framework.pdf. 
Ceniceros, R. “Catastrophe Model Changes Tighen Market for Storm Risks.” Business Insurance, 
June 12, 2006. 
Ceres. “Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure: A Statement of Investor Expectations for 
Comprehensive Corporate Disclosure.” Ceres, 2006. 
 
  192 
http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=73. 
———. “Investors Managing $2.1 Trillion in Assets Praise SEC for Climate Disclosure Guidance,” 
March 10, 2010. http://www.incr.com/Page.aspx?pid=1214. 
———. “Regulators Require Insurers to Disclose Climate Change Risks and Strategies,” March 17, 
2009. http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=1062. 
Cerny, Phillip. The Changing Architecture of Politics. London: SAGE, 1990. 
Chan, Michelle. Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis: Designing Carbon Markets for 
Environmental Effectiveness and Financial Stability. Washington D.C.: Friends of the Earth, 
2009. 
Chapple, Alice. “Responding to the Challenge of Climate Change.” Forum for the Future, January 12, 
2010. http://www.forumforthefuture.org/files/2010-10-04-Climatewise-
web%20%282%29.pdf. 
Chartered Accountants of Canada. “How to Become a CA.” Chartered Accountants of Canada, April 
12, 2011. http://www.cica.ca/become-a-ca/how-to-become-a-ca/index.aspx. 
CICA. “Background: CICA Climate Change Reporting.” CICA, May 2010. 
http://www.cica.ca/climatechange/item39810.pdf. 
Clapp, Jennifer. “Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing 
World.” Global Governance 4 (1998): 295-316. 
———. “The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing 
World.” In The Business of Global Environmental Governance, edited by David L. Levy and 
Peter J. Newell, 223-248. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 
Clapp, Jennifer, and Peter Dauvergne. Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global 
Environment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005. 
Clapp, Jennifer, and Jason Thistlethwaite. “Private Voluntary Programs in Environmental 
Governance: Climate Change and the Financial Sector.” New Orleans, LA, 2009. 
Climate and Insurance. “TakeFive Interview with Robert Detlefsen, Vice President, National 
Association of Mutual Insurance Companies.” Climate and Insurance, March 16, 2008. 
http://www.climateandinsurance.org/takefive/bio_detlefsen.html. 
“Climate Change Advisor to the CICA.”  Interview by Jason Thistlethwaite, May 6, 2010. 
ClimateWise. “ClimateWise statement on the UNFCCC Copenhagen negotiations,” October 2009. 
———. “Member Signatories.” ClimateWise, November 5, 2010. 
http://www.climatewise.org.uk/member-signatories/. 
———. “The ClimateWise Principles,” December 2009. 
http://www.climatewise.org.uk/storage/climatewise-docs/ClimateWise%20Factsheet.pdf. 
ClimateWise, The Geneva Association, MCII, and UNEP FI. “Global Insurance Industry Statement 





Cogan, Doug. “Sup-prime and Carbon: An Eerie Similarity.” Responsible Investor, March 7, 2008. 
http://www.responsible-investor.com/home/article/sub_prime_carbon/. 
Cormier, Denis, and Michael Magnan. “Investors' Assessment of Implicit Environmental Liabilities: 
An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 16, no. 2 (1997): 205-
244. 
Cornejo, Rick. “Katrina Lawsuits Pose Serious Threat to Insurance Market, Experts Say.” Best's 
Insurance News, July 10, 2006. 
Cox, Robert. Production, Power and World Order. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 
 
  193 
Cutler, A. Claire, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter. “Introduction.” In Private Authority and 
International Affairs, edited by Claire, A. Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, 333-370. 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999. 
———. Private Authority and International Affairs. SUNY Press, 1999. 
Cutler, Claire, A. “Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in International 
Law.” Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 2 (1997): 261-285. 
Davies, Paul. “Insurers Call to Action on Climate Change.” Financial Times, October 22, 2009. 
Delmas, Magali A., and Maria Montes-Sancho. “Voluntary Agreements to Improve Environmental 
Quality: Symbolic and Substantive Cooperation.” Strategic Management Journal 31 (2010): 
575-601. 
Deloitte. “Climate Change and Carbon Markets.” Deloitte, 2010. 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GX/global/industries/energy-resources/climate-change-
carbon-markets/. 
Desjardins, Julie, and Alan Willis. “Low-Carbon Economy: The Business of Climate Change.” CA 
Magazine, December 1, 2009. 




Dingwerth, Klaus. “Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A Comparative 
Perspective.” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 607-634. 
———. The New Transnationalism: Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimacy. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. 
Dlugodecki, Andrew. “A Changing Climate for Insurance: A Summary Report for Chief Executives 
and Policymakers.” Association of British Insurers, June 2004. 
———. Coping with Climate Change: Risks and Opportunities. London: Chartered Insurance 
Institute, 2009. 
Dlugodecki, Andrew, and Sascha Lafeld. “Climate Change and the Financial Sector: An Agenda for 
Action.” WWF and Allianz, June 2005. 
Drezner, Daniel. All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007. 
Durbin, Andrea, and Carol Welch. “The Environmental Movement and Global Finance.” In Civil 
Society and Global Finance, edited by Jan Aart Scholte and Albrecht Schnabel, 213-228. 
London: Routledge, 2002. 
Eeuwens, Karen. “Have Near Term CAT Risk Models Failed?.” Reactions, June 15, 2009. 
Elkington, John, and Seb Beloe. “The Twenty-First Century NGO.” In Good Cop Bad Cop: 
Environmental NGOs and their Strategies Towards Business, edited by Thomas, P Lyon, 17-
47. Washington D.C.: RFF Press, 2010. 
Ericson, Richard V., Aaron Doyle, and Dean Barry. Insurance as Governance. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003. 
Ernst & Young. “Climate Change and Sustainability Services.” Ernst & Young, 2010. 
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Specialty-Services/Climate-Change-and-Sustainability-
Services/Climate-Change-and-Sustainability-Services---Overview. 
———. “Strategic Business Risk 2008: Insurance.” Ernst and Young, March 2008. 
http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?a=top_pc&id=92201. 
EU Corporate Leaders Group. “EU CLG.” University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability 
Leadership, May 30, 2011. http://www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/Leaders-Groups/The-Prince-of-Wales-
Corporate-Leaders-Group-on-Climate-Change/EU-CLG.aspx. 
 
  194 
Falkner, Robert. Business Power and Conflict in International Environmental Politics. New York: 
Palgrave, 2008. 
———. “Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links.” 
Global Environmental Politics 3, no. 2 (2003): 72-87. 
Felsted, Andrea. “Insurers Exposed.” The Financial Times, December 1, 2008. 
Financial Times. “Thickening Fog Over Accounting Row.” Financial Times, October 14, 2004. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b8e4b78-1d7e-11d9-abbf-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1KfzAGf6K. 
Fleming, Peyton. “Major Investors, State Officials, Environmental Groups Petition SEC to Require 
Full Corporate Climate Risk Disclosure,” September 18, 2007. 
http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=445. 
Forbes. “The Global 2000.” Forbes, April 21, 2010. http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/18/global-
2000-10_The-Global-2000_Rank.html. 
Forum for the Future. “ClimateWise: The 2009 Review,” November 26, 2009. 
http://www.climatewise.org.uk/storage/climatewise-
docs/Second%20Year%20Review%202009.pdf. 
FSA. “FSA Regulation of Insurance Selling and Administration - do I need to be Authorised?.” 
Financial Services Authority, November 1, 2010. 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ins_reg.pdf. 
FSCO. “Insurance.” Financial Services Comission of Ontario, November 1, 2010. 
http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/english/insurance/. 
Ganzi, John, Frances Seymour, Sandy Buffett, and Navroz K. Dubash. “Leverage for the 
Environment: A Guide to the Private Financial Services Industry.” World Resources Institute, 
1998. http://pdf.wri.org/leverage_for_the_environment.pdf. 
GHG Protocol. “What is the GHG Protocol?.” About the GHG Protocol, 2010. 
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp. 
Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987. 
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and 
Political Change. Reprint. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
Gray, Rob. “Thirty Years of Social Accounting, Reporting and Auditing: What (if anything) Have We 
Learnt?.” Business Ethics, A European Review 10 (2001): 9-15. 
Gray, Rob, and Jan Bebbington. Accounting for the Environment. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications, 
2002. 
Graz, Jean-Christophe, and Andreas Nolke. “Introduction: Beyond the Fragmented Debate on 
Transnational Private Governance.” In Transnational Private Governance and Its Limits, 
edited by Jean-Christophe Graz and Andreas Nolke, 1-27. London: Routledge, 2008. 
Green, Jessica F. “Private Standards in the Climate Regime: The Greenhouse Gas Protocol.” Business 
& Politics 12, no. 3 (2010): 1-37. 
Gronewold, Nathaniel. “The Big Four of Accounting Will be Among the Big Winners if U.S. Adopts 
Climate Law.” New York Times, July 7, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/07/07climatewire-the-big-four-of-accounting-will-
be-among-the-77758.html. 
Gross, Rob, and Ian Bragg. “The Financial Crisis: An Environmental, Social and Governance 
Perspective.” CR Strategies, June 5, 2009. http://crstrategies.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/financialcrisis-anesgperspective-cr-strategies-june2009.pdf. 
Haas, Peter M. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.” 
International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 1-35. 
Harmes, Adam. “The Limits of Carbon Disclosure: Theorizing the Business Case for Investor 
 
  195 
Environmentalism.” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 2 (2011): 96-119. 
———. Unseen Power: How Mutual Funds Threaten the Political and Economic Wealth of Nations. 
Toronto: Stoddart, 2001. 
Haufler, Virginia. A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global 
Economy. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001. 
———. Dangerous Commerce: Insurance and the Management of International Risk. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997. 
Hawkes, Alex. “Big Four Auditors Face OFT Consultation.” The Guardian, May 17, 2011. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/may/17/big-four-auditors-face-oft-consultation. 
Hays, Daniel, and Caroline McDonald. “Downgrades Loom as Katrina Loss Grows.” National 
Underwriter Property and Casualty, September 19, 2005. 
Hessling, Alexandra. “Cognitive Shifts in Regulation: The Role of Ignorance in the Regulatory Fields 
of Accounting.” In Towards a Cognitive Mode in Global Finance: The Governance of a 
Knowledge-Based Financial System, edited by Torsten Strulik and Helmut Willke, 178-208. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
Hillman, Amy, and Michael Hitt. “Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A Model of Approach, 
Participation, and Strategy.” The Academy of Management Review 24, no. 4 (October 1999): 
825-842. 
HM Government, and ABI. “ABI/Government Statement on Flooding and Insurance for England.” 
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, July 20, 2008. 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/flooding/policy/insurance/jointstatement.htm. 
Hoffman, Andrew, and Stephanie Bertels. “Who is Part of the Environmental Movement?.” In Good 
Cop Bad Cop: Environmental NGOs and their Strategies Towards Business, edited by 
Thomas, P Lyon, 48-69. Washington D.C.: RFF Press, 2010. 
IAIS. “About the IAIS.” International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2010. 
http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=28. 
———. “International Association of Insurance Supervisors.” Improving Insurance Supervision, 
2011. http://www.iaisweb.org/. 
———. “Principles on Capital Adequacy and Solvency.” International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors, January 2002. 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Principles_on_capital_adequacy_and_solvency.pdf. 
IASB. “About the IASB.” International Accounting Standards Board, 2010. 
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+IASB/IFRSs+around+the +world.htm. 
———. “An Improved Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting,” May 2008. 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/464C50D6-00FD-4BE7-A6FF-
1BEAD353CD97/0/conceptual_framework_exposure_draft.pdf. 
———. “Emissions Trading Schemes: Background and History.” IASB, June 2010. 
http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/A6F56527-957F-4614-B3DE-
A7EE5F4D4A1C/0/Background_historyETS.pdf. 
———. “IASC Foundation Constitution.” IASB, 2000. 
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/2007revisedconstitution.pdf. 
———. “Monitoring Board.” Governance and Accountability, December 30, 2010. 
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/Governance+and+accountability/Monitoring+Board.ht
m. 
———. “Use Around the World.” International Accounting Standards Board, 2011. 
http://www.ifrs.org/use+around+the+world/use+around+the+world.htm. 
IASB Staff. “IAS 37 Redeliberation: Distinguishing Between a Liability and a Business Risk 
(Agenda Paper 3b).” IASB, 2009. http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/0D962775-6DFA-
 
  196 
4D79-9438-3EABC67AD57C/0/Agendapaper3AIAS37redeliberationsCovernote.pdf, 
IIGCC. “A Climate for Change: A Trustee's Guide for Understanding and Addressing Climate 
Change Risk.” Institutional Investor Group on Climate Change, January 2005. 
http://www.iigcc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/262/A_climate_for_change.pdf. 
INCR. “About INCR.” Ceres, 2008. http://www.incr.com/Page.aspx?pid=261. 
———. “Investor Network on Climate Risk Action Plan: Capitalizing the New Energy Future: 
Minimizing Climate Risks, Seizing Opportunities.” Ceres, 2005. 
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/Investor%20Network%20on%20Climate%20Risk%20
Action%20Plan.pdf. 
———. “Investor Summit on Climate Risk.” INCR, April 25, 2011. 
http://www.incr.com/Page.aspx?pid=1186. 
———. “Supplemental Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure.” INCR, 
November 23, 2009. 
http://www.ceres.org/files/Supplemental_Climate_Risk_Petition_Nov_23_2009.pdf/at_downl
oad/file. 
Jagers, Sverker, Matthew Paterson, and Johannes Stripple. “Privatising Governance, Practising 
Triage: Securitization of Insurance Risks and the Politics of Global Warming.” In Business in 
International Environmental Politics: A Political Economy Approach, edited by David, L 
Levy, Peter Newell, and Matthew Paterson. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 
Jagers, Sverker, and Johannes Stripple. “Climate Governance Beyond the State.” Global Governance 
9, no. 3 (2003): 385–400. 
Johnson, Sarah. “Audit Costs Not Affected by Big Four's Stronghold: GAO.” CFO.com, January 14, 
2008. http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10522661. 
Jones, Aled. “Transformational Change Model: Acheiving a Low Climate Risk Economy.” 
University of Cambridge Programme For Sustainability Leadership, 2009. 
http://www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/pdf/CPSL_Trans_Change%20_summary.pdf. 
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
Keohane, Robert, and Helen Milner. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Kern, Brian. “RMS Withdraws Five-Year Hurricane Model From Florida.” Insurance Journal, May 
18, 2007. 
King, Andrew, Michael Lenox, and Michael Barnett. “Strategic Responses to the Reputation 
Commons Problem.” In Organizations, Policy and the Natural Environment: Institutional 
and Strategic Perspectives, edited by Andrew Hoffman and M Ventresca, 393-406. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2002. 
Kolk, Ans, David Levy, and Jonathan Pinkse. “Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate 
Regime: The Institutionalization and Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure.” European 
Accounting Review 17, no. 4 (2008): 719-745. 
Kossey, Alexandre, and Phillippe Ambrosi. “States and Trends of the Carbon Market.” World Bank, 
May 2010. 
KPMG. “Climate Change and Sustainability Services.” KPMG, 2010. 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/WhatWeDo/Advisory/Risk-Compliance/Internal-
Audit/Climate-Change-Sustainability-Services/Pages/default.aspx. 
Kunreuther, Howard, and O. Michel-Kerjan, Erwann. At War with the Weather: Managing Large-
Scale Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009. 
Kunreuther, Howard C., and Erwann Michel-Kerjan. “Climate Change, Insurability of Large-Scale 
Disasters and The Emerging Liability Challenge.” National Bureau of Economic Research, 
 
  197 
January 2007. 
Lamberton, Geoff. “Sustainability Accounting: A Brief History.” Accounting Forum, no. 29 (2005): 
7-26. 
Leggett, Jeremy. “Climate Change and the Insurance Industry: Solidarity Among the Risk 
Community.” Greenpeace, May 24, 1993. 
Leggett, Jeremy K. The Carbon War. London: Routledge, 2001. 
Lehmann, Evan. “Sudden Revolt by Insurance Regulators Scales Back Climate Rule on Industry.” 
New York Times, March 30, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/03/30/30climatewire-
sudden-revolt-by-insurance-regulators-scales-8154.html. 
Lehmann, R. J. “A Catastrophic Battle.” Best's Review, October 10, 2006. 
Leonardo, Martinez-Diaz, “Strategic Experts and Improvising Regulators: Explaining the IASC's Rise 
to Global Influence, 1973-2001.” Business and Politics 7, no. 3 (2005). 
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol7/iss3/art3. 
Levi-Faur, David. “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism.” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 598, no. 12 (2005): 12-32. 
Levy, David L., and Peter J. Newell. “Business Strategy and International Environmental 
Governance.” Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 4 (2002): 84-100. 
Lewis, Ken. “Remarks to the North Carolina Emerging Issues Forum, "North Carolina's Energy 
Futures: Realizing a State of Opportunity.” Bank of America, February 12, 2008. 
http://mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1383078&highlight=. 
Llewellyn, Robert. “Time to Stop Living off the Earth's Capital - Before it's all Used Up.” Western 
Mail, November 25, 2010. http://www.walesonline.co.uk/business-in-wales/business-
news/2010/11/25/accountants-chief-talks-in-cardiff-on-sustainability-91466-27711514/. 
Lovell, Heather, and Donald MacKenzie. “Accounting for Carbon: The Role of Accounting 
Professional Organisations in Governing Climate Change.” Antipode 43, no. 3 (2011): 704-
731. 
Macleod, Michael, and Jacob Park. “Financial Activism and Global Climate Change: The Rise of 
Investor-Driven Governance Networks.” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 2 (2011): 54-
74. 
MacLeod, Michael. “Private Governance and Climate Change: Institutional Investors and Emerging 
Investor-Driven Governance Mechanisms.” St Antony's International Review 5, no. 2 (2010): 
46-65. 
May, Jakki. “Climate Change - Green For Go.” Post Magazine, November 20, 2008. 
Miller, Peter, and Anthony Hopwood. “Accounting as a Social and Institutional Practice: An 
Introduction.” In Accounting as a Social and Institutional Practice, 1-40. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Miller, Peter, and Ted O'Leary. “Accounting and The Construction of the Governable Person.” 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 12, no. 3 (1987): 235-265. 
Mills, Evan. “A Global Review of Insurance Industry Responses to Climate Change.” The Geneva 
Papers 34 (2009): 323-359. 
———. “From Risk to Opportunity - Insurer Responses to Climate Change.” Ceres, November 2007. 
———. “From Risk to Opportunity: Insurer Responses to Climate Change.” Ceres, April 2009. 
Mills, Evan, and Eugene Lecomte. “Availability and Affordability of Insurance Under Climate 
Change: A Growing Threat for the U.S..” Ceres, September 8, 2005. 
———. “From Risk to Opportunity: How Insurers can Proactively and Profitably Manage Climate 
Change.” Ceres, August 2006. 
Mills, Evan, Eugene Lecomte, and Andrew Peara. “U.S. Insurance Perspectives on Global Climate 
 
  198 
Change.” Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, U.S, Department of Energy, University of 
California, 2001. http://evanmills.lbl.gov/pubs/pdf/climate_report.pdf. 
NAIC. “About the NAIC.” National Association of Insurance Commissioners, November 1, 2010. 
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm. 
Newell, Peter, and Matthew Paterson. Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation 
of the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Nicholls, Mark. “S&P To Integrate Climate Risk into Credit Ratings.” Environmental Finance, 
February 16, 2011. http://www.environmental-finance.com/news/view/1550. 
Nolke, Andreas. “The Politics of Accounting Regulation: Responses to the Subprime Crisis.” In 
Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change, edited by Eric 
Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari, and Hubert Zimmermann, 37-55. London: Routledge, 2009. 
Nolke, Andreas, and James Perry. “The Power of Transnational Private Governance: Financialization 
and the IASB.” Business & Politics 9, no. 3 (2007): 1-34. 
OSFI. “Property and Casualty Insurance Companies Section.” Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions Canada, November 1, 2010. http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/osfi/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=178. 
Paterson, Matthew. “Legitimation and Accumulation in Climate Change Governance.” New Political 
Economy 15, no. 3 (2010): 345-366. 
———. “Risky Business: Insurance Companies in Global Warming Politics.” Global Environmental 
Politics 1, no. 4 (2001): 18-41. 
Pattberg. Private Institutions and Global Governance: The New Politics of Environmental Stability. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007. 
Pattberg, Phillip. “The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and Nonprofit 
Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules.” Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration, and Institutions 18, no. 4 (2005): 589-610. 
“Payments for Ecosystem Services: A Primer.” Forest Trends, The Katoomba Group, UNEP, May 
2008. http://www.katoombagroup.org/documents/publications/GettingStarted.pdf. 
Perry, James, and Andreas Nolke. “The Political Economy of International Accounting Standards.” 
Review of International Political Economy 13, no. 4 (2006): 559-586. 
Polcorn, Mattias K. “A Model of an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market.” The Geneva Papers on Risk 
and Insurance 23, no. 1 (2008): 41-48. 
Porter, Tony. “Private authority, Technical Authority, and the Globalization of Accounting 
Standards.” Business and Politics 7, no. 3 (2005): 1–32. 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers. “'Too much regulation' Tops Insurance Risks,” May 2007. 
http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/Content/Detail.asp?ReleaseID=2350&NewsAreaID=2. 
———. “Building Trust in Emissions Reporting: Global Trends in Emissions Trading Schemes,” 
2007. http://www.pwc.com/en_KH/kh/publications/assets/building-trust-in-emissions-
reporting-final.pdf. 
———. “Global Sustainability.” PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2010. 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/sustainability. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “ClimateWise Principles: Third Independent Review 2010.” ClimateWise, 
2010. 
Rees, Joseph. Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile 
Island. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
Richardson, Benjamin J. Environmental Regulation Through Financial Organisations. London: 
Kluwer Law International, 2002. 
Rivera, Joseph, and Peter De Leon. “Is Greener Whiter? The Sustainable Slopes Program and 
Voluntary Environmental Performance of Western Ski Slopes.” Policy Studies Journal 34 
 
  199 
(2004): 195-221. 
Ronit, Karsten, and Volker Schneider. “Private Organizations and Their Contribution to Problem-
Solving in the Global Arena.” In Private Organizations, edited by Karsten Ronit and Volker 
Schneider. London: Routledge, 2000. 
Ronit, Karsten, and Schneider Volker. “Global Governance Through Private-Organizations..” 
Governance: International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions 12, no. 3 (1999): 
243-266. 
Rowlands, Ian H. The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change. Issues in Environmental Politics. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995. 
Ruggie, John. “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors and Practices.” European 
Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (2004): 499-531. 
Schmidheiny, Stephan, and Federico Zorraquin. Financing Change: The Financial Community, Eco-
efficiency, and Sustainable Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 
Simmons, Beth. “The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market 
Regulation.” International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 589-620. 
Sinclair, Timothy. “An Institutional Approach to the Politics of Global Finance.” In Towards a 
Cognitive Mode in Global Finance: The Governance of a Knowledge-Based Financial 
System, edited by Torsten Strulik and Helmut Willke, 103-130. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007. 
———. The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of 
Creditworthiness. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
Singh, Rachel. “Calls for Global Standard on Carbon Reporting Grow.” Accountancy Age, December 
7, 2009. http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1748283/calls-global-standard-carbon-
reporting-grow. 
———. “Cracks Appear in Carbon Emissions Accounting.” Accountancy Age, November 12, 2009. 
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1750852/cracks-appear-carbon-emissions-
accounting. 
Smith, Jeffrey, A., Matthew Morreale, and Michael E. Mariani. “Climate Change Disclosure: Moving 
Towards a Brave New World.” Capital Markets Law Journal 3, no. 4 (2008): 469-485. 
Strange, Susan. States and Markets. London: Pinter Publishers, 1988. 
———. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Strulik, Torsten. “Introduction.” In Towards a Cognitive Mode in Global Finance: The Governance 
of a Knowledge-Based Financial System, 9-35. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
Sutter, Daniel. “Policy Uncertainty and the Market for Wind Insurance.” Mercatus Centre, George 
Washington University, June 2009. 
The Climate Group. “The Climate Principles: A Framework for the Finance Sector.” The Climate 
Group, 2008. 
The Climate Registry. “Mission,” May 2011. http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/mission/. 
, The Prince of Wales. “A Speech by HRH The Prince of Wales to launch the Insurance Sector 
"ClimateWise Principles",” London, UK, September 12, 2007. 
Thistlethwaite, Jason. “Counting the Environment: The Environmental Implications of International 
Accounting Standards.” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 2 (2011): 75-97. 
———. “Head of Sustainability and Energy Risk Management North America, Swiss Re,” February 
12, 2010. 
Torrance, Andrew. “Letter from the Chairman of ClimateWise to UNFCCC Negotiators in Cancun.” 
ClimateWise, December 2010. 
Towers Perrin. “2005 Catastrophe Losses Katrina/Rita/Wilma.” Towers Perrin Reinsurance Market 
 
  200 
Services, November 4, 2005. 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=REIN/USA/2005/200511/Hurricane
_Report_11_04_05.pdf. 
Trucost. “Carbon Risks and Opportunities in the S&P 500.” Investor Responsibility Research Centre 
Institute for Corporate Responsibilities, June 2, 2009. 
http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/irrc_trucost_0906.pdf. 
Tsingou, Eleni. “The Role of Policy Communities in Global Financial Governance: A Critical 
Examination of the Group of Thirty.” In Towards a Cognitive Mode in Global Finance: The 
Governance of a Knowledge-Based Financial System, edited by Torsten Strulik and Helmut 
Willke, 212-235. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
———. “Transnational Governance Networks in the Regulation of Finance - The Making of Global 
Regulation and Supervision Standards in the Banking Industry.” In Theoretical Perspectives 
on Business and Global Governance: Bridging Theoretical Divides, edited by Morten 
Ougaard and Anna Leander. London: Routledge, 2010. 
Tweedie, David, Sir, and Leslie Seidman. “Interview with Sir David Tweedie and Leslie Seidman 
regarding the timeline for completiing the convergence programme.”  Interview by Mark 
Byatt, April 14, 2011. 
http://www.ifrs.org/News/Announcements+and+Speeches/IASB+FASB+interview.htm. 
UK Corporate Leaders Group. “UK CLG.” University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability 
Leadership, May 30, 2011. http://www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/Leaders-Groups/The-Prince-of-Wales-
Corporate-Leaders-Group-on-Climate-Change/UK-CLG.aspx. 
UNEP FI. “About UNEP FI: Background,” April 21, 2011. 
http://www.unepfi.org/about/background/index.html. 
———. “The Global State of Sustainable Insurance.” Insurance Working Group United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative, October 2009. 
UNEP-FI. “CEO Briefing: Demystifying Materiality: Hardwiring Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services into Finance.” UNEP-FI, October 2010. 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/CEO_DemystifyingMateriality.pdf. 
USCAP. “Issue Overview: Comparison of Emissions Targets.” United States Climate Action 
Partnership, March 2009. http://www.us-
cap.org/upload/file/FINAL%20USCAP%20Issue%20Brief%20Target%20Comparison.pdf. 
Utting, Peter. “Regulating Business via Multistakeholder Initiatives: A Preliminary Assessment.” In 
Voluntary Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility: Readings and Resources Guide, 
edited by R Jenkins, P Utting, and R.A. Pino, 61-130. Geneva: NGLS, 2002. 
———. “Social and Environmental Liabilities of Transnational Corporations: New Directions, 
Opportunities and Constraints.” In Corporate Accountability and Sustainable Development, 
92-119. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
———. “The Struggle for Corporate Accountability.” Development and Change 39, no. 6 (2008): 
959 - 975. 
Véron, Nicolas, Matthieu Autret, and Alfred Galichon. Smoke & Mirrors, Inc: Accounting For 
Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. 
Wapner, Paul. “Governance in Global Civil Society.” In Global Governance: Drawing Insights from 
Environmental Experience, edited by Oran Young, 65-84. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. 
Warner, Koko, Thomas Loster, and Michael Zissener. “Vulnerable Countries and People: How 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance Can Help Manage the Risks of Climate Change.” 
United Nations University, 2009. http://www.climate-
insurance.org/upload/pdf/MCII_Policy_Brief.pdf. 
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Los Angeles: University of 
 
  201 
California Press, 1978. 
Weber, Olaf, Scholz, Roland W., and Georg Michalik. “Incorporating Sustainability Criteria into 
Credit Risk Management.” Business Strategy and the Environment 10, no. 1002 (2008): 1-30. 
Wells, Michael. “International Financial Reporting Standards,” January 2011. 
http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/272B5170-BF00-4B46-95EF-
2BEE10024ECF/0/Typicalvisitingstudentspresentation.pdf. 
Woods, Ngaire, and Walter Mattli. “In Whose Benefit?.” In The Politics of Global Regulation, edited 
by Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, 1-43. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 
WRI and WBCSD. “The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Accounting and Reporting 
Standard.” World Resources Institute and World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, 2001. http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghg-protocol-2001.pdf. 
Wright, Christopher, and Alexis Rwabizambuga. “Institutional Pressures, Corporate Reputation, and 
Voluntary Codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator Principles.” Business and 
Society Review 111, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 89-117. 
Young, Beth, Celine Suarez, and Kimberly Gladman. “Climate Risk Disclosure in SEC Filings: An 
Analysis of 10-K Reporting by Oil and Gas, Insurance, Coal, Transportation and Electric 
Power Companies.” Ceres and Environmental Defense Fund, June 2009. 
 
 
